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Abstract
Political inclusion of migrants is at the heart of contested scholarly and
political debate. The increasing diversity of European democracies and the
exclusion of a large part of the resident population from the political process
raise questions about social cohesion and the quality of democracy. In the
absence of voting rights for migrant residents, associations are often consid-
ered as an alternative for voice, representing migrants and defending their
interest in the political process. Yet, little is known about the conditions
favoring the political inclusion of migrant associations.
Studies on migrants associations tend to consider migrant organizations
as discrete units acting independently from each other. Yet, migrant as-
sociations do not act in a vacuum and are embedded in webs of relations
as well as in a wider political context. Social movement scholars implicitly
acknowledge an interaction between institutional and relational context in
aﬀecting collective action, but studies analyzing this interaction are scarce.
Considering only one of the two structures in which associations are embed-
ded might lead to wrong conclusions as to what fosters political inclusion.
Thus, the objective of this study is twofold. First it attempts to link two
traditions in the social movement literature: the political opportunity the-
ory and the relational approach. Second, it aims at furthering our knowledge
on the mechanisms linking the embeddedness of migrants associations in an
institutional and a relational context and their political inclusion.
Empirically, this study analyzes network structures in the ﬁeld of immi-
gration and the political inclusion of migrant organizations in Lyon and in
Zurich. To analyze network structures the study draws on a relational ap-
proach to social movements that provides useful tools for comparing networks
across contexts by deﬁning a typology of modes of coordination of collective
action. Modes of coordination are the mechanisms through which resources
are allocated within collectivities but also how collective representation are
elaborated as well as collective identities. The speciﬁc opportunities in the
ﬁeld of immigration draw on the citizenship approaches of nation-states to
deﬁne the opportunities in the ﬁeld. Two dimensions of political opportuntiy
structures are deﬁned. An institutional dimension, which refers to the rights
and duties oﬀered to immigrants as well as the institutional channels avail-
able to them, but also resources to actors acting in the ﬁeld. The cultural
dimension refers to the notions of citizenship and national identity that act as
discursive opportunities and provide public recognition of diﬀerent identities
in the ﬁeld. The main argument of this study is that the speciﬁc institutional
and discursive opportunities in the ﬁeld of immigration aﬀect the network
structure of migrant organizations and that the political inclusion of migrant
organizations is aﬀected by the interaction of both structures.
Drawing on the social movement literature, this study analyzes the eﬀect
of the speciﬁc opportunity structure in the ﬁeld of immigration on network
structure and the political inclusion of migrant organizations. The results
show that migrant organizations adapt to the speciﬁc opportunities when
creating alliances, and the networks that emerge vary between the cities
under study. Indeed, associations tend to create alliances on the basis of their
access to institutional channels, and the publicly recognized identities in the
ﬁeld. Moreover, it shows that the interaction of the opportunity structure
and the network structure aﬀects political inclusion of migrant associations.
Indeed, the embeddedness of associations in similar relational structures has
diﬀerent outcomes for political inclusion according to the context.
The study concludes by stating that analyzing the interaction of speciﬁc
political opportunity structures and network structures is necessary to get
a better understanding of the conditions favoring or hindering the political
inclusion of migrant organizations.
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Résumé
L'inclusion politique des migrants fait l'objet de débats controversés aussi
bien dans le milieu académique que dans la sphère politique. La diversité
grandissante des démocraties européennes et l'exclusion du processus poli-
tique d'une grande partie de la population résidente soulèvent des questions
quant à la cohésion sociale et la qualité de la démocratie. En l'absence
de droit de vote pour les migrants résidents, les associations sont souvent
considérées comme une alternative à l'expression des migrants ainsi qu'à la
défense de leurs intérêts dans le processus politique. Cependant, les condi-
tions favorisant l'inclusion politique des associations de migrants sont peu
connues. Les études sur les associations de migrants tendent à les considérer
comme des unités distinctes, agissant indépendamment les unes des autres.
Toutefois, les associations de migrants n'agissent pas dans le vide ; elles sont
incorporées dans un réseau de relations ainsi que dans un contexte politique
plus large. Les spécialistes des mouvements sociaux reconnaissent implicite-
ment que l'interaction du contexte institutionnel avec le contexte relationnel
peut aﬀecter l'action collective, mais les études analysant cette interaction
restent rares. Ne considérer qu'une seule des deux structures dans lesquelles
les associations de migrants sont incorporées peut mener à des conclusions
erronées sur ce qui favorise l'inclusion politique. Ainsi, l'objectif de cette
étude est double. Premièrement, elle tente de combiner deux traditions de
la littérature sur les mouvements sociaux: la théorie des opportunités poli-
tiques et l'approche relationnelle. Deuxièmement, elle a pour objectif de
développer nos connaissances des mécanismes reliant l'incorporation des as-
sociations de migrants dans un contexte institutionnel et relationnel et leur
inclusion politique.
Au niveau empirique, cette étude analyse les structures de réseau dans le
champ de l'immigration et l'inclusion politique des associations de migrants
à Lyon et à Zurich. Aﬁn d'analyser ces réseaux, elle s'appuie sur l'approche
relationnelle des mouvements sociaux. Celle-ci oﬀre des outils utiles pour la
comparaison de réseaux dans diﬀérents contextes en déﬁnissant une typologie
des modes de coordination de l'action collective. Les modes de coordination
renvoient aux mécanismes à travers lesquels les ressources sont aﬀectées au
sein des collectivités, mais également à la manière dont les représentations
ainsi que les identités collectives sont élaborées. Les opportunités spéciﬁques
dans le champ de l'immigration se basent sur les approches de la citoyenneté
des état-nations pour déﬁnir les opportunités Deux dimensions des opportu-
nités sont déﬁnies. La dimension institutionnelle se réfère aux droits et aux
devoirs des migrants ainsi qu'aux accès institutionnels dont ils disposent.
Celle-ci prévoit les accès institutionnels mais également les ressources des
acteurs agissant dans le champ de l'immigration. La dimension culturelle
fait référence aux notions de citoyenneté et d'identité nationale qui agis-
sent comme des opportunités discursives et prévoit la reconnaissance de dif-
férentes identités dans le champ de l'immigration. L'argument principal de
cette étude est que les opportunités spéciﬁques institutionnelles et discursives
dans le champ de l'immigration ont un eﬀet sur la structure des réseaux des
associations de migrants et que l'inclusion politique de celles-ci dépend de
l'interaction des deux structures.
Faisant appel à la littérature sur les mouvements sociaux, cette étude
analyse l'eﬀet des structures d'opportunités politiques spéciﬁques dans le
champ de l'immigration sur les réseaux d'associations des migrants et leur
inclusion politique. Les résultats montrent que les associations de migrants
s'adaptent aux opportunités spéciﬁques en créant des alliances et que les
réseaux qui se forment varient d'un contexte à l'autre. En eﬀet, les asso-
ciations tendent à créer des alliances sur la base de leur accès aux canaux
institutionnels et des identités reconnues publiquement dans le champ. De
plus, les résultats montrent que l'interaction des structures d'opportunités
et de la structure du réseau a un eﬀet sur l'inclusion politique des migrants.
En eﬀet, l'incorporation des associations dans des structures relationnelles
similaires a diﬀérentes conséquences selon le contexte.
Cette étude conclut en déclarant que l'analyse de l'interaction des op-
portunités politiques spéciﬁques et des structures de réseau est nécessaire
pour une meilleure compréhension des conditions favorisant ou empêchant
l'inclusion politique des associations de migrants.
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Riassunto
L'inclusione politica dei migranti è al centro del dibattito scientiﬁco e
politico. La diversità in progressivo aumento delle democrazie europee e
l'esclusione di una vasta parte della popolazione residente dai processi politici
sollevano importanti questioni inerenti la coesione sociale da un lato e la qual-
ità della democrazia dall'altro.In assenza del diritto di voto per gli immigrati
residenti, le associazioni sono spesso considerate una possibile alternativa di
protesta, rappresentando i migranti e difendendone i diritti nel corso del
processo politico. Tuttavia, le condizioni che favoriscono l'inclusione sociale
delle associazioni di migranti sono state ancora poco esplorate.
Le ricerche sulle associazioni di immigrati tendono a considerarle orga-
nizzazioni isolate che agiscono indipendentemente l'una dall'altra. Ciononos-
tante, esse non agiscono in un vacuum, sono piuttosto integrate in relazioni
di rete così come in un più ampio contesto politico. Gli studiosi di movimenti
sociali d'altro canto assumono implicitamente l'esistenza di una interazione
tra contesto istituzionale e relazionale in grado di inﬂuenzare l'azione collet-
tiva, ma gli studi che analizzano speciﬁcamente tale interazione sono ancora
poco numerosi. Prendere in considerazione solo una delle due strutture in cui
le associazioni sono inserite potrebbe portare a conclusioni errate circa ciò
che promuove l'inclusione politica. Per queste ragioni, gli obiettivi di questo
lavoro sono duplici. Prima di tutto cerca di unire due tradizioni della letter-
atura sui movimenti sociali: la teoria dell'opportunità politica e l'approccio
relazionale. In secondo luogo, mira ad approfondire la nostra conoscenza dei
meccanismi che legano le associazioni di migranti, esaminate nel contesto
politico e relazionale in cui sono inserite, e la loro inclusione politica.
Da un punto di vista empirico questa ricerca analizza le strutture di rete
nel campo dell'immigrazione e dell'inclusione politica delle organizzazioni
di migranti a Lione e Zurigo. Per analizzare le strutture di rete si basa
sull'approccio relazionale ai movimenti sociali che fornisce utili strumenti di
comparazione delle reti attraverso i vari contesti deﬁnendo una tipologia degli
stili di coordinamento dell'azione collettiva. Gli stili di coordinamento sono
i meccanismi attraverso cui si allocano le risorse all'interno delle collettività,
ma permettono di stabilire anche come le rappresentazioni e le identità collet-
tive siano elaborate. Le opportunità speciﬁche nel campo dell'immigrazione
si basano sugli approcci di cittadinanza degli stati-nazione per deﬁnire le op-
portunità nel campo. Saranno deﬁnite due dimensioni di opportunità. Una
dimensione istituzionale, che riguarda i diritti e i doveri di cui gli immigrati
sono portatori, e i canali istituzionali di cui possono avvalersi, ad anche le
risorse disponibili per gli attori attivi sul campo. La dimensione culturale
fa riferimento ai concetti di cittadinanza e identità nazionale che agiscono
come opportunità discorsive e oﬀrono riconoscimento pubblico alle diﬀerenti
identità culturali in campo. La tesi principale di questa ricerca è che le oppor-
tunità istituzionali e discorsive nel campo dell'immigrazione inﬂuenzino gli
stili di coordinamento dell'azione collettiva delle organizzazioni di immigrati
e che la loro inclusione politica sia a sua volta inﬂuenzata dall'interazione di
entrambe le strutture.
Poggiandosi sulla letteratura dei movimenti sociali, questa ricerca anal-
izza gli eﬀetti della speciﬁca struttura di opportunità nel campo dell'immigrazione
sulle strutture relazionali e sull'inclusione politica delle organizzazioni dei mi-
granti. I risultati mostrano che le organizzazioni di immigrati si adattano
alle speciﬁche opportunità creando alleanze e i network emersi variano tra
le due città studiate. Cionondimeno, le associazioni tendono a creare al-
leanze sulla base degli accessi ai canali istituzionali e sulla base delle identità
pubblicamente riconosciute sul campo. Inoltre, questa ricerca mostra che
l'interazione fra la struttura delle opportunità e la struttura relazionale in-
ﬂuenza l'inclusione politica delle associazioni di migranti. L'inserimento di
associazioni in contesti relazionali simili ha esiti diversi in termini di inclu-
sione politica a seconda del contesto.
La ricerca evidenzia quindi che analizzare l'interazione sia delle speciﬁche
strutture di opportunità politica e sia delle speciﬁche strutture relazionali è
necessario per poter comprendere le condizioni che favoriscono od ostacolano
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1.1 Aims and research questions
This study focuses on the eﬀect of political opportunity structures on ﬁelds
of migrant organizations, and on the consequences for collective action of ac-
tors embedded in these structures. More precisely, it aims at understanding
the underlying mechanisms linking institutional structures, network struc-
tures and collective action and their consequences for the political inclusion
of migrant organizations. More precisely, its aim is to understand the mech-
anisms favoring or hindering their political participation in the receiving
society. The study analyzes how the institutional context aﬀects the net-
work structure in the ﬁeld of immigration and how the interaction of these
two structures impacts political inclusion of migrant associations. Empiri-
cally, it looks at the networks in the ﬁeld of immigration in Lyon and Zurich
and at the political participation of migrant organizations in these cities.
The issue of political integration of migrants has become an important
political and scholarly debate (Bloemraad, 2006; Fennema and Tillie, 2001,
1999; Giugni and Passy, 2006; Ireland, 1994; Koopmans et al., 2005; Morales
and Giugni, 2011b; Portes and Zhou, 1993; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad,
2008a). Previously, integration has been studied mainly in its economical,
social and cultural dimensions, particularly in Northern European countries,
where immigrants were long considered as only temporary residents who
would return to their homeland. As immigrants settled, the question of
their integration in the decision-making process started to become salient.
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Indeed, few European countries are granting immigrants voting rights. Thus,
a large part of the resident population is excluded from the political sphere.
The growing diversity of Western democracies and the exclusion of a large
part of the resident population has raised the question of migrants' politi-
cal inclusion and of how immigration policies can foster migrants' political
involvement in the host society. The exclusion from the political arena of
a large part of the population not only raises questions about the quality
of democracy, but can also have negatives eﬀects on democratic politics as
well as social cohesion. To address these issues, the question of granting
migrants voting rights has been debated in many European democracies.
In France, for example, the socialist government is attempting to introduce
voting rights for migrants at the local level since the 80's. In Switzerland,
while some cantons grant migrants with voting rights, it is a recurrent issue
in those which do not. Popular initiatives were launched in diﬀerent cantons
- such as Zurich - that were rejected by voters. However, 8 cantons out of
26 grant migrants voting right at the local level.
As mentioned previously, the absence of voting rights of a large share
of the resident populations can have negative consequences for democratic
politics. Indeed, it weakens the process of political representation and the
legitimacy of political authorities. Moreover, the political exclusion of mi-
grants is likely to spill over to their social and economic integration, as the
policy process will fail to address adequately their needs in these domains
(Morales and Giugni, 2011a).
This raises the question of the quality of democracy, when considered in
its participatory dimension and in terms of access to decision-making pro-
cesses. Participation in the political sphere is by no means limited to voting
activities and migrants can access the political sphere through associations.
Migrants' associations can serve as vectors of migrants' interests and rep-
resent them in the political process. The integrative potential of migrants'
associations is widely emphasized by state actors. However, the means to
deal with migrants' associations is highly contested. Should states favor
migrants organizing processes by actively encouraging associations by pro-
viding funds or let migrants organize by themselves? Which policies favor
associations' capacity of representing migrants and defend their interests?
Moreover, not all associations in general, and migrants' associations in par-
ticular, do engage in political activities and are able to make their voice
2
heard. The question of why some migrants engage in political activities
and others do not remains an open one, as well as the question of the most
eﬃcient policy favoring their political participation.
Since Tocqueville, the density and variety of civil society are considered
as conditions for a democracy to work. In this perspective, social integration
through associations is necessary for democratic institutions to work (Put-
nam, 1993, 2000, 2007). Many scholars addressed this issue and showed the
positive outcomes of a developed associational life on the quality of democ-
racy. Associations are increasing the level of political participation (Verba
et al., 1995), but they also increase the social capital of its members and thus
the general level of trust in a society (Putnam, 1993, 2000, 2007). There is
in this literature a consensus about Tocqueville's view that viability of a
democracy depends on the robustness of its associational life. Associations
are said to provide representation, as well as means of resistance. In terms
of political equality, associations allow for voice for the disadvantaged by the
existing distribution of power (Warren, 2001).
Following this line of reasoning, works on migrants' integration empha-
size the positive outcomes of associations for social, cultural, and political
integration of immigrants (Schmitter, 1980; Fennema and Tillie, 1999, 2001;
Vertovec, 1999; Odmalm, 2004; Vermeulen, 2005; Pilati, 2008; Portes et al.,
2008). Such organizations are considered important for immigrants' partic-
ipation and integration in the host society. This importance can be traced
back to the fact that these associations provide services for newcomers'
settlement, welfare services for settled immigrants, but they can also pro-
vide immigrants with access to the local political community and help them
in maintaining ties with their homeland (Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005a).
More generally, migrants' organizations are said to provide immigrants with
social and cultural resources, favoring their integration and participation in
the host society or helping them in maintaining their identity.
Studies on immigrants' political integration also emphasized the positive
eﬀects of immigrants' associations on political participation. At the individ-
ual level, membership in associations (ethnic and non-ethnic) favors political
participation of immigrants (Jacobs and Tillie, 2004; Morales and Giugni,
2011b). Associations endow individuals with resources such as civic skills,
social capital or group consciousness. At the community level, Fennema
and Tillie (1999) showed the positive eﬀect of associations, through their
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networks and the resources they provide for political integration. Following
Putnam's (1993) work on social capital, they explain levels of political par-
ticipation of migrants at the group level in Amsterdam, by the density of
ethnic organizational networks and their level of trust in the members of the
community they belong to. To do so, they looked at the network of ethnic
organizations and suggested that denser ethnic organizational networks fa-
vor the political participation (electoral participation in local elections) of
ethnic groups. Indeed, a denser ethnic civic community increases trust and
mutual reciprocity within the community, which spills over to trust in polit-
ical institutions, which in turn favors political participation. Starting from
their study, diﬀerent authors tested the social capital hypothesis of Fennema
and Tillie by applying it at diﬀerent local contexts (see the special issue of
the JEMS edited by Jacobs and Tillie, 2004; Morales, 2011). These authors
looked at immigrants' membership in voluntary organizations and its link
to political participation from an individual perspective and showed that
membership in voluntary associations spurs political participation.
However, the approach based on Putnam's social capital considers that
more participation makes citizens more virtuous, and that participation in-
creases with trust and reciprocity (Warren, 2001). Yet, associations can
also exclude migrants from the receiving society. Identity-based groups may
increase in-group solidarity, but at the same time, demonize out-groups.
Democracy requires a variety of eﬀects, not just trust and reciprocity, but
also, in diﬀerent contexts, capacities for dissent and resistance (Warren,
2001). As pointed out by several authors (Kymlicka, 1998), there are two
key questions about ethnic associations from the perspective of liberal demo-
cratic citizenship: whether these associations develop the ability to question
authority and whether they are willing to engage in public discourse.
Political inclusion refers to the possibility that some groups have to ac-
cess the institutional channels and make their claims heard, not only through
voting, but also as collective actors. Many authors tend to take the posi-
tive eﬀect of immigrants' organizations on integration and voice for granted.
However, immigrants' organizations could also exclude immigrants from the
host society. Finally, associations may replicate or reinforce existing power
relations among groups (Warren, 2001). So the question remains open, of
to what extent are immigrants' organizations positive for political inclusion
of the migrant population. Indeed, the positive eﬀect of dense networks of
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ethnic associations found in Amsterdam by Fennema and Tillie may not
be observed in other contexts. The multicultural context encourages mi-
grants to organize on an ethnic basis and in this context, dense networks of
ethnic associations may be the appropriate network structure for political in-
tegration. In contrast, in assimilationist countries, where organization on an
ethnic basis is not encouraged, dense ethnic networks may exclude migrants
from the host society or reinforce the existing exclusion.
Thus, context matters. In his account on social capital as a resource for
action, Lin (2001) stresses that dense networks can be useful for preserving
and maintaining valued resources, what he calls expressive actions. Instead,
for instrumental actions, that is the search for obtaining resources that are
not yet in possession of a group, it is more useful to access and extend
bridges. Migrants do not have access to the same resources according to
the context; migrants' associations are embedded in political contexts with
diﬀerent opportunities for participation. Studies on collective claim making
show that multicultural contexts give migrants the legitimacy to intervene in
the public sphere which enhances their level of mobilizations. Other contexts
exclude migrants from the public sphere. Indeed, according to Soysal (1994),
particular policies deﬁne forms of participation that also conﬁgure the collec-
tive patterns of migrants' organizations. Some scholars have addressed this
issue and suggested that the modes of incorporating migrants (i.e., the spe-
ciﬁc political opportunities to the ﬁeld of immigration) shape their political
mobilization (Koopmans et al., 2005; Giugni and Passy, 2006). The political
opportunities have also been shown to impact the nature and continuity or
the formation of immigrants' organizations (Bloemraad, 2005; Schrover and
Vermeulen, 2005a). Few studies also examined how the host society insti-
tutions shape the organizational incorporation of immigrants. They showed
that political institutions can pattern the political organization of groups
through the way in which public resources are provided, through the pro-
cess of selection and expression which gain legitimation by the state, and
through the kinds of representational categories which are oﬃcially recog-
nized (Soysal, 1994).
At the individual level, the context has been shown to aﬀect the role
of migrants' organizations for political integration. Indeed, in some con-
texts, cross-ethnic or non-ethnic organizations play a more important role
in explaining political integration of migrants than do membership in ethnic
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organizations (Jacobs et al., 2004). Using social movement theories to com-
pare levels of political integration of migrants, some authors have taken into
account the eﬀect of the context on political integration and how it aﬀects
migrants' organizations. Testing for the crowding out eﬀect of government
intervention on civil society hypothesized by Tocqueville, Bloemraad (2005)
shows in Boston and Toronto how political intervention favors the number
as well as the diversity of migrants' organizations. The founding and con-
tinuation of migrant organizations have been found to be context dependent
(Vermeulen, 2005). Others show how the mobilizing role of migrants' orga-
nizations, but also the ability of migrants' associations to represent migrants
interest, have an eﬀect on local politics and make their voice heard (Ramakr-
ishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a).
At the organizational level, the political opportunity structure also aﬀects
the integration potential of migrants' organizations. In Milan, characterized
by an ethno-assimilationist model of citizenship, migrants' organizations that
are linked to autochthonous organizations are better integrated politically
than migrant organizations densely related to ethnic organizations (Pilati,
2011). Migrants organized on an ethnic basis are excluded from the political
sphere and autochthonous organizations act as brokers between migrants
and the receiving society's public sphere. Vermeulen and Berger (2008) ,
by comparing the network structure of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam
and Berlin, found a horizontal and densely interconnected network in the
open context of Amsterdam and a hierarchical and fragmented network in
the rather closed context of Berlin. As a consequence, Turks in Amsterdam
are better integrated politically than Turks in Berlin.
These studies point to the importance of taking into account the context
in which migrants are embedded for explaining political inclusion, and more
speciﬁcally, the modes of incorporating migrants. Yet, few studies looked
at why certain organizations play a positive role for integration, are able to
make their voice heard and inﬂuence politics and decision-making and why
others are left out of the process (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a).
Moreover, studies of immigrants' associations usually consider associations
as discrete units, acting independently from other associations. Only few
looked at the networks in which associations are embedded, and when they
do, they tend to focus on one speciﬁc ethnic group. Yet, associations are
not only embedded in speciﬁc political opportunity structures, they are also
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embedded in a context of interaction with other actors. Inter-organizational
networks create constraints and opportunities for collective action (Diani,
2004; Knoke, 1990). In order to understand what resources are available
to immigrants' organizations for political integration, one should take into
account the relational aspect in the ﬁeld of immigration and try to identify
how organizations can access the resources provided by the networks. The
idea that networks provide resources stems from the social capital literature
(Coleman, 1988; Bourdieu, 1980; Putnam, 1993; Lin, 2001), and some au-
thors have demonstrated that diﬀerent network structures provide diﬀerent
type of resources (Lin, 2001). In this vein, the type of resources available to
immigrants' organizations will also depend on how organizations are linked
to each other, on the content of their ties, and on the structure of the whole
network. It is thus important to identify the factors explaining the variations
in the network structure so as to explain diﬀerences in the level of political
inclusion of immigrants' associations.
This discussion raises diﬀerent questions about migrants' associations
and political inclusion. While it underlines the importance of taking into
account the context in which associations are embedded, it also shows how
taking the relational structure into account might improve our knowledge
of the processes favoring migrant's associations' political inclusion. Thus
the research questions are the following: What is the shape of migrants'
organizational networks? Do migrants' organizational networks vary from
one context to the other?, and if so, what accounts for diﬀerent structures
of migrants' organizational networks? Do diﬀerent network structures pro-
vide migrants' associations with diﬀerent resources for political inclusion?
And how does the network structure interact with the context in providing
resources to migrants' organizations?
1.2 Political opportunity theory and the relational
approach to social movements
To answers these questions, this study draws on the social movement liter-
ature, with the attempt to link two traditions in social movement analysis:
the political opportunity theory and the relational approach to social move-
ments. The political opportunity theory posits that the political context and
the political opportunity structure have an impact on the action repertoire,
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on the mobilization level, and on the outcomes of social movements (Tarrow,
1989; Kriesi et al., 1995; Giugni, 2004). They have been deﬁned as signals
to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use
internal resources to form social movements (Tarrow, 1996, p.65). Drawing
on the political opportunity theory, authors dealing with migrants' collective
action developed a theoretical framework for the analysis of claim-making
and formation of collective identities in the ﬁeld of immigration and eth-
nic relations (Koopmans et al., 2005; Giugni and Passy, 2006). They deﬁned
speciﬁc opportunities to the ﬁeld of immigration, drawing on the conceptions
of citizenship and nationhood. This approach allows to overcome a limit of
the traditional political opportunity approach, which focused on the how
of mobilization, and neglected the question of why social movements con-
stitute themselves around speciﬁc collective identities and aims (Koopmans
et al., 2005). Thus, it adds a cultural dimension to the institutional dimen-
sion of political opportunity structures. Hence, speciﬁc opportunities to the
ﬁeld of immigration combine two dimensions: (1) an institutional dimension
which refers to the rights and duties oﬀered to immigrants, as well as to the
resources and institutional channels available to them and (2) a cultural di-
mension referring to the cultural notions of citizenship and national identity,
the discursive opportunities.
Social movement scholars recently started to emphasize the importance
of a relational approach for understanding collective action (McAdam et al.,
2001; Diani and McAdam, 2003; Fligstein and McAdam, 2011). One of these
approaches stresses states that social movements are not mere aggregates of
organizations or protest events, but that they are a characterized by a speciﬁc
relational pattern which distinguishes social movements from other forms of
collective action (Diani, 2003b; Diani and Bison, 2004; Diani, 2011). As a
consequence, in order to identify social movements, the analysis has to be ex-
tended to organizational ﬁelds instead of selecting organizations on the basis
of their speciﬁc interests or the participation in speciﬁc protest events. In
this perspective, social movements are deﬁned as networks of organizations
combining dense resource exchanges with a collective identity. Analyzing
organizational ﬁelds and the relational patterns that take place within these
ﬁelds allows us to identify social movements as opposed to other forms of
collective action. This approach emphasizing the relational dimension of
social movements and its distinction of diﬀerent forms of collective action
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based on the patterns of relations in which associations are embedded, this
approach oﬀers useful tools for the analysis of migrants' organizational net-
works. Indeed, by developing a typology of forms of collective action (i.e.,
diﬀerent forms of relational patterns), it allows us to compare networks of
migrants' organizations in diﬀerent contexts and to identify the relational
patterns in which they are embedded. Ultimately, it allows assessing the
resources available to migrants' organizations for political integration.
The relation between political opportunities and organizational networks
has received only little attention from social movement scholars. Indeed,
whereas the political opportunity literature has neglected the intermediate
structural basis for the mobilization, on its side, the resource mobilization
theories have neglected the broader political and cultural environment in
which they are embedded (Rucht, 1996). Only a few studies have examined
this relation (Baldassarri and Diani, 2007; Cinalli and Füglister, 2008; Diani
and Bison, 2004; Diani et al., 2010; Kriesi, 1996; Rucht, 1989, 1996), but their
ﬁndings are inconsistent or even inconclusive. The present study is thus an
attempt to relate both traditions and to examine in a systematic and formal
way the eﬀect of political opportunity structures on organizational network
structures.
Hence, the main argument is that network structures will vary according
to the institutional and cultural contexts in which they are embedded by giv-
ing incentives to actors to create certain types of alliances rather than others.
More speciﬁcally, migrant organizational network structures are expected to
vary according to the speciﬁc opportunities in the ﬁeld of immigration. These
provide migrants' organizations with symbolic and material resources which
vary from one citizenship regime to the other. These resources are thus ex-
pected to aﬀect the networks in the ﬁeld of immigration and consequently
the political inclusion of migrants' organizations.
1.3 Research design
To analyze networks of migrants' organizations and the way they are aﬀected
by political opportunities, the study follows a comparative approach. The
next section describes the case selection as well as the comparative strategy
adopted. It is followed by sections describing the data collection and the
method of analysis.
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1.3.1 Comparing Lyon and Zurich
To examine the relation between speciﬁc opportunities to the ﬁeld of immi-
gration and migrants' organizational networks, the study compares migrants'
organizational networks at the local level. The local level is where organiza-
tions act on a daily basis, create alliances, draw boundaries and are politically
active. Thus, two cities in two diﬀerent countries are compared: Lyon and
Zurich.1 These two cities were selected for diﬀerent reasons. First, France
and Switzerland are two traditional immigration countries with similar im-
migration patterns. After World War II, both countries developed a policy of
massive guest-worker immigration to overcome the shortage of labor, hence
responding to the economic needs these countries. In the 70's, they both
closed their borders to labor immigration but couldn't stop family reunion.
Immigration thus resumed in both countries. Nowadays, in both countries,
the main immigration source is still family reunion, additionned by asylum
seekers and illegal immigration. Second, France and Switzerland have dif-
ferent models of citizenship. France combines a civic territorial conception
of citizenship with the request of assimilation of immigrants. Switzerland
combines an ethnic conception of citizenship with assimilation. Yet, the re-
quest for assimilation follows country speciﬁc lines of thinking (Giugni and
Passy, 2006). The French ideal relies on universalism, republicanism, stem-
ming from the revolution and deeply anchored in its deﬁnition of the Nation
State. By contrast, the Swiss conception of assimilation relies on an ethno-
assimilationist approach of its citizenship.
Lyon and Zurich being two important economic centers, immigration
trends in both cities follow their national patterns. Both have a large immi-
grant population. Indeed, in Lyon over 20% of the population (Bozec, 2007)
and over 30% of the population in Zurich has an immigration background.
In addition, while both cities developed their own integration policies, the
conceptions of citizenship at the local level are deeply anchored in their re-
spective national conception of citizenship. Thus, both cities are confronted
with a large migrant population and with the challenges it represents in
dealing with integration and cohesion issues. However, they give diﬀerent
responses in terms of policies aiming at promoting migrants' integration.
The two countries diﬀer not only in their approaches to the incorporation of
1We refer her to Lyon for simplicity, but the study has been conducted in Vaulx-en-
Velin a commune of the Greater Lyon
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migrants, but also in the structure of the state. While Switzerland is a highly
decentralized state in which the cantons and the communes have a great au-
tonomy in the deﬁnition and implementation of public policies (and this is
particularly true for the integration domain), France is a highly centralized
country giving only limited competences to subnational units. However, the
decentralization law gives cities in France strong power. The similarity of
Lyon and Zurich in their immigration patterns and their diﬀerences in the
way of dealing with migrants' incorporation make them very good cases to
examine the mechanisms linking political inclusion of migrants' organizations
and the interaction between institutional and network structures.
In order to achieve this aim, the present study follows a strategy of paired
comparison between contextualized cases based in part on qualitative evi-
dence (i.e. evidence about the context) and a detailed analysis of the network
structure. Paired comparison is a comparative strategy in itself; it is neither
a most similar nor a most diﬀerent strategy, but rather a combination of
both (McAdam et al., 2001). As opposed to most diﬀerent or most similar
designs, paired comparison allows us to look at common mechanisms rather
than at correlations between variables (della Porta, 2002). "Paired compar-
ison is not simply a degenerate form of large-N analysis, nor is it only a
case study plus one. It is a distinct analytical strategy for working through
complex empirical and historical materials using the leverage aﬀorded by
the diﬀerences and similarities of comparable cases."(Tarrow, 2010, p.243).
More precisely, paired comparison draws on deep background knowledge of
the cases under analysis allowing us to disentangle the mechanisms lying be-
yond a phenomenon. Using this strategy allows identifying the mechanisms
linking political opportunities and network structures, and highlighting the
interaction of these structures in the way they aﬀect political inclusion of
migrants' organizations. More precisely, the study qualitatively analyses the
speciﬁc opportunity structure in the ﬁeld of immigration and combines it to
a detailed network analysis of inter-organizational networks in both cities in
order to show how diﬀerent settings and combinations of mechanisms pro-
duce diﬀerent processes and outcomes (McAdam et al., 2001).
1.3.2 The survey
The empirical focus of the study are the networks of migrants' voluntary
associations, where an association is deﬁned as a formally organized named
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group most of whose members whether persons or organizations  are not
ﬁnancially recompensed for their participation (Knoke, 1986). An associa-
tion is said to be a migrants' association if at least around half of the board
members have an immigration background or/and if at least half of the
members have an immigration background. Such a deﬁnition of migrants'
organizations allows us to examine migrants' self-organizing processes and
their networking strategies. It extends the study of migrants' organizations'
political inclusion to the ﬁeld of immigration, as its selects organizations on
the basis of their constituency and not on their interest in speciﬁc issues or
in their participation in protest events.
The ﬁeld work took place between 2007 and 2008. We proceeded in two
steps. First, active migrants' organizations had to be retrieved. To retrieve
migrants' organizations in Zurich and Lyon, we relied on diﬀerent sources.
Since associations do not have to register at the administration, there was no
readily accessible exhaustive list which we could rely upon. Consequently,
organizations were selected from diﬀerent sources (oﬃcial directories of as-
sociations, chamber of commerce registers, directories of associations pub-
lished by private ﬁrms, consulates of the most important immigrant groups
in the cities, internet search, interviews with informants and ﬁnally using
the snowballing method through short interviews with already identiﬁed as-
sociations). During the mapping process, we assessed whether the contacted
associations ﬁt the deﬁnition of migrant associations. Those which did not
correspond to the deﬁnition were dropped from the list. When new names
were no longer mentioned, the mapping process was considered completed.
As a total, 218 associations were mapped in Zurich and 535 in Lyon. Re-
spectively, 142 and 176 were conﬁrmed active (see table 1.1). The response
rate was similar in both cities. The non response of associations that were
conﬁrmed still active was mainly due to the fact that no accurate contact
information could be found. It is worth mentioning that few associations
cancelled the interview, did not show up, or refused to participate to the
study. Thus, in each of the cities, the sample of associations gives a reli-
able picture of the migrants' associations being active and visible. This was
further conﬁrmed by looking at the network of interviewed associations. In-
deed, some associations also mentioned non-interviewed associations as their
alliance partners. However, with the exception of two associations in Zurich,
none of the reported non-interviewed associations was mentioned more than
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Table 1.1: Response rate of migrant organizations in Lyon and Zurich
Lyon Zurich
Mapped associations 535 218
Conﬁrmed active 176 142
Conﬁrmed not active 23 16
Interviewed associations 52 39
Response rate (total active/total interviewed) 29.5 27.5
once. In other words, these associations do not have a higher indegree (i.e.,
the number of times an actor receives a tie from another actor) than 1, which
means that none of these associations were considered as important actors
in the network by the interviewed associations.
In a second step, the organizational survey was conducted. The data were
collected through face-to-face interviews with associational leaders. Aside
from the relational questions that constituted the core of the questionnaire,
dimensions such as organizations' activities (whether they engage in civic,
cultural and political activities and the frequency of such activities), associ-
ational identity, and associational resources (size and origin of membership,
sources and amount of ﬁnances) were addressed. The duration of the in-
terviews varied between an hour and a half and two hours.2 During the
interviews, some associations were found not to correspond to the deﬁnition
of migrants' associations, and were dropped from the ﬁnal list.
The data were analyzed using social network analysis. Social network
analysis, as opposed to traditional analysis in social sciences, focuses on the
relations of actors rather than on their characteristics. It looks at the rela-
tional patterns of actors as well as at the implications of these relationships.
This method draws on a number of principles. First, actors are consid-
ered as interdependent; the links between actors are channels for transfer
of resources. Finally, the network environment in which actors are embed-
ded provide opportunities and constraints for action (Wasserman and Faust,
1994). Applying this method allows us to understand in what relational
patterns migrants' associations are embedded and to identify opportunities
and constraints these networks provide for their political integration.
2See Appendix ?? on page ?? for the questionnaire.
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Together, the objectives of the present study are twofold. First, it aims at
analyzing in a systematic way the eﬀect of the political opportunity structure
on organizational ﬁelds. As mentioned earlier, the social movement litera-
ture implicitly acknowledged the link between political opportunity struc-
tures but it rarely looked at it in a systematic way. Moreover, existing
results are inconclusive or inconsistent. Addressing the link between po-
litical opportunity structure through a detailed reconstruction of political
opportunities in the ﬁeld of immigration and a detailed network analysis
of the inter-organizational networks will allow us to better understand the
mechanisms linking political opportunities and organizational networks and
enhanced knowledge about the conditions under which diﬀerent forms of
collective action emerge.
The second objective of the study is to get a better understanding of
the factors favoring or inhibiting the political inclusion of migrants' organi-
zations. Since migrants are excluded from electoral politics and migrants'
associations are considered as alternatives for voice, grasping the conditions
under which they participate or not is a central issue for social cohesion and
for political actors to address migrants needs in other domains.
1.4 Outline
The manuscript is structured as follows. The next chapter provides a dis-
cussion of the political opportunity theory and of the relational approach to
social movements and develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of
migrants' organizational networks and associations' political inclusion. More
precisely, the chapter ﬁrst provides a discussion of the typology of the modes
of coordination of collective action (the relational patterns). It then exam-
ines the general opportunity theory and how general political opportunities
aﬀect social movements' organizational networks. It also looks at the spe-
ciﬁc political opportunities in the ﬁeld of immigration and insists in how
speciﬁc opportunities are better suited for explaining network structures in
the ﬁeld of immigration. Building on the discussed literature, hypotheses are
formulated on how the political opportunity structure can aﬀect the network
structure of migrant organizations. In a second part, the chapter addresses
the political inclusion of migrants and discusses how the interactions of the
speciﬁc political opportunity structures and the network structures aﬀect the
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political inclusion of migrants' organizations. It concludes with the hypothe-
ses formulated regarding the political inclusion of migrants' organizations.
Chapter 3 oﬀers a detailed description of the context in which migrant
organizations are embedded. It ﬁrst gives an overview of immigration in
France and Switzerland and then, more speciﬁcally, in Lyon and Zurich. It
then compares the political opportunity structure in the ﬁeld of immigration
in both cities. It shows how Lyon and Zurich provide migrant organizations
with diﬀerent opportunities and how the context is generally more favorable
to migrants in Lyon and in Zurich. It concludes by providing a speciﬁcation
of the hypotheses formulated in the previous chapter.
Chapter 4 and 5 report the empirical assessment of the hypotheses of
the eﬀect of the speciﬁc political opportunity structure on the structure of
migrants' organizational networks. These chapters examine the migrant or-
ganizational networks in Lyon and Zurich on two diﬀerent aspects. Chapter 4
reports the comparison of the networks in Lyon and Zurich, and looks at the
ties of resource exchange and ties of boundary deﬁnition and the relational
patterns in which migrant organizations are embedded, that is the mode of
coordination of collective action. Chapter 5 provides the examination the
fragmentation principles at work in the networks.
In Chapter 6, the implications of the network structures for the political
integration of migrant associations are analyzed. The analysis shows how
diﬀerent relational patterns can provide associations with diﬀerent resources
according the the political opportunity structures. Indeed, associations em-
bedded in the same relational patterns in the two cities show diﬀerent degrees
of political inclusion, which suggests that the political opportunity structures
interacts with network structure in aﬀecting organizations' political integra-
tion.
Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, summarizes the results and discusses
the implications of the ﬁndings for the analysis of the political integration of






Structures in the Field of
Immigration
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the relationship between institu-
tional context and network structure of migrant associations and to develop a
theoretical framework for the analysis of networks in the ﬁeld of immigration.
Section 2.1 focuses on network structures. It ﬁrst presents two dimensions
along which global network structures (i.e., the whole organizational net-
work) can be analyzed. It then looks at the interaction patterns and the
content of ties between associations, shows the importance of distinguishing
between instrumental ties and identity ties, and examines how these local
relational patterns can aﬀect the global network structure. Drawing on a net-
work approach to social movements, how instrumental ties reﬂect processes
of resource exchange and how identity ties reﬂect processes of boundary def-
inition are shown. Finally, it discusses a typology of relational patterns that
emerge from the combination of these two types of ties. Section 2.2 focuses
on the context in which networks are embedded and discusses the politi-
cal and institutional context in which networks are embedded, drawing on
the social movement literature and more speciﬁcally on political opportu-
nity theory. It ﬁrst describes the traditional political opportunity approach
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Figure 2.1: Theoretical framework for the analysis of immigrants' associa-
tional networks and political integration
works. It then turns to the speciﬁc opportunities in the ﬁeld of immigration
and ethnic relations. It argues that speciﬁc opportunities may shape the
way in which immigrant associations are related to each other by giving in-
centives to develop certain type of ties. It shows that, when addressing the
issue of organizational networks, the traditional political opportunity theory
focuses mainly on instrumental ties and strategic adaptation of actors to the
political context, the speciﬁc opportunity structure to the ﬁeld of immigra-
tion mainly addresses identity ties and processes of boundary-making. By
combining these two approaches, it develops a theoretical framework that
explains tie formation in the ﬁeld of immigration. Finally, a section is de-
voted to the opportunities and constraints created by the network for the
political incorporation of migrant organizations and how diﬀerent combina-
tions of political opportunity structures and network structures aﬀect the
political incorporation of migrants' associations. It concludes by presenting
the hypotheses that will guide the empirical analysis. Figure 2.1 shows the
theoretical framework. The next section discusses the central box of the
ﬁgure.
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2.1 Network structures of civic organizations
2.1.1 Global network structures
It is widely acknowledged that organizations are not acting in a vacuum and
that they are embedded in sets of relationships with other organizations.
This also holds true for immigrants associations. Yet, networks are also em-
bedded in diﬀerent contexts that may aﬀect their overall structure (Entwisle
et al., 2007). What forms can organizational networks take? What are the
possible structures that immigrants' organizational networks can display?
Diﬀerent research domains have taken into account the relational perspec-
tive in studying actions of organizations, their global network structures, the
local conﬁgurations of these networks, and the structural position of actors
within the network. Community and organizational studies as well as so-
cial movement studies draw particular attention to organizational network
structures.
First, the relational perspective has been taken into account in research
on community power structures (Knoke, 1990). This approach emphasizes
how personal and inter-organizational resource exchange result in collective
actions to inﬂuence the outcome of political controversies. Second, organi-
zational studies look at the way organizations interact to reduce uncertainty
related to the environment and how organizations react to the constraints
and opportunities of this environment in creating some type of networks
rather than others (Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Brass et al., 2004). Finally,
the social movement literature adopts a relational perspective to understand
diﬀerent levels of mobilization, recruitment strategies, and outcomes of move-
ments, or to deﬁne a social movement compared to other forms of collective
action (see (Diani, 2004) for a review of social networks in social movement
studies).
These research domains found that organizational networks take diﬀerent
forms and deﬁne similar dimensions to describe network structures. In com-
munity power studies, networks are found to be centralized and hierarchical
(Hunter, 1953) or pluralistic, with a diversity of major players and many
lines of cleavage, such as the aﬃliation to diﬀerent political parties (Dahl,
1961). Community studies conceive community structure as an aggregate
network of inter-organizational relations (Laumann et al., 1978, p. 455).
Actors are involved in complex relationships that aﬀect the mobilization of
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collective eﬀorts for supporting or opposing diﬀerent policy initiatives. From
these relationships, network structures emerge that can be analyzed along
diﬀerent dimensions. Organizational networks are structured along two prin-
ciples: centrality and periphery, and interest diﬀerentiation (Laumann and
Pappi, 1976). The centrality periphery principle occurs in many networks
such as friendship or authority relationships. Some actors receive more ties
than others, and they tend to send ties to others having similarly high popu-
larity. The resulting global network structure contains a few central positions
occupied by actors tied to many others and a large number of peripheral po-
sitions occupied by actors with lower visibility, fewer ties, and generally little
involvement in the system. The interest diﬀerentiation principle draws upon
the relational contents of communication and speciﬁcally the tendency for
pairs of organizations sharing common interests across a range of issues to
establish a tie. In a network as a whole, organizations with identical or sim-
ilar interests are thus more closely linked than organizations with divergent
interests (Laumann and Knoke, 1987).
In their study of community power structures in Germany, Laumann and
Pappi (1976) found a centralized structure in which the center was composed
of more integrative organizations and the periphery of highly specialized or-
ganizations. Others found a highly clustered network in which clusters were
organized around functional areas (Galaskiewicz, 1979). Thus, networks
can take a centralized pyramidal form or a decentralized fractionalized one
(Knoke, 1990). Comparing national policy networks in diﬀerent domains
along these two principles Laumann and Knoke (1987) found, for example,
that central positions in the network are dominated by organizations serving
as information brokers, while peripheral positions were occupied by special-
ist organizations having only limited capacity to sustain large amounts of
communication because of lack of resources or low interest in the domain
at stake. To conclude, community power structures and policy networks
take diﬀerent global structures and vary in time and place along two main
dimensions: hierarchy/centralization and fragmentation. Moreover, the frag-
mentation principles also vary. In some cases, networks are fragmented along
the functional area (Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz, 1993), while in others, frag-
mentation occurs along ideological lines, such as party aﬃliation (Laumann
and Pappi, 1976).
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Social movement studies also try to identify how social movements take
diﬀerent organizational forms (Campbell, 2005). While some authors argue
that social movements typically take a horizontal and polycentric form (Ger-
lach, 2001), others found rather hierarchical structures of social movements
(Diani, 2003a; Osa, 2003)1. Furthermore, social movement networks have
been found to be fragmented along diﬀerent lines. For example, fragmented
along a generational line, whereas more established organizations clustered
together and other, more recent organizations formed another cluster (Diani,
2003a). Other social movement networks are fragmented along ideological
lines, such as the environmental movement in Milan in the 70's, in which
ideological cleavages prevented collaboration between political ecology orga-
nizations and more conservationist organizations (Diani, 2003a). Networks
of civic organizations have also been found to be fragmented along diﬀer-
ent principles, like shared interest and identity (Diani and Pilati, 2011).
In conclusion, social movement networks vary in place and time along the
dimensions identiﬁed in community power structures and policy networks.
The ﬁrst dimension refers to the level of hierarchy in a network, and the
second one to the level of fragmentation and the principles guiding the frag-
mentation. These dimensions refer to characteristics of the global network
structure that emerge from local interaction patterns. The next section dis-
cusses local interaction patterns and how these patterns give rise to diﬀerent
global forms.
2.1.2 Local interactions and the content of ties
The previous section showed how global networks can take diﬀerent forms
according to the principles of hierarchy and fragmentation (center box in
ﬁgure 2.1). This section focuses on the second aspect of network structures
(center box of the ﬁgure and on arrow 2) on the local level of the network,
the content of ties, and how global structures emerge from local patterns of
interaction.
Hierarchy and fragmentation refer to global structural patterns. Social
network analysts distinguish between local and global network structures.
The global structures can only be determined by examining the entire net-
work. Global features of the network are contrasted with local patterns of
1See Diani (2003b) for diﬀerent network forms of social movements
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interaction that can give rise to them. Local structures rely on small net-
work conﬁgurations, that is, subgraphs involving only a few network ties.
These conﬁgurations are the outcomes of local social processes. Network
ties emerge, persist, and disappear by virtue of actions made locally on the
scale of the individual actors in a network (Robins et al., 2005). On the
basis of their localized views, actors form strategies and make decisions that
intersect with those others who are socially proximate. Combinations of
these competing or complementary intentions and actions constitute social
processes that make up local patterns of relationships (Robins et al., 2005).
These local patterns agglomerate to create the global structure.
Local patterns of interaction can be examined by looking at the content
of ties and at their distribution. Actors in a network are usually involved
simultaneously in diﬀerent types of ties. Organizations can be involved in
exchanges of information, exchanges of resources or more personal relation-
ships such as sharing core members or friendships between members. Stud-
ies of inter-organizational networks identify two main dimensions of linkages
between organizations. Although links between organizations have mainly
been considered instrumental links (resource transfer), Laumann et al. (1978)
identify two main types of inter-organizational relationships, linkages of re-
source transfers and those based on interpenetration of boundaries. If both
types of linkages are instrumental, Laumann et al. (1978) emphasize the addi-
tional solidarity maintenance component of relationships involving boundary
interpenetration. Resource transfer ties refer to money, funds, and informa-
tion exchanges, whereas ties involving interpenetration of boundaries refer
to common membership in federations or coalitions and shared membership.
This distinction is also acknowledged by social movements studies, in which
resource transfer relations are opposed to personal ties between organiza-
tions. Resource transfer refers to such exchanges as information, sharing an
oﬃce, or other material resources. Personal ties refer to shared core mem-
bers or board members or friendships between members (Knoke and Wisely,
1990). Diﬀerent type of ties can occur simultaneously between associations.
Looking at the content of ties Baldassarri and Diani (2007), take into consid-
eration the composition of ties and their interplay in networks of civic orga-
nizations. Indeed, it is more than likely that network processes will involve
diﬀerent kinds of relational ties (Koehly and Pattison, 2005). Multiplexity of
ties (which refers to the tendency for two or more diﬀerent types of relation-
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ship to occur together) may also play a role in shaping network structures.
Multiplexity of ties has been mainly analyzed in its role in explaining actors'
behavior, acting as opportunities or constraints shaping their behavior. By
looking at the distribution of certain types of ties (making a distinction be-
tween instrumental ties and ties reﬂecting belongingness), Baldassarri and
Diani (2007) show how ties reﬂecting belongingness, what they call "social
bonds", characterize clusters of dense interactions between similar organi-
zations and how instrumental ties create bridges between diﬀerent groups
and increase the overall interconnection of civic networks. Thus, the global
network structure that emerges from these patterns of interaction takes on
a polycentric form.
In a similar vein, a relational approach to social movements (Diani, 2003b;
Diani and Bison, 2004; Diani, 2011) follows the distinction of type of ties of
Laumann et al. (1978) for the analysis of social movements and oﬀers useful
tools for the analysis of organizational networks and the relational patterns
taking place within these networks. To deﬁne social movements as opposed
to other forms of collective action, Diani and Pilati (2011) deﬁnes a typology
of networks relying on the content of ties and their density. Deﬁning collec-
tive action as "social phenomena in which actor engage in collective activities
for demanding and/or providing collective goods" (Baldassarri, 2009, p.321),
this approach proposes a typology that identiﬁes social movement types of
collective action as opposed to other forms of collective action. These forms
are diﬀerentiated by the modes of coordination of organizations in networks
of organizational ﬁelds. Modes of coordination are "the mechanisms through
which resources are allocated within a certain collectivity, decision taken,
collective representation elaborated, feelings of solidarity and mutual obli-
gation forged" (Diani, 2011, p.xx) and rely on two mechanisms related to
the content of ties between organizations: resource allocation and boundary
deﬁnition.
Relations of resource coordination are relations such as exchange of infor-
mation, collaboration on projects or exchange of any other type of resources.
Resource coordination refers to the use of organizational resources that is
the instrumental aspect of relations between associations. Networks of vol-
untary associations are composed of various types of associations. They vary
in their structure (formal, informal) but also in the type of resources avail-
able. Instrumental ties are the locus of resource exchange between various
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actors endowed with diﬀerent amount of resources allowing them to pursue
joint collective actions. While resources might be invested only in organiza-
tions' own project, they might also be used for collaborative projects. The
way associations use their resources might thus have an eﬀect on the overall
network structure.
Boundary deﬁnition refers to a more symbolic, ideational element of so-
cial life (Diani, 2009). Boundaries classify elements of social life in diﬀerent
groups and categories and deﬁnes "us" as opposed to "them". A boundary
is thus a fundamentally relational concept (Lamont and Molnar, 2002). Pro-
cesses of boundary deﬁnition are related to social representation. In that
sense, they can be seen as processes of identity building. Collective identity
is described as constituted by a dialectic interplay of processes of internal and
external deﬁnition (Jenkins, 1996). Individuals must be able to distinguish
themselves from others by drawing on criteria of community and a sense
of shared belonging within their subgroup. On the other hand, this inter-
nal identiﬁcation process must be recognized by outsiders for an objectiﬁed
collective identity to emerge (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 14-21). This
follows a non-essentalist deﬁnition of identity, based rather on processes and
activities. It is related to a process of recognition of others as similar, that
is, as belonging to the same group (de la Rúa, 2007). In the case of volun-
tary associations, links between associations through shared core members
and personal ties can serve as a proxy for ties reﬂecting boundary deﬁnition,
links of identiﬁcation. Indeed, in voluntary associations, resting largely on
solidarity incentives, multiple involvements provide an indicator of whether
activists perceive two organizations as compatible and close enough to share
their commitment (Diani and Bison, 2004), thus generating broader collec-
tive identities and processes of boundary deﬁnition. Processes of boundary
deﬁnition can take place across and within organizations. Thus, a collective
identity can be located within a single organization and may not cut across
organizational boundaries. In this case, boundary deﬁnition processes take
place within organizations.
The distribution and density of resource exchange and boundary deﬁni-
tion ties and their various combinations yield diﬀerent modes of coordination
of collective action (see ﬁgure 2.2) (Diani, 2011). A social movement mode
of coordination combines high investment in boundary deﬁnition and high
exchange of resources, that is, a network of dense interpersonal networks and
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Figure 2.2: Modes of coordination of collective action
multiple aﬃliation cutting across organizational boundaries. Indeed, for mo-
bilizing, movements need diﬀerent types of resources, not only material but
also more symbolic resources such as a collective identity. Engaging in re-
source exchange networks can provide organizations with resources they are
not endowed with. Not only will dense organizational resource exchange in-
crease the number of individuals organizations can mobilize, but they might
also gain more visibility and political legitimacy. Organizations involved
in a social movement mode of coordination also invest highly in boundary
deﬁnition ties. Boundary deﬁnition provide organizations with a collective
identity that goes beyond single organizations and acts as motivation for
participation.
When organizations are involved in resource exchange alliances without
processes of boundary deﬁnition, the mode of coordination is a coalitional
mode. Indeed, in this cases organizations exchange resources for speciﬁc
initiatives and for a determined period. This process does not involve any
collective identity, and coalitions are only temporary alliances.
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The third type of mode of coordination is organizational. In an organi-
zational mode of coordination the boundary deﬁnition process takes place
within organizations, collective action is limited within a speciﬁc organi-
zation. Organizations invest in their own niche for example and do not
exchange resources, or at least not at a signiﬁcant level with other organiza-
tions.
Finally, subcultures/community is a mode of coordination of collective
action with low resource exchanges but strong collective identities that goes
beyond organizations representing this identity.
Modes of coordination of collective action are local interaction patterns,
and diﬀerent modes of coordination can be found in a ﬁeld. The combination
of diﬀerent modes of coordination yields various global network structures.
For example, a network composed of subnetworks involved in a social move-
ment mode of coordination, with only few connections between them would
give rise to a highly fragmented and horizontal network. Thus, looking at
the interaction patterns and at the distribution (the density) of ties at the
local level and identifying subnetworks within the whole network allows us
to understand why speciﬁc forms of global network emerge. This aspect is
crucial since diﬀerent global structures provide organizations embedded in
these webs of relationships with diﬀerent resources for political participation.
This point will be addressed in section 2.3. The next section focuses on the
context in which networks are embedded and discusses the conditions under
which speciﬁc tie distributions occur and speciﬁc global structures emerge
(see left box in ﬁgure 2.1).
2.2 Context and networks structures
Local interaction patterns aﬀect the network's global structure. But how
do actors in a network decide to whom they will send which type of ties?
What can explain these local interaction patterns? This section discusses
contextual factors that may shape tie formation of associations in the ﬁeld
of immigration. Under what circumstances can we observe one structure
rather than another? What factors may explain diﬀerent network struc-
tures? Diﬀerent bodies of literature point to the importance of the context
in which networks are embedded as an explanatory factor of diﬀerent net-
work structures: organizational studies (Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz, 1993;
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Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Powell et al., 2005), community studies (Knoke,
1990; Entwisle et al., 2007), policy network studies (Marsh and Smith, 2000),
and social movement studies (Kriesi, 1996; Rucht, 1989, 1996; Baldassarri
and Diani, 2007; Diani et al., 2010; Osa, 2003; Meyer et al., 2005; Cinalli and
Füglister, 2008). By deﬁning typologies of network structures, these studies,
implicitly (most often) or explicitly recognize that network structures may
diﬀer and that such diﬀerences might be traced back to the institutional con-
text in which they emerge. The institutional and political context can aﬀect
the position of some actors in civil society, and consequently it can aﬀect
the network by having an impact on agents' positions and alliance strate-
gies, that is, instrumental ties (Marsh and Smith, 2000). The political and
institutional context gives signals to actors in terms of strategies of alliances,
giving them incentives to forge instrumental or identity ties with some actors
rather than others. Following this line of reasoning, this section discusses the
link between network structures of immigrant associations and the context
these networks are embedded in (arrow 1 in ﬁgure 2.1). It ﬁrst discusses the
political opportunity theory in social movement studies and how political
opportunities can aﬀect social movement organizational networks. It then
looks at the speciﬁc opportunity structure in the ﬁeld of immigration and
how these opportunities shape the mobilization of immigrants, their collec-
tive identities, organizing processes, and the network structures of migrant
organizations.
2.2.1 Social movement studies: political opportunity theory
Political opportunity theory suggests that the political opportunity struc-
tures (POS) aﬀect the action repertoire, the mobilization level, and the
outcomes of social movements (Giugni, 2004; Kriesi et al., 1995; Tarrow,
1989). Political oportunities have been deﬁned as "signals to social or polit-
ical actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal
resources to form social movements" (Tarrow, 1996, p.85) as well as op-
tions for collective action, with chances and risks attached to them, which
depend on factors outside the mobilizing groups (Koopmans, 1999, p.65).
Although the concept has been applied to a great variety of diﬀerent di-
mensions (Meyer, 2004), most work has focused upon one or more of the
four following aspects of political opportunity structures: (1) the relative
openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; (2) the stability
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or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird
a polity; (3) the presence or absence of elite allies; and (4) the state's ca-
pacity and propensity for repression (McAdam, 1996, p.27). Others include
cleavage structures as a component of the POS (Kriesi et al., 1995).
Political opportunity theory and movement network structures
While the interaction of context and organizational structures has been em-
phasized and the network approach has been widely used in social movement
studies (see Diani, 2004, for a review), only few studies have examined net-
work structures in diﬀerent contexts in a systematic way. These studies
suggest that the POS signals the type of alliances that social movement
organizations create by a strategic adaptation to the institutional context.
The eﬀect of political opportunity structures on network structures has
received little attention from social movement scholars. While studies of
coalition formation focus on the eﬀect of the emergence of threats and op-
portunities to explain the decision of social movement organizations to join
a coalition, few studies look at the eﬀect of the POS on the network struc-
ture of a social movement or civic organizations in diﬀerent political settings
(Rucht, 1989, 1996; Kriesi, 1996; Diani and Bison, 2004; Baldassarri and
Diani, 2007; Diani and Pilati, 2011). Moreover, ﬁndings are rather incon-
sistent since some studies show that network structures vary according to
the political opportunity structures (Rucht, 1989, 1996; Kriesi, 1996; Diani,
2003a), while others ﬁnd very similar structures in diﬀerent contexts (Diani
and Bison, 2004; Baldassarri and Diani, 2007). Still these works looking at
the eﬀect of POS on network structures oﬀer some insights for developing
hypotheses. The ﬁndings on network structures in diﬀerent political settings
will be discussed in the remainder of the section, and the hypotheses that
will guide the analysis will be formulated.
Work on social movement coalition formation addresses the relationship
between context and alliances between organizations. Resource mobiliza-
tion theories stress the importance of mobilizing structures, that is, orga-
nizations and their networks, for the success of mobilization. To mobilize
many participants' social movements need coalitions between organizations.
The question these authors are addressing is how and under what circum-
stances do coalitions form given the obstacles to cooperation organizations
are facing. Indeed, the choice to participate in a coalition carries with it
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potential costs such as obscuring an organization's own identity and thus
diminishing its capacity to recruit members or funds (Meyer and Corrigall-
Brown, 2005). Moreover, social cleavages or ideology can prevent organiza-
tions from working together. Work on coalitions in social movements has
shown how coalitions form when threats (strong countermovements or socio-
economic threats) and opportunities emerge (Staggenborg, 1986; McCam-
mon and Campbell, 2002; Van Dyke and Soule, 2002; Meyer and Corrigall-
Brown, 2005). Under these conditions, the beneﬁts of forming a coalition are
higher than the costs involved, and organizations can temporarily overcome
some ideological cleavages. Still, although coalitions form in relationship to
speciﬁc initiatives and dissolve with time due to the costs implied in main-
taining them, they are strategic alliances formed to attain a speciﬁc goal,
thus focusing on short-term objectives. Moreover, coalitions are only one
form of collective action. The objective of this study is to look at networks
of mutual recognition of associations in an organizational ﬁeld in which more
stable aspects of the context rather than changes in threats and opportunities
will aﬀect tie formation .
Studies examining the impact of the POS on network structures or orga-
nizational ﬁelds identify two main dimensions of the context: an institutional
dimension and a cultural, symbolic dimension. Although operationalization
of these dimensions diﬀers between authors, we ﬁnd some consistency in the
mechanisms linking institutional and cultural aspects of the context and net-
work structures. Basically, institutional aspects are related to access to the
decision-making procedures and cultural, symbolic aspects relate to cleav-
ages. More generally, it refers to the resonance the organization's issues and
demands have with the framing of the problem at stake and how these issues
and demands resonate in public discourse (Diani and Pilati, 2011, p.xx).
Rucht (1996), for example, shows how the open access of the political
system favors more centralized movement structures. Comparing the en-
vironmental and women's movement in France, Germany, and the U.S, he
found a highly centralized network in the U.S., where the decision-making
process is very open. Open access invites challengers to take a chance to in-
ﬂuence the system. In the long run, it encourages the formation of centralized
and professional interest groups in a movement. This openness encourages
professional organizations, which thus act as brokers between the system
and more grassroots organizations having fewer resources. As professional
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organizations seek to make their voices heard, they invest less in alliance-
building with other organizations. Less resourceful organizations would seek
access to decision-making by seeking alliances with more professional orga-
nizations. The network structure that emerges from such linking strategies
is thus centralized. In Germany, where opportunities are relatively less open
compared to the U.S., the network structure is decentralized.
While access to decision-making procedure can aﬀect the network struc-
ture, the salience of cleavages may also shape the network structure. A
salient cleavage can lead to fragmentation of the network into densely inter-
connected clusters, whereas in contexts in which cleavages are less salient,
the network structure can be more centralized connected, through a small
number of organizations.
Rucht (1989) compares the environmental movement in France and Ger-
many and looks at the diﬀerent POS in the two countries. He examines
whether social movement structures adopt the SPIN model (segmented, poly-
cephalous, informal networks) and whether the movement structure diﬀers
across contexts. He found a clustered but interconnected movement in Ger-
many, where opportunities are more favorable. In France, the chances of
participation and mobilization are much more limited, and he found a more
hierarchical segmented movement, highly polarized around diﬀerent orienta-
tions of the movement with only weak ties connecting the diﬀerent segments.
To be eﬃcient, associations have to take into consideration the context
in which they act. Indeed, Kriesi (1996) showed that the political context
shapes external structuration (i.e., the integration of an organization in its
organizational environment) of a movement, that is, the type of alliances
social movement organizations create. The presence of the left in the gov-
ernment aﬀects the ties new socialmovement organizaitons have with leftist
parties, and the salience of the class cleavage also shapes alliance structures
of new social movements.
Social movements vary over time under diﬀerent political conditions. The
structure of the environmental movement in Milan changed between the 70's
and the 80's under changed political conditions. In the 70's, the salience of
the left-right cleavage prevented social movement organizations from diﬀer-
ent locations with respect to the cleavage to develop linkages. The reduced
salience of the cleavage in the 80's facilitated linkages between social move-
ment organizations. A new structure emerged, in which an integrative core,
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representative of the diﬀerent orientations within the movement, acted as
bridge between various orientations. The diﬀerences between orientations
did not disappear, but organizations had a rather inclusive strategy in their
choices of allies. A salient cleavage can thus favor fragmented network struc-
tures and prevent organizations from diﬀerent sides of the cleavage from
creating alliances, while in situations in which cleavages are less salient, cen-
tralized structures might emerge, in which organizations ally across diﬀer-
ent locations with respect to the cleavage(Diani, 2003a, p.119-120). Hence,
in the presence of ideological conﬂict, fragmentation of the network occurs
along ideological line, and the absence of conﬂict favors fragmentation along
functional lines.
These results suggest that open institutional opportunities would lead
to a more hierarchical and centralized network. Indeed, access to resources
and representation would lead to a professionalization and specialization of
an organization, which would "replace the kind of activism that rely on the
mobilization of identity" (Diani and Pilati, 2011, p.x). Depending less on
their members for resources and working mainly in their own niche, organi-
zations would develop only instrumental ties to more central organizations.
Indeed, resources of organizations in this context would be concentrated in
participating in the political process, instead of being invested in alliance
building. Closed institutional opportunities would favor strong identities
because organizations will have to rely on members for collective action. In
this case, the network is expected to be horizontal and fragmented in densely
interconnected clusters that would compete for scarce resources.
The salience of cleavages in speciﬁc ﬁelds can also aﬀect the network
structure. Indeed, when cleavages are salient, the network may be frag-
mented along the lines of the cleavage, preventing alliances from cutting
across the cleavage. In a context with less salient cleavages, the network is
expected to be fragmented along functional or issue interest lines. Associ-
ations are more likely in this context to cut across cleavages and to create
alliances based on a division of labor within a ﬁeld rather than on ideological
lines.
In addition to the salience of cleavages, institutional opportunities can
condition the network structure of voluntary associations. The relationship
between POS and network structures is expected to be curvilinear (Einsinger,
1973; Kitschelt, 1986; Cinalli and Giugni, 2011). In a totally open context,
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associations would compete for access to institutions as well as for resources.
This may lead to a totally atomized network, in which associations have no
contact with one another. At the other extreme, in a totally closed system,
such as authoritarian regimes, we might also ﬁnd an extreme fragmenta-
tion of the network. In such a system, relationships with other associations
and the danger of coalition because of repression force associations to act
in clandestinity, since relationships with other associations carry potential
danger. The network would thus be totally fragmented and decentralized,
with a density of 0. However, in relatively open or closed contexts, some
diﬀerences are expected. In relatively open contexts in which civil society
actors have access to the decision-making process, through consultation in
deﬁnition of public policies and participation in implementation, associa-
tions can be expected to concentrate their activities in this direction. More
resourceful associations will participate directly in the process and invest
less in alliance-building with other associations. Associations having fewer
resources would invest in relationships with associations that have access to
the decision-making process to gain access, although indirectly, to the pro-
cess. In this case, they would be less likely to create close horizontal ties
with other associations. The network in such a context is thus expected
to be rather centralized, and the density of exchanges would be rather low,
with little investment in boundary deﬁnition ties. It would thus display a
organizational mode of collective action.
In more closed institutional contexts in which access to decision-making
is diﬃcult and resources for voluntary associations are scarce, associations
would have to rely more on their members for collective action. In this case,
creating alliances with other associations would be encouraged to mobilize as
many adherents as possible. Moreover, the higher dependence of associations
on their constituencies would prevent them from forming alliances that would
require a negotiation of their identity. In this case, we can expect a more
fragmented network, less centralized, with higher investment in boundary
deﬁnition and a high density of resource exchange. The network can be
expected to display forms of social movements.
The salience of cleavage may also aﬀect alliance-building between as-
sociations. A salient cleavage can inﬂuence the fragmentation lines of the
network. Indeed, when a cleavage is salient, associations may think in terms
of political diﬀerentiation. Associations will be less likely to create ties with
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associations from the other side of a given cleavage. Moreover, when rely-
ing primarily on their members for collective action, they will not want to
lose their credibility. Thus, the saliency of cleavages is expected to aﬀect
the level of fragmentation as well as the principles fragmenting the network.
In a context with a salient cleavage, organizational networks may be highly
fragmented along ideological lines. In this case, associations are expected
to invest a great deal in processes of boundary deﬁnition. When cleavages
are less salient, the network is expected to be less fragmented, and when
fragmentation occurs, it is expected to be along functional or interest lines.
Furthermore, investment in boundary deﬁnition is expected to be lower.
This section showed how the general POS can aﬀect social movement net-
work structures. However, studies of the collective claim-making of migrants
show that their mobilization is shaped by speciﬁc opportunities in the ﬁeld of
immigration. The next section discusses this approach and how the speciﬁc
opportunities can aﬀect the network structure in the ﬁeld of immigration,
integrating a symbolic dimension into the POS concept.
2.2.2 Models of citizenship as opportunities for migrants'
organizations
In the ﬁeld of immigration, scholars looking at collective claim-making of
immigrants suggest that not only cross-national variations in the level and
issues and scope of immigrants' claims, but also their collective identity and
organizing process depend upon a speciﬁc political opportunity structure in
the ﬁeld of immigration and ethnic relations.
Drawing on social movement studies, authors in the ﬁeld of immigra-
tion have also acknowledged the impact of POS on intermediary structures.
Vermeulen (2005) suggests that immigrants' organizational patterns (the cre-
ation and continuity of immigrants' organizations) are partly shaped by POS.
Testing for the crowding-out eﬀect of government intervention on civil soci-
ety, Bloemraad (2005) shows how political intervention favors the number as
well as the diversity of migrants' organizations. Nevertheless, these authors
look at processes of organizing from a population ecology perspective.
32
Modes of incorporating migrants and organizational processes
The modes of incorporating migrants into the host society have proven to
have an impact on the organizing process of immigrants. Associations are
embedded in a political context with diﬀerent opportunities for participa-
tion. Indeed, according to Soysal (1994), particular polities deﬁne forms of
participation that also conﬁgure the collective patterns of migrant organiza-
tion. The way migrants are incorporated in the host society aﬀects migrants'
organizational strategies, discourses, and identities. Soysal (1994) found that
host societies shape the collective organization of migrants by providing (or
not) certain resources for and models of organizing. Some host countries
provide explicit channels for the participation and organization of migrant
populations, thereby aﬀecting their self-organization. Certain host coun-
tries' institutions and policies encourage collective identity and organization
by means of categorization and the provisions of resources to ethnic groups.
Migrant organizations, in turn, deﬁne their goals, strategies, functions, and
level of operation in relationship to the existing policies and resources of the
host state. Hence, the expression and organization of migrants' collective
identity are framed by the institutionalized forms of the state's incorpora-
tion regime.
While no studies look at networks of immigrant associations' in a system-
atic and formal way, Ireland (1994) describes diﬀerent network structures in
France and Switzerland. In 1981, when foreign associations became subject
to the same conditions as French associations, the number of ethnic orga-
nizations increased dramatically. The new decree on associations and the
progressive creation of consultative bodies at the local and national level cre-
ated opportunities for contacts between French citizens and immigrants and
also between the various immigrant communities. These factors produced a
gradual convergence in the strategies of many immigrants associations. This
period witnessed an inter-ethnic movement that widened its scope and de-
veloped a political mission. Inter-ethnic collaborations transcended ethnic
divisions and coordinated member associations' activities with the aim of im-
proving the lot of all immigrant workers in France. Collaborations thus over-
came the ethnic cleavage and created a more integrated network. Moreover,
ethnic associations developed a new identity as "immigrants" overcoming
the distinction between ethnic and/or national groups. Before, immigrant
associations were few and were ﬁnanced and controlled by the countries of
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origin with the agreement of France, which saw in this a means to ensure
migrants' solidarity and identiﬁcation with their homelands, which would en-
courage their return. With the change of opportunities, the network shifted
from a highly fragmented structure, with processes of boundary deﬁnitions
within national groups, that is, a community mode of interaction, to a more
integrated network with lower fragmentation. This may be seen as an in-
termediary situation in which the network structure changed in reaction to
a new opportunity. The opening of opportunities for immigrants may in
the long run encourage more centralized structures. Immigrant associations
that access to resources, such as funding because of the new conditions in the
long run may become more professionalized. The process described earlier
may thus lead to a more centralized structure and an organizational mode
of coordination.
A community mode of coordination, with a highly fragmented network
and high investment in processes of boundary deﬁnition within clusters char-
acterizes the network of immigrant associations in Switzerland from the
60's to the 80's (Ireland, 1994). Networks of immigrant organizations were
densely connected in subnetworks of associations with the same national
origin. Each of these national subnetworks sent ties to a central actor (a
federation, for instance). Immigrants in Switzerland were organized along
national/ethnic lines, since the networks of immigrant associations were set
up and ﬁnanced by homeland governments. Each national group from the
main immigrant population in Switzerland (Spaniards, Portuguese, and Ital-
ians) had a central association that regrouped all the local ones. These fed-
erations connected diﬀerent immigrant groups in the late 80s, but ties were
very weak and only activated for speciﬁc purposes.
Ireland also observed a very fragmented and decentralized network, with-
out any boundary deﬁnition process, an organizational mode of collective ac-
tion in which associations tended to work on their own without any contacts
with other associations in Switzerland before the 80's. Immigrants had very
few individual and collective rights, the political opportunity structure was
very closed, and immigrant associations during this period tended to act
on their own, without collaborating with other migrant or autochthonous
associations.
These studies point to the eﬀect of modes of incorporating migrants on
their organizing process. They show that, depending on the context, immi-
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grant associations develop diﬀerent relationships with other immigrant as-
sociations and also with autochthonous associations. Diﬀerent contexts may
give diﬀerent resources (symbolic as well as material) and thus structure the
logics of interaction in the ﬁeld of immigration. Drawing on these studies on
political opportunity theory, Koopmans et al. (2005) and Giugni and Passy
(2006) developed a theoretical framework for the analysis of claim-making
and formation of collective identities in the ﬁeld of immigration and ethnic
relations. The next section describes this framework, summarizes its ﬁnd-
ings, and shows its usefulness in explaining variations in network structures
in the ﬁeld of immigration.
Models of citizenship and claim-making in the ﬁeld of immigration
Koopmans et al. (2005) conceived of citizenship not as a static model, but as
a conceptual (and political) space in which diﬀerent actors and policies can
be situated. As mentioned previously, the POS (national cleavage structure,
formal institutional structure, prevailing elite strategies, alliance structure,
and cleavage structures) deﬁne the available channels of access for challengers
to the polity. According to Koopmans and Statham (2000), the conception
of citizenship and nationhood are ﬁrst of all part of a nation's cleavage struc-
ture. Second, citizenship has a formal institutional dimension that especially
aﬀects opportunities of access of immigrants to the political system. The
national conﬁguration of citizenship also reﬂects the prevailing strategies
for dealing with societal cleavages and conﬂicts. Finally, controversies over
citizenship and nationhood are important determinants of the alliance and
conﬂict structures in the politics of migration and ethnic relations. Looking
at speciﬁc POS in the ﬁeld of immigration and ethnic relations, they argue,
overcomes a limitation of the traditional POS approach, which has focused
on the how of mobilization and neglected the question of why social move-
ments constitute themselves around particular collective identities and aims.
The questions of the constitution of identities and aims of collective actors
are especially salient in the ﬁeld of immigration. What is at stake revolves
around questions of identity, the national identity of the receiving nation
state and its relationship to the group identities of immigrants as well as to
tendencies toward closure from the perspective of the majority population.
Discursive opportunities (cultural notions of citizenship and nations' iden-
tity) inﬂuence how people see themselves in relationship to others. The best
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example is the race category used in Britain, but not in France, where racial
categories are virtually absent from the public debate.
To take into account both aspects of citizenship, the identity dimen-
sion and the institutional dimension, Koopmans et al. (2005) distinguishes
between institutional and discursive opportunities. The rights and duties
oﬀered to immigrants as well as the resources and institutional channels
available to them act as institutional opportunities. The cultural notions
of citizenship and national identity act as discursive opportunities, i.e., as
symbolic cleavage in the ﬁeld of immigration.
Discursive opportunities have consequences on the self-deﬁnition of immi-
grants and on the collective identity they mobilize. Discursive opportunities
determine a collective actor's chances of gaining recognized access in its in-
teraction with decision-makers. Discursive opportunities "determine which
collective identities have a high likelihood to gain visibility, to resonate with
the claims of other collective actors and to achieve legitimacy in the public
discourse" (Cinalli and Giugni, 2011, p.46). Thus, immigrants are expected
to organize along diﬀerent identities according to the discursive opportuni-
ties.
Institutional opportunities are deﬁned not only by the rights and duties
oﬀered to migrants, but also by their access to institutional channels. These
opportunities are deﬁned along two dimensions. First, a cultural dimension
distinguishes between cultural pluralism (countries such as Britain and the
Netherlands) and cultural monism (France and Switzerland) and deﬁnes the
collective group's rights. Cultural pluralist countries recognize cultural dif-
ferences and sometimes even promote them. On the contrary, cultural monist
countries ask immigrants to assimilate into the majority culture. The second
dimensions concerns the formal requirements for acquisition of citizenships
and distinguishes between jus sanguinis and jus soli, in other words, between
an ethnic conception of citizenship and a civic-territorial one. The combi-
nation of these two dimensions constitutes the conceptions of citizenship, or
the speciﬁc institutional opportunity structure for the ﬁeld of immigration
and ethnic relations (Koopmans et al., 2005). Modes of incorporating mi-
grants into the host society shape the political mobilizations of immigrants.
Cross-national variations are explained by the access to the political system
given by the institutional opportunities and the legitimacy, resonance, and
visibility discursive opportunities give immigrants to intervene in the pub-
36
lic sphere of the receiving country. A country having a more exclusive way
of conceiving citizenship may exclude migrants from the majority political
community. Migrants would thus feel less legitimized to intervene in po-
litical issues in the host country. For example, these studies showed that
in countries combining a territorial approach to citizenship and ask immi-
grants to assimilate, such as France, the level of mobilization of immigrants
is higher, but they also address their claims to the host society on issues
such as integration. In contrast, in countries with an ethnic conception of
citizenship that ask immigrants to assimilate, such as Switzerland, the focus
of their claims is mainly their homeland, and they express themselves on
issues of entry and stay conditions than on integration. Finally, in countries
combining a civic-territorial approach of citizenship with a multiculturalist
approach of collective rights, migrants mobilize on an ethnic basis, but they
address their claims to the host country.
Ethnic boundaries perspective
The POS have an eﬀect on the collective identities of migrants, their alliance
strategies, and the global network structure in the ﬁeld of immigration. Nev-
ertheless, these processes are fundamentally relational, and none of the pre-
vious cited work looks at the actual network structure and the processes of
resource exchange and boundary formation in the ﬁeld of immigration
Wimmer (2008) proposes to study migrants' integration from an ethnic
boundary perspective. The main argument of this perspective is that ethnic
communities do not necessarily overlap with ethnic identity and culture and
that diﬀerent factors may aﬀect the deﬁnition of ethnic boundaries, among
others, the institutional rules. His model explains the varying features of eth-
nic boundaries as the result of negotiations between actors whose strategies
are shaped by the characteristics of the social ﬁeld in which they are embed-
ded. In this model, the institutional framework determines which types of
boundaries (ethnic, social class, gender) can be drawn in a meaningful and
acceptable way in a particular social ﬁeld. Boundaries display a categorical
and a behavioral dimension. While the categorical dimension refers to acts of
social classiﬁcation and collective representation, the behavioral dimension
refers to everyday networks of relationships resulting from individual acts
of connecting and distancing(Wimmer, 2008, p. 975). As opposed to POS
theory, this approach explicitly looks at social networks to understand which
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boundaries are salient in a speciﬁc ﬁeld: ethnic categories are relational and
segmentary in nature and therefore not all correspond to communities held
together by dense webs of social ties (Wimmer, 2008, p. 975). From an
ethnic boundary perspective, as in the POS theory, the division between
nationals and immigrants is part of the ongoing process of nation-building
and needs to be studied rather than taken for granted to understand the
dynamics of migrant incorporation.
Still some boundaries are politically salient while others are not. Institu-
tions provide incentives for actors to draw certain boundaries, ethnic rather
than class or gender, and to emphasize certain levels of ethnic diﬀerentiation
instead of others (Okamoto, 2003). The institutional framework speciﬁes the
historical context within which boundary deﬁnition take place, which in turn
has an eﬀect on the boundary-making of actors embedded in the context.
The way in which the boundary between those belonging to the nation and
the others is deﬁned varies from one context to the other. These boundaries
then aﬀect, for example, the claim-making of migrants and their organizing
processes.
Looking at levels of racial and ethnic boundaries, (Okamoto, 2003) shows,
for example, that the level of ethnic or racial boundaries are shaped by the in-
stitutional context. Wimmer (2002) found that individuals in neighborhoods
with high immigrant populations in diﬀerent Swiss cities are not segmented
along ethnic lines, but rather along a distinction between insiders and out-
siders. Immigrants from the guest-worker period distance themselves from
the recently arrived refugees from former-Yugoslavia and Turkey. In these
Swiss neighborhoods, notions of community and belonging are deﬁned in
cross-ethnic terms. Ethnic categories play a secondary role in this classiﬁ-
cation; it is not the main principle for constructing the boundary, and both
insiders and outsiders are ethnically heterogeneous. Using social network
analysis (primary ties of individuals), he ﬁnds that the main interactional
cleavage separates old-established neighborhood residents from newly arrived
immigrants, but he also ﬁnds that most of the networks where mono-ethnic.
While this study looks at the boundary deﬁnition of individuals, the same
logic can be applied to organizations. Indeed, previous studies identiﬁed mi-
grants' organizing process (Soysal, 1994) and the collective identity on which
migrants mobilize in the public sphere. The citizenship regimes may thus
also impact the processes of boundary deﬁnition of migrant organizations.
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This discussion suggests that the POS shape the organizing process of
immigrants as well as the network structure of immigrants' organizations.
While Soysal (1994) shows how institutional approaches deﬁne migrants' or-
ganizing process and the identities upon which they organize, Ireland (1994)
ﬁnds that political opportunities can aﬀect the network structure. Although
not in a formal and systematic way, he ﬁnds variations in the way migrant or-
ganizations are related to other migrant and autochthonous organizations. In
a similar vein, the boundary deﬁnition approach of Wimmer (2008) empha-
sizes the impact of institutions on the relational aspect of boundary deﬁni-
tion. When it addresses the issue of networks, the traditional POS approach
mainly focuses on instrumental ties and the strategic adaptation to given
opportunities and constraints, but authors looking at immigrant collective
action extend the traditional POS approach by also taking into account the
formation of collective identities and boundary formation. Their deﬁnition of
the POS in the ﬁeld of immigration allows them to explain not only resource
exchange processes, but also boundary formation.
2.2.3 Hypotheses on the eﬀect of the POS on network struc-
ture
Based on these ﬁndings, diﬀerent explorative hypotheses can be developed.
The central idea of this research is that the network structure in the ﬁeld of
immigration is aﬀected by the political opportunity structure in the ﬁeld in
its discursive as well as in its institutional dimension. Discursive opportuni-
ties act as a symbolic cleavage in the ﬁeld, while institutional opportunities
deﬁne the chances of migrant organizations gaining access to the political
system.
Contextual aspects are expected to shape patterns of interaction by af-
fecting the logic of inter-organizational linkages of resource exchange and
boundary deﬁnition. The structure of the organizational network in the ﬁeld
of immigration and ethnic relations, and its level of integration depends upon
the speciﬁc POS. These contextual factors are expected to have an eﬀect on
the modes of coordination of collective action, which in turn shape the global
network structure. The combination of the institutional aspect of the spe-
ciﬁc POS in the ﬁeld of immigration as part of opportunities for migrants
to access the political system and the cultural aspect of citizenship regimes,
39
as part of a nation's symbolic cleavage structure is expected to aﬀect the
network structure of migrant organizations.
As outlined previously, general POS deﬁne the access of actors to the
political system and have been shown to aﬀect logics of organizational inter-
actions. The institutional dimension of speciﬁc opportunities in the ﬁeld of
immigration deﬁnes the access of migrants to the political system. Speciﬁc
POS determine whether migrants are recognized as legitimate actors and
have access to the public sphere. The civic-assimilationist and the mutli-
culturalist models recognize migrants as legitimate actors who can intervene
in the public space and as a consequence give them access to institutional
channels. While in both systems migrants are recognized as legitimate to
intervene in the public sphere, their legitimacy stems from diﬀerent concep-
tions of citizenship and diﬀerent deﬁnitions of legitimate collective identities
(this aspect will be developed further in the upcoming discussion of the ef-
fect of the symbolic cleavage structure on networks). Since migrants can
access institutional channels, they have also access to resources, represen-
tation, and recognition. In this case, their resources are expected to be
concentrated on intervention in the political process and to encourage the
formation of professionalized and centralized associations in the ﬁeld. More
resourceful associations would participate directly in the political process
and invest less in alliance-building. Associations with fewer resources would
invest in alliance-building with associations that have more resources, to in-
directly access the political process. Moreover, because of the recognition
of migrants as legitimate actors and their access to resources, associations
would have to rely less on strong collective identities for collective action and
are thus expected to invest less in ties reﬂecting boundaries (because of the
costs related to creating and maintaining such ties). As a consequence, in
open speciﬁc POS, networks of migrant organizations are expected to display
higher densities of resource exchanges and to be embedded in organizational
or coalitional modes of coordination of collective action in which boundary
deﬁnition does not cut across single organizations. Therefore, the network
is expected to be hierarchical and dominated by a few specialized and pro-
fessionalized associations acting as brokers between the system and more
grassroots associations.
In a context of closed speciﬁc POS, resources for collective action are
scarce, since access to the political system is more diﬃcult and associations
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do not have the resources and legitimacy to intervene in the public sphere.
Ethno-assimilationist models of citizenship exclude migrants from the ma-
jority political community, and both symbolic and material resources for
collective action are scarce. Migrant associations in this context will have
to rely mainly on their constituency for collective action. Creating alliances
with other associations would be encouraged to mobilize as many adherents
as possible. Therefore, associations are expected to develop collective iden-
tities cutting across single associations to increase the number of members
they can mobilize. In a closed context, organizations would thus invest more
in ties reﬂecting processes of boundary deﬁnition. The higher dependence
of associations on their members would prevent associations from forming
alliances that would require a negotiation of their identity. In this context,
the network of migrant associations is expected to display higher densities of
ties reﬂecting boundary deﬁnition. Therefore, the associations are expected
to be embedded in social movement or community modes of coordination
of collective action. As a consequence, the network is expected to be more
horizontal, but also highly fragmented. Indeed, the high investment in ties
reﬂecting boundaries is expected to favor a network with diﬀerent highly in-
terconnected clusters with distinct collective identities that are only slightly
connected to one another.
Besides speciﬁc institutional opportunities, networks in the ﬁeld of immi-
gration are expected to vary along the symbolic cleavage in the ﬁeld, namely,
discursive opportunities. Indeed, migrant identities and patterns of organi-
zation and participation are shaped by the receiving society's discourse and
policies regarding migrants. By deﬁning the legitimacy, resonance, and vis-
ibility of migrants in the host society, discursive opportunities are expected
to aﬀect the lines along which immigrants' organizational networks are seg-
mented. In other words, discursive opportunities and the recognition of
identities in the ﬁeld of immigration are expected to aﬀect the fragmenta-
tion principle at work in the network of migrant organizations in the same
way as cleavages aﬀect the fragmentation principles of social movement net-
works. As a consequence, discursive opportunities are expected to shape the
network structure.
In the ﬁeld of immigration, discursive opportunities reﬂect the salience
of the ethnic cleavage. Discursive opportunities determine which collective
identities are more likely to gain visibility and achieve legitimacy in the pub-
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lic discourse; they have consequences on the self-deﬁnition of migrants and
on the collective identity they mobilize (Koopmans et al., 2005). In the
civic-assimilationist model, migrants are recognized as legitimate when they
mobilize and organize on a civic basis, that is, as citizens without any partic-
ularistic identity such as ethnicity. In this context, ethnic identities are not
recognized, and migrants would thus not organize on an ethnic basis. How-
ever, the discursive context is rather open in this case, since migrants are
considered legitimate to intervene in the public sphere as long as they do not
mobilize on an ethnic basis, but the symbolic ethnic cleavage is not salient.
Consequently, the network of migrant organizations is expected to be frag-
mented along functional lines on the basis of a division of labor in the ﬁeld of
immigration, because migrant organizations are expected to form alliances
cutting across ethnicity. In the ethno-assimilationist model and the multi-
cultural model, ethnic identities are recognized. In the multicultural model,
ethnic identities are promoted and migrants are encouraged to mobilize and
organize on an ethnic basis. On the other hand, ethnicity is not recognized
as a legitimate identity in the ethno-assimilationist model, but migrants are
deﬁned as members of a national or an ethnic group. The consequences of
the discourse on ethnic identities on the legitimacy of migrants to mobilize on
an ethnic basis diﬀer in these two models, but the symbolic ethnic cleavage
is salient in both contexts. As a consequence, in both contexts the network
is expected to be fragmented along ethnic lines.
To summarize, the hypotheses concerning the impact of political oppor-
tunity structure on the network structure are:
In a context of open speciﬁc institutional opportunities, the network of mi-
grant organizations is expected to display organizational or coalitional
modes of coordination, a hierarchical structure with a lower level of
fragmentation. In closed speciﬁc institutional opportunities, the net-
work of migrant organizations is expected to display social movement
or community modes of coordination of collective action, a horizontal
structure and a high level of fragmentation.
When the symbolic ethnic cleavage is salient as expressed by discursive
opportunities, the network of migrant organizations is expected to be
fragmented along ethnic lines. When this cleavage is less salient, the
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network of migrant organizations is expected to be fragmented along
functional lines.
2.3 Political inclusion of migrant organizations
What are the consequences of the network structures in which migrant orga-
nizations are embedded for the political inclusion of migrant organizations?
Organizations do not act in a vacuum. Networks provide opportunities and
constraints for political participation (Knoke, 1990). Thus, taking into ac-
count the relational context in which associations are embedded is central
to understanding the dynamics of political inclusion of migrant associations
and what favors or inhibits their political inclusion. This section addresses
this issue. It ﬁrst brieﬂy reviews studies of political participation of migrants
at the individual and collective levels. It then deﬁnes political inclusion of
migrant organizations. It ﬁnally examines the combination of POS and net-
work structures and its consequences for political inclusion and concludes
with hypotheses on political inclusion of migrant organizations.
2.3.1 Organizations and political inclusion
A growing body of literature addresses the integrative role of migrant or-
ganizations. Migrant organizations are considered positive for economical,
social, and political integration. Associations have been found to favor po-
litical integration of migrants by providing ethnic groups with social capital.
Following Putnam's (1993) approach of social capital, Fennema and Tillie
(1999) look at ethnic civic communities and their impact on political in-
tegration of migrants. They found that in Amsterdam, dense ethnic civic
networks provide migrant groups with ethnic social capital, which favors
their political integration. Following the same approach but examining indi-
viduals' political integration in diﬀerent European cities, others found that
participation in migrants' associations increases the political integration of
individuals (Jacobs and Tillie, 2004). However, these studies also found that
the depending on the context, membership in cross-ethnic and non-ethnic or-
ganizations played a more important role in explaining political integration
of migrants than did ethnic organizations (Jacobs et al., 2004).
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Political opportunity theory has also been used to explain the organiz-
ing process of migrant groups in diﬀerent European cities (Vermeulen, 2005)
2. These studies show that the founding and continuation of migrant as-
sociations is context-dependent. More precisely, active integration policies
favoring migrants' organizing process play a positive role in the foundation
and continuation of immigrant associations. Finally, some studies look at
the mobilizing role of migrant organizations and how they can mobilize mi-
grants, but also at whether these associations are able to represent migrants'
interest, have an eﬀect on local politics, and make their voice heard (Ra-
makrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a).
While these studies focus on the political integration of migrants, their
deﬁnition of integration diﬀers largely. When looking at group-level inte-
gration, Fennema and Tillie (1999) analyze migrants' level of participation
in local elections. The studies of individuals' integration extend migrants'
participation to diﬀerent forms of participation that are also available to
non-citizens, such as contacting and protest activities. But they also take
into account the attitudinal dimension of participation, such as interest in
politics. Finally, analyzing the political incorporation at the organizational
level, Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008a) look at the abilities migrant
associations have to defend migrants' interest and make their voice heard by
public oﬃcials. Distinguishing between civic and political engagement, these
studies look at three dimensions for both forms of engagement: the resources
available to organizations, their presence (their visibility and recognition,
their degree of connection to other political or civic organizations), and their
weight (access to public oﬃcials, ability to have their agenda represented)
(Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a, p.17-22).
Analyzing political participation of migrants, most of these studies refer
to political integration or political incorporation. Yet, the notion of political
integration is complex and multifaceted and is still the object of an ongoing
debate in the literature (see Morales, 2011, for a review). While some argue
that integration equates assimilation, others distinguish between processes
and outcomes of political incorporation. However, the main issue is that
most of the deﬁnitions of migrants' political integration contain a normative
dimension that deﬁnes when migrants are politically integrated. This means
deﬁning a threshold distinguishing successful from failed integration. This
2See the JEMS special issue (Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005b)
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also holds true for most studies of migrants' political participation. Another
debated issue is whether to take autochthonous participation as a landmark
for assessing the level of migrants' integration. However, as pointed out by
Morales (2011), depending on the context, migrants may engage in diﬀerent
forms of participation than autochthonous populations do. To avoid the nor-
mative dimension of integration, this study will consider migrants' political
inclusion. This will allow us to assess whether migrants engage in political
activities, to what extent, and in what forms. The extent to which migrant
engage in political activities and what forms their participation take will be
compared in diﬀerent contexts to understand under what conditions migrant
associations participate in the political process.
Focusing on migrant organizations, and drawing on Morales (2011), three
dimensions of political inclusion will be considered. The ﬁrst is the political
function of associations. The political function distinguishes associations'
activities between policy- and client-oriented (Kriesi, 1996; Lelieveldt et al.,
2007). While most voluntary associations engage in collective action, their
activities are not necessarily political. Making a distinction between pol-
icy and client-oriented activities will allow us to assess the extent to which
associations engage in political activities as opposed to activities oriented
towards their clients.
The second dimension refers to the forms of political activities of asso-
ciations, in other words, their action repertoire. The repertoire of action
of migrant associations might vary according to the POS (Koopmans et al.,
2005). Moreover, being embedded in social movement mode of coordination
or in organizational mode of coordination might also aﬀect the forms of po-
litical activities in which they engage. The forms of political activities can
be more conventional ones, but can also take contentious forms.
The last dimension refers to the political contacts of migrant associations
and assesses their ability to gain access to public oﬃcials, in other words their
potential political impact. Their access to public oﬃcials and institutions
might also depend on the modes of coordination in which they are embedded
as well as the overall network structure.
2.3.2 POS, network structures and political inclusion
In the literature on immigration, ethnic associations are viewed as positive
for the social, cultural, and political integration of immigrants. These views
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are in line with a Tocquevillian approach to civil society that considers that
active civil societies are virtuous (Warren, 2001). In this perspective, the
number of voluntary associations is an indicator of a well-functioning civil
society and consequently a virtuous democracy. This view is common in
studies of migrant associations and their potential for integration. The more
immigrants are organized, that is, the higher the number of immigrant as-
sociations, the better their integration in diﬀerent spheres: social, political,
and cultural.
However, why would migrants with more associations be better oﬀ? Im-
migrant associations are embedded in patterns of relationships that act as
constraints and opportunities for political action and the possibility of mak-
ing their voices heard. The structure of immigrant associations' network
as well as the structural location have to be taken in consideration to bet-
ter understand the mechanisms explaining immigrants' associations' political
integration.
In their study of ethnic civic communities in Amsterdam, Fennema and
Tillie (1999) showed how a dense ethnic organizational network favors the
political participation of ethnic groups. While this might hold true for Am-
sterdam, a city characterized by a multicultural citizenship model that en-
courages organization on an ethnic basis, in other contexts in which ethnic
identities are not encouraged, dense ethnic civic networks may exclude mi-
grants from the host society. In Milan, which is characterized by an ethno-
assimilationist model of citizenship, migrant organizations that are linked to
autochthonous organizations are better integrated politically than migrant
associations densely related to ethnic organizations (Pilati, 2011). Migrants
organized on an ethnic basis are excluded from the political sphere, and au-
tochthonous associations act as brokers between migrants and the receiving
society's public sphere. Vermeulen and Berger (2008), comparing the net-
work structure of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and Berlin, found a
horizontal and densely connected network in the open context of Amster-
dam and a hierarchical and fragmented network in the rather closed context
of Berlin. As a consequence of these structures, Turkish organizations in
Amsterdam are better integrated than their counterparts in Berlin.
These ﬁndings highlight the role that the combination of POS and net-
work structure can play for the political integration of migrant associations.
Still, focusing on a speciﬁc group in diﬀerent contexts or on diﬀerent mi-
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grant groups in the same context does not tell the whole story about the
network structure in the ﬁeld of immigration in diﬀerent contexts. How are
organizations composed of migrants, related to each other, and what are the
consequences of the network in the ﬁeld of immigration on their political in-
tegration? The overall network structure might have an impact on the level
of political incorporation of associations. Moreover, diﬀerent network struc-
tures might have diﬀerent eﬀects on political integration in diﬀerent contexts.
Social movement studies found inconsistent results on the form of network
structures and mobilization. While some found that hierarchical networks
favor mobilization of social movements (Osa, 2003), others pointed to the
positive eﬀect of more horizontal networks (Rucht, 1989). These ﬁndings
suggest that the eﬀect of the network structure varies in time and in space.
But the structural location of actors within speciﬁc global networks might
also aﬀect the political integration of associations. At the individual level,
some authors found that the centrality of actors in a network was an impor-
tant determinant of political mobilization in a context characterized by low
levels of contention, while in contexts with a long contentious tradition, cen-
trality was not as important in explaining the level of mobilization (Knoke,
1990, p.73). In a similar vein, associations embedded in social movement
types of coordination of collective action show higher levels of participation
in contentious activities in a context characterized by a contentious politi-
cal tradition, whereas civic organizations embedded in the same relational
patterns in a political context characterized by a more consensual political
tradition tend to participate in more conventional types of political activities
(Diani et al., 2010).
2.3.3 Hypotheses on political inclusion
Drawing on these ﬁndings and following the POS approach, the following
hypotheses can be formulated. The central argument is that political inclu-
sion of migrant organizations depends on the interaction between POS and
network structures in which they are embedded. More precisely, the combi-
nation of POS and network structures will aﬀect the political participation
of migrant organizations (arrow 3 in ﬁgure 2.1).
As previously outlined, institutional POS are expected to aﬀect the pre-
vailing modes of coordination of collective action and consequently the cen-
tralization and fragmentation of migrant organizational networks. Moreover,
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the fragmentation principles at work in the networks will depend on the
discursive opportunities. Political opportunity theory, as well as previous
studies on collective claim-making in the ﬁeld of immigration argue that col-
lective mobilization is shaped by the POS (arrow 4 in ﬁgure 2.1). However,
since associations are embedded in networks that also provide opportunities
and constraints for political participation, and since these networks in turn
are embedded in political contexts, the eﬀect of given network structures on
political participation is expected to vary according to the context.
It has been previously argued that similar network structures can be
found in diﬀerent contexts. For example, multiculturalist models and ethno-
assimilationsit models of citizenship are expected to favor social movement
or subcultural models of collective action. Moreover, in both contexts, the
networks of migrant organizations are expected to be fragmented along eth-
nic lines because of the salience of the symbolic ethnic cleavage. However,
given the diﬀerent discursive opportunities related to ethnic identities in
these contexts, the outcome for political inclusion of migrant organizations
is expected to vary. In a multiculturalist context in which ethnic identities
are recognized and even promoted, migrant organizations embedded in so-
cial movement or subcultural modes of coordination fragmented along ethnic
lines will show higher levels of political inclusion than associations embedded
in similar networks in an ethno-assimilationist context. Indeed, in a multicul-
turalist context, migrants embedded in such networks will have the resources
to participate politically. Being recognized as legitimate actors, this conﬁg-
uration will favor their political inclusion. But in an ethno-assimilationist
context, these network structures would exclude migrants from the political
sphere because their organization around ethnic identities is not recognized
as legitimate for intervening in the public sphere. As a consequence, mi-
grant organizations embedded in the latter context are expected to engage
rather in client-oriented activities, to show lower levels and more contentious
forms of political activities, and ﬁnally to have fewer contacts with political
institutions.
In a civic-assimilationist model, the pattern is expected to be diﬀerent.
As outlined previously, the network is expected to display more hierarchical
forms and organizational or coalitional modes of coordination of collective
action. Moreover, the network will be fragmented along functional lines. In
this context, ethnic identities are not recognized. However, migrants can ac-
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cess institutional channels as long as they do not organize on an ethnic basis.
This institutional openness and the absence of a symbolic ethnic cleavage is
expected to have a positive eﬀect on political inclusion of migrant associa-
tions. This combination of POS and network structure is thus expected to
have a positive eﬀect on the political inclusion of migrant organizations. In
such as conﬁguration, migrant associations are expected to engage more in
policy-oriented activities than in the ethno-assimilationist model. While as-
sociations are also expected to have more contacts with political institutions,
their forms of participation will be less contentious.
To summarize, the hypothesis concerning the impact of the interaction
of speciﬁc POS and network structures on political inclusion is:
The interaction of speciﬁc POS and network structures is expected to im-
pact the political inclusion of migrant organizations. Migrant organi-
zations embedded in modes of coordination displaying high densities of
ties reﬂecting boundary deﬁnition, will show higher levels of political
inclusion if the boundaries are drawn along the recognized identities in
the ﬁeld.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the factors that can aﬀect the network structure of
migrant organizations. It showed how the speciﬁc opportunities in the ﬁeld of
immigration can explain network structures of migrant organizations. More
speciﬁcally, two dimensions of speciﬁc POS can aﬀect network structures
in the ﬁeld of immigration: the institutional dimension, which deﬁnes the
access of migrants to institutional channels, and the discursive dimension
which deﬁnes the visibility, resonance, and legitimacy of migrants to inter-
vene in the public sphere. It discussed how the fragmentation principle and
the modes of coordination of collective action can be aﬀected by the speciﬁc
opportunity structure in the ﬁeld of immigration, but also how the inter-
action of the speciﬁc POS and the network structure can aﬀect migrants'
organizations' political inclusion. The chapter then developed the hypoth-
esis that will guide the empirical analysis. The next chapter will provide
an overview of the speciﬁc institutional and discursive opportunities of the




Opportunities in Lyon and
Zurich
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter presented the theoretical framework for the analysis of
networks of immigrants' associations in diﬀerent political settings. It high-
lighted the role played by institutional and discursive opportunity structures
in inﬂuencing strategic choices and in the formation of legitimate collec-
tive identities of immigrant associations. The chapter suggested diﬀerent
mechanisms for the formation of instrumental and identity ties. The central
argument is that context may play a role in shaping ﬁeld network struc-
tures by giving incentives to associational actors to ally with some actors
rather than others. The main idea is that by shaping legitimate collective
identities,the institutional and discursive factors will have an eﬀect not only
on the way migrants organize as a collective actor, but also in how associ-
ations relate to each other. This chapter aims at describing this context,
i.e., the independent variable. First, it brieﬂy describes of immigration and
some general aspects of integration philosophies in France and Switzerland
and in the two cities under stud, Lyon and Zurich. In the second part, it
focuses on the institutional opportunity structures in both cities and shows
how immigrants' associations face a more open institutional context in Lyon
than in Zurich. It ﬁrst describes the individual rights dimension, followed
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by the cultural group rights' dimension. It then examines speciﬁc opportu-
nities at the local level. It shows that individual rights are more developed
in Lyon, but that immigrants in Zurich have more cultural group rights.
Moreover, the speciﬁc opportunities at the local level are also more open
in Zurich, because policies for immigrants' integration are more developed
there. The next section looks at discursive opportunity structures in both
cities and shows that the symbolic ethnic cleavage is more salient in Zurich
than in Lyon. The chapter concludes by discussing the implications these
diﬀerences have for tie formation of immigrant associations in both cities,
examining the hypotheses formulated in the previous chapter in light of the
speciﬁc political opportunity structures in Lyon and Zurich.
3.2 Immigration and integration in France and Switzer-
land
3.2.1 France
France has been an immigration country since the thirteenth century (Weil,
2004) and has faced diﬀerent immigration waves. Mass immigration to
France began in the mid-nineteenth century. Migrants came mainly from
Belgium, Italy, and Poland. By 1930, France had the world's highest rate
of immigration (Weil, 2004; Wihtol de Wenden, 2002). After World War
II, immigration resumed, and France had the highest world's foreign-born
population. A new wave of migrants of Spanish, Asian, or North-African
origin came to France to work in the mines and factories in which French
peasants were reluctant to work. In 1901, nearly two-thirds of the foreign
population in France was Belgian or Italian (Horowitz, 1992). During the
interwar period, many Slavs came, as did Poles, Czechs, and Ukrainians.
However, immigration involved people from elsewhere in Europe, who would
have either left after a short while or undergone complete assimilation into
French society. In the immediate after-war period, lacking the work force for
the reconstruction and modernization of the country, and to reconstruct and
develop its economy, France adopted a policy of importing guest-workers.
The arrival of immigrants on the national territory is strongly linked to its
economic needs. After World War II, the composition of the foreign pop-
ulation changed to become more heterogeneous, and this ethnically diverse
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foreign-born population transformed into true minority communities (Ire-
land, 1994). In 1974, France decided to end labor immigration and closed its
borders, mainly because of the economic crisis and fear of unemployment.
But authorities could not stop family reunions. A new wave of immigration
started in which families from Maghreb moved to France. Those migrants
were mainly young, unqualiﬁed single men. Although France had closed its
borders, immigration resumed from Maghreb, and from southern European
countries such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal.
As opposed to the 1920 and '30s, which saw high numbers of workers im-
migrating to France, or the 1950s through the 1970s, France is no longer an
immigration country. The share of foreign-born population living in France
has been stable for the last twenty-ﬁve years. After the decision to close
French borders to new labor-related immigration in the 1970s, such immi-
gration decreased drastically. Family reunion is nowadays the main source
of immigration to France. Immigrants to France are mainly from Africa,
especially North-Africa. Of the existing immigrant groups in France, almost
half of them are Europeans (45%) (Bozec, 2007)
Like many European states with a long guest-worker tradition, France
only started relatively late to address the issue of integration of migrants.
For a long time, France did not have any integration policy, because the
question about migrants' settlement remained open (Weil, 2004). Migrants'
integration was left to private ﬁrms, political associations, and trade unions.
Furthermore, since immigration was reduced to its economic dimension, it
was left out the political debate (Chabanet, 2005)
After the war, integration took the republican path. Migrants' integra-
tion into the labor and housing markets (by gaining access to housing in the
newly built social housing, where they lived with middle-class Frenchmen
medium (Loch, 2005)) allowed individual upward mobility and social inte-
gration. Over time, immigrants assimilated in the creuset français (Noiriel,
1988), although they maintained their original culture through cultural or-
ganizations. These strong links to their country of origin were encouraged
by both the countries of origin and the receiving country, because they were
expected to leave after a short stay. Diﬀerent institutions played a central
role in the integration of immigrants and mainly of their children who were
born in France: the school, the army, churches, trade unions, and politi-
cal parties. Many of them identiﬁed themselves as workers and members of
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the workers' parties. Moreover, the republican integration model worked as
planned: starting with social integration, it was followed by cultural assim-
ilation and ﬁnally national identiﬁcation. Immigrants became workers and
then citizens ("de l'immigré au citoyen", Schnapper). Ethnic, linguistic, cul-
tural, and religious conﬂict were not non existent, but in the political sphere,
class conﬂict was much more salient (Chabanet, 2005).
In the 60's, in answer to the population's awareness about the social and
housing conditions of immigrants, the government created structures aimed
at dealing with immigrants' speciﬁc problems (Sonacotra and FAS). The
ﬁrst integration policy was related to housing. The lack of decent houses for
migrants and in general led to the creation in 1956 of the SONACOTRAL
(Société Nationale de Construction de Logements pour les Travailleurs Al-
gériens), aimed at constructing houses for migrants and their families. In
1958, the state created the FAS (Fonds d'action sociale pour les travailleurs
musulmans d'Algérie en métropole et pour leurs familles), which ﬁnances
socio-cultural activities. The creation of these institutions illustrates the
particularity of the French way of dealing with integration issues, by creat-
ing institutions that respond to a speciﬁc social problem particular to im-
migrants. In the 70's, new sectorial institutions were created, each dealing
with a speciﬁc social problem: housing,for instance, or education (Lapey-
ronnie, 1993; Weil, 2004; Loch, 2005). The approach is not much diﬀerent
nowadays. Many speciﬁc institutions deal with immigration and integration
in a transversal approach, involving diﬀerent ministries.
In the 1980s the immigrant population was concentrated in certain ar-
eas where socio-economic disadvantaged people lived, which mobilized na-
tional public opinion. The priority of public action thus focused on one
these residential areas, and state intervention shifted to the local level. In
these years, the state was using a new method: means were concentrated
on speciﬁc locations, not toward speciﬁc populations, as is done in the U.S.
(Weil, 2004). Hence, for each speciﬁc problem, an institution was created.
For the schooling issue, ZEP (Zones d'éducation prioritiaires) were created,
which are deﬁned by the share of foreign pupils (30%). The ZEP get more
ﬁnancial resources on the basis of pedagogical projects as well as human re-
sources. Another issue that became increasingly sensitive after the riots in
the summer 1981 (l'été chaud) was the professional and social integration of
young people. It was during this period that the Mission locales were cre-
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ated, which are institutions aimed at favoring the professional advancement
of young people. These Mission locales intervening in education, health, and
housing issues.
Housing is a domain in which the state intervenes at the local level, via
the mayors because of the decentralization law. The objective of this action
is the rehabilitation of degraded houses in selected urban areas in to avoid
the development of ghettos. Finally, with the contrats d'agglomération the
state engages in measures by ﬁnancing public collectivities and associations.
Contracts are also created with associations, which have ﬂourished since the
liberalization of migrants, organization in 1981. The FAS selects but also
orients associations' activities by granting funds and making associations
playing a central role in integration. Nevertheless, if these policies had a
positive eﬀect in certain areas, they did not have the expected success. Mi-
grants are still facing high levels of unemployment, housing problems, and
school problems. Urban segregation was aggravated, and the most disadvan-
taged communes became poorer.
Presently, the Politique de la Ville and its actions at the local level still
remain one of the main instrument of France's integration policy. It has two
main objectives, housing and the rehabilitation of socially disadvantaged ar-
eas and social inclusion. Two institutions are implementing this policy. The
ANRU (Agence nationale pour le rénovation urbaine) focuses on the housing
issue, and the ACSE (Agence nationale pour la cohésion social et l'égalité
des chances) focuses on social inclusion. These policies reﬂect the awareness
of national political actors that emerged when the tensions in the suburbs
with high concentrations of immigrant populations were getting critical (ri-
ots in the 90's and again in 2005). Positive discrimination seemed to be
the right answer to the lack of social and professional integration and to
the high unemployment rates in those areas. However, the issue of positive
discrimination remains sensitive in France, so, other criteria than nationality
or ethnicity had to be deﬁned. As a consequence, the target of these poli-
cies became speciﬁc territories and not speciﬁc populations. The Politique
de la Ville is considered the best means of fostering integration of people
living in disadvantaged areas. Nevertheless, this approach is sometimes crit-
icized, because many neighborhoods classiﬁed as "politique de la ville" are
not mainly composed of immigrants. Furthermore, the eﬀects of the policy
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are not those expected, since the number of recipients increased and funding
for each neighborhood decreased (Simon, 1999).
Under these integration policies, public authorities had to recognize the
discrimination problem, whether it was based on a religious, cultural or na-
tional basis (Weil, 2004; Fassin, 2002). Authorities recognized the racial
foundation of these inequalities. Discriminations concerned primarily hous-
ing and employment. The state reacted by diﬀerent means to this issue,
the last being the creation of the HALDE (Haute autorité de lutte contre
les discriminations et pour l'égalité) in 2005, following a European directive.
It has real investigation and mediation power as well as full jurisdiction,
although it has no sanctioning power. At the local level, with the decentral-
ization in the 1980's and the Politique de la Ville, French localities have an
instrument giving them a certain autonomy to deal with integration issues.
These policies are mainly oriented towards disadvantaged neighborhoods,
but they de facto address immigrants, who are concentrated in those areas.
Nevertheless, the French policies are ethnicity-blind. No reference is made
to ethnicity because of the republican model.
To conclude, the major issue in the debate on immigration and integra-
tion in France concerns the place of immigrants and their descendants in
the French society. Two main issues are central: socio-economic disadvan-
tages of people from ethnic minority groups and the way cultural diversity
and minority identities are addressed in France. These issues questioned
the traditional French model of integration, which is based on an individ-
ualistic conception of integration and a negative vision of any institutional
recognition of groups and minorities as such. Although the French integra-
tion model has been regularly questioned, and the idea of policies oriented
towards disadvantaged groups has been raised, France is holding ﬁrm to its
republican integration and a strong rejection of multicultural policies such as
the U.S. model. Indeed, a recent report of the Haut Conseil à l'Integration
(HCI) (HCI, 2009), highlights the importance of the individual and universal
aspect of rights. Integration is still considered a direct link between the state
and individuals, and the model is based on individual rights. The French
integration model is based on a politically deﬁned nation, to be understood
as a community of citizens of the state that allows immigrants a political
identity (Loch, 2009). In return, it expects them to assimilate to French
values, which it considers universally valid.
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3.2.2 Lyon (Vaulx-en-Velin)
The history of Lyon perfectly reﬂects national trends on immigration and
integration. Vaulx-en-Velin is a commune of the Greater Lyon of 40'000
inhabitants. It has a long immigration tradition, and nowadays 20.8% of the
population has an immigrant background (Bozec, 2007).
Lyon is one of the cities that received most of the North-African immi-
grants along with Marseille and Paris, and it has always been an economic
center. It was one of the three most important industrial places on the north-
south axis of France, with its textile, metal, and petrochemical industries.
This industrial activity attracted many immigrants. The economic growth
was paralleled by the development of the agglomeration, mainly toward the
east with workers' cities, to which Vaulx-en-Velin belongs.
Until the nineteenth century, Vaulx-en-Velin was a rural village on the
border of Lyon. Industrialization in Vaulx-en-Velin took place in the com-
munes at the east of the city where Lyon is located. When the traditional silk
industry declined, Rhône-Poulenc created several factories for the production
of synthetic silk. One of the most important was situated in Vaulx-en-Velin.
Industrialization started to develop between 1892 and 1898, and many work-
ers migrated to Vaulx-en-Velin during this period (Chabanet, 2005). The
village was growing fast with the establishment of new textile and pharma-
ceutical factories.
Industrialization goes together with the growth of the migrant popula-
tion. The ﬁrst migrants come from Poland, followed by Armenians after
the genocide. In the interwar period, many Italians and Spaniards migrated
to Lyon. After World War II, mainly Kabyles leaving Algeria for economic
and/or political reasons, and Portuguese escaping the Salazar regime mi-
grated to the city. In the 70's, Rhône Poulenc was hiring many workers
from Maghreb. Before France closed its borders in 1974, the las immigration
wave, which was mainly composed of workers from North and Subsaharan
Africa and the Far East, took place.
Industrialization and the demographic development that followed was the
source of the accelerated urbanization of Vaulx-en-Velin (Chabanet, 2005).
As in the "banlieues rouges" 1, social and political activities took place by
the association of production and housing functions related to the develop-
1Workers' suburbs in Paris, strongholds of the French Communist Party in the after
war period.
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ment of the city. Indeed, Vaulx-en-Velin had a communist mayor from 1929
until the 1990s. For a long period, the French Communist Party (PCF) had
the hegemony over a relatively homogeneous social milieu. With the emer-
gence of the worker culture, labor unions started to play a role in interest
representation in the city.
Vaulx-en-Velin became a residential town with the creation of the ZUP
(Zone à Urbaniser en Priorité) in the late 60's 2. While in the ﬁrst years
the ZUP was characterized by a heterogeneity of social origin of its popu-
lation, with mainly middle-class households abandoning the area, the social
distribution of its inhabitants changed in the 70's as the ZUP became an
area where mainly poor families lived. More wealthy households left the
ZUP, and more disadvantaged populations started to move in. Because im-
migrants are often more precarious, predominantly migrants were exposed
to this population movement. These areas are nowadays confronted with a
high concentration of immigrant population, high unemployment levels, and
a younger population than are other areas (Chabanet, 2005).
Immigrants who came after the industrialization to Vaulx-en-Velin got
involved in the labour movement. In this way, migrants were integrated into
the communal clientelist system in which local counselors provided apart-
ments or jobs to newcomers in exchange for their political support (Loch,
2005). The PCF had already lost its dominance by the 70's. Votes for the
PCF started to drop, and in 1981, Vaulx-en-Velin elected a coalition with
the socialist party. This coalition run the city until 2001 under the lead of
Maurice Charrier. Since the elections of 2001, the new mayor has been a
social-democrat. The right has always been weakly represented in Vaulx-
en-Velin, but the Front National (FN) has risen continuously since 1984. In
the 80's, the FN was the strongest right-wing party in Vaulx-en-Velin. The
political situation in Vaulx-en-Velin is rather fragmented, with the PCF on
one side and the center right on the other. In the 90's, the clientelist system
of Vaulx-en-Velin faced a crisis, although the left maintained its majority
(Loch, 2005). If until today it is still the main stream in the commune, this
lies mainly in the important role that the French system grants the mayors.
2The Zone à Urbaniser en Priorité was a French public program between 1959 and 1963
aimed at resolving the housing issue. Many social housing were build in the framework
of this program. Entire new neighborhoods were created, which became the "grands
ensembles". These grands ensembles are still today the target of the Politique de la Ville.
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As other similar cities in France, Vaulx-en-Velin is characterized by a low
voter turnout, one of the lowest in France.
In cities such as Vaulx-en-Velin, the integration of migrants was marked
by the French worker culture that was dominant there. Traditionally and fol-
lowing the republican model, institutions such as the school, the church, and
the political institutions were the main integration instruments (Schnapper,
1991). Nevertheless, with deindustrialization and the concentration of immi-
grants and disadvantaged populations in some areas, the french integration
model did not work as planned any more, and the capacity for integration
of the traditional republican institutions decreased (Loch, 2005).
Vaulx-en-Velin has been an early target of the Politique de la Ville be-
cause of the awareness of the social problems in the "grands ensembles". In
the 1980's, policies were developed in Vaulx-en-Velin such as the renovation
of the ZUP and the creation of a city center. Vaulx-en-Velin was considered
an example of the success of the renovation policies initiated by the central
state. The riots in the 90's in Vaulx-en-Velin came as a surprise to local and
national political actors because the rehabilitation of the ZUP, which started
in 1985, was already considered as a model of the success of the Politique de
la Ville.
In the framework of the Politique de la Ville, contrats de ville were de-
veloped from 1990-1994 that became later the grands projets urbains (GPU)
and grands projets de la ville (GPV) in 2000-2006. The objectives of these
programs are wide. The planned objectives of the 90's was divided into urban
development and social provisions.The ﬁrst objective of the city development
was the construction of the city center. The social aspect concentrated on the
vitalization of the neigborhoods. These objectives were aimed at developing
neighborhood identity for communities from diﬀerent cultural backgrounds
as well as taking measures on behalf of young people. The social measures
comprised the creation of participatory forums in the neighborhoods and the
development of associations (Loch, 2005, p.228). Indeed, after the riots in
the 90's, one of the objectives of the FAS was to ﬁnance local centers and
associations. These associations were supposed to be intermediary instances
of interest representation of the population in the neighborhoods. Funding
was provided by the city and the state, mainly through the FAS. The foun-
dation of new associations was supported, but lacking a real constituency,
these new associations were dissolved soon after the riots (Loch, 2005; Wih-
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tol de Wenden and Leveau, 2007). Nevertheless, the city and the state are
still funding associations within the framework of the Politique de la Ville
through the ACSE, and the city has a speciﬁc department devoted to the
development and the support of associations. Nevertheless the main business
of the Politique de la Ville in Vaulx-en-Velin remains urban renewal.
3.2.3 Switzerland
Like France, in the after-war period, Switzerland was confronted with a
shortage of workers. The agreements signed with Italy in 1949 opened a
wave of massive immigration from Italian guest-workers. These migrants
worked primarily in agriculture, hotel businesses and domestic work, the
textile industry, construction, and the mechanical industry. The approach
in Switzerland was the same as that followed in France, namely that guest-
workers will only remain temporarily in Swiss territory. The immigration
policy is oriented toward discouraging guest-workers settle (Cerutti, 2005).
Four main phases of immigration can be distinguished: a rapid and contin-
uous increase of immigration from 1949 to 1962, followed by a decline from
1963 to 1976, a moderate increase from 1977 to 1992, and ﬁnally a new de-
cline until recently (Piguet, 2005). Although immigration decreased in the
70's as in many other European countries, diﬀerent national groups migrated
to Switzerland. In the immediate after-war period, most immigrants came
from European countries. In the 1950s, the most important groups were
Italians, Germans, French people, and Austrians. Spaniards started to mi-
grate from the 70's and the share of Austrians decreased drastically. The
diversiﬁcation of national origins of immigrants to Switzerland started in
the 1980s with the arrival of Yugoslavians and increased numbers of immi-
grants coming from Turkey and Portugal. By the end of the 1990s, the share
of immigrants from Yugoslavia was as high as the share of Italians. Nowa-
days, Switzerland, like other European countries, faces a more heterogeneous
immigration. Indeed, in 2005, foreigners of 188 diﬀerent nationalities were
living in Switzerland (ODM, 2006). The most important source of immigra-
tion are European countries (59% of foreigners living in Switzerland), which
can be related to the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and Euro-
pean countries on free movement of people. Italians still constitute the most
important national group in the country. Immigration from non-European
countries has also increased and the most important national groups are
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Turks and nationals from former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, and Brazil. While
European immigrants are mainly highly qualiﬁed workers, the main reason
for immigration for non-Europeans is family reunion (Turks, Brazilians, and
nationals from former Yugoslavia) and humanitarian (Sri Lanka) (ODM,
2006).
Although Switzerland has been an immigration country for over sixty
years, Swiss policies on integration are introduced only in 2000 at the federal
level. Switzerland has a long tradition of non-integration, reﬂected through
the rotation principle of foreign workers and the debate on überfremdung
(overforeignization) (Niederberger, 2005). The question of integration of
foreigners came late to the public agenda. Previously, the naturalization
process was expected to assimilate foreigners in Switzerland and to reduce
the share of foreign population. The very restrictive naturalization laws
implied that this objective has never been reached.
Until 2000, the Swiss immigration policy was based on the assumption
that immigrants would come to the country for a limited time and then would
return to their homelands. The immigration issue was characterized until the
end of the 1980s by an antagonism between two main actors: the economy,
demanding open borders to ﬁll the need for workers, and the xenophobic mi-
lieu lobbying for more restrictive conditions of entry to the territory, using to
a large extent the instruments of direct democracy (Mahnig, 2005a). One of
the reasons for the late awareness of national authorities about the settlement
of immigrants and the need for an integration policy can be related in part
to the conﬂict between these two main actors, since the federal authorities
were more reacting to the demands of these two main actors, than develop-
ing a coherent immigration and immigrant policy. Another reason could also
be that integration issues were always a competence of the cantons and the
communes (Niederberger, 2005). The concept of integration has been men-
tioned in the federal law only in the new law on foreigners. Naturalization
is still considered the last step in the integration process, and candidates for
naturalization are expected to be assimilated into Swiss culture. The law
on nationality now requires integration into the Swiss community, but the
text remains vague about deﬁning the concept. This change in the law came
along with the adoption of the ordinance on integration in 2000. According
to it, policies of integration are left to the cantons, which are implement-
ing and adopting it to their speciﬁc contexts. At the national level, only
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broad objectives are deﬁned. Some integration projects are then funded by
the confederation according to these objectives, but also to the extent that
cantons, communities, or third parties make appropriate contributions.
3.2.4 Zurich
Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the region of Zurich has al-
ways been a region of immigration. The expansion of the construction sector
attracted many workers from France, Germany, and Italy, as well as from the
rural regions of the country. The City of Zurich before World War II already
had a high percentage of immigrants (about 34% of the population had a
foreign background) (Mahnig, 2005a). At that time, the most important
community was the German one, but Italians were the most visible com-
munity because they were concentrated in a speciﬁc area. The exceptional
economic situation in Switzerland just after World War II led to a new wave
of massive immigration to the city. The most important populations were
the Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, and Turks. Zurich is still a city with a
high percentage of immigrants (around 30% in 2005), but the composition
of the immigrant population has changed in the last twenty years. It is less
homogeneous now than after World War II, when immigrants from the same
country of origin came in massive numbers. Indeed, the ﬁrst waves of im-
migration after the war were mainly composed of guest workers from south
European countries: Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Immigration was rather
homogeneous in terms of national origin of immigrants. The city of Zurich
shows a similar pattern of the immigrant population as the national trend.
The main and more visible immigrant groups in Zurich are still Italians, but
Turks and Kosovars also are present in signiﬁcant numbers.
Zurich is the biggest Swiss city, with 360'000 inhabitants (1 million in
the agglomaration), and the nation's economic center. It has a large share
of foreign population, and immigrants are concentrated in some areas of the
city. It is led by a coalition of three parties (social democrats, center right,
and christian democrats). Zurich is the home of the extreme-right wing of
the Swiss People's Party and of its leader, Christoph Blocher. Since the 90's,
the share of this party has continuously increased to reach 19% at the last
elections in 2006. However, the Swiss People's Party has been out of the
government coalition since 1998.
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The federalist structure of Switzerland implies that the cantons and the
communes have great autonomy in deﬁning and implementing their policies.
This also holds true for naturalization and integration policies, but not for
granting stay permits, which is a federal competence.
In Zurich, the issue of integration started to become salient only in the
1990's because of the declining integration of migrants into the Swiss econ-
omy, which was largely due to a general increase of unemployment that hit
the migrant population much harder than the Swiss. This was a new prob-
lem for Switzerland, where unemployment of foreigners had always been
resolved through the guest-worker policy. With the settlement and family
reunion of guest-workers, during the 1990s, Switzerland was confronting a
high unemployment rate of foreigners (much higher than that of the Swiss).
The problem struck strongly the cities and raised the question of integration
on the public agendas, most speciﬁcally in cities such as Zurich, Bern, and
Basel (Mahnig and Wimmer 1999). In these years, Zurich elaborated an in-
tegration policy design (Integrationsleitbild) to create a new comprehensive
approach to the question. Based on its previous experience, Zurich devel-
oped in the last years a clear integration policy and is also implementing
it. A department is speciﬁcally devoted to immigrants' integration. This is
directed at newcomers, with welcome conferences give some insights into the
city, the Swiss way of life, and the most important administrations. Another
aspect focuses on settled migrants. The program oﬀers language courses
aimed speciﬁcally at immigrant women, who have not had the opportunity
to learn the language in their workplace. Another central aspect is the in-
tegration of young immigrants in the labor market with a speciﬁc target on
the transition from school to the workplace. Finally, the department for
integration is responsible for the implementation of the federal law on inte-
gration and speciﬁcally the funding of integration projects. It also developed
a policy of exchange and networking with immigrant associations, but has
no speciﬁc funding program for migrant associations. The city of Zurich also
created a consultative body of immigrants, because immigrant do not have
voting rights in Zurich. This body can make suggestions to the city council
on issues related to immigration and integration and is also consulted by the
city council on these issues.
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3.3 Institutional opportunities in Lyon and Zurich
The previous section described the way France and Switzerland, respectively
Lyon and Zurich, deal with immigration and incorporate migrants. To give
a more systematic description of the context, the next section analyzes the
political opportunity structure in both cities. A large set of indicators al-
lows us to classify Lyon and Zurich and to deﬁne the political opportunity
immigrants face. Two dimensions of the speciﬁc POS will be discussed: the
institutional and discursive dimensions. As outlined in chapter 2, the insti-
tutional dimension is deﬁned by the rights and duties oﬀered to migrants and
their access to institutional channels. Discursive opportunities refer to the
cultural notions of citizenship and national identity. These two dimensions
constitute the speciﬁc opportunities in the ﬁeld of immigration (Koopmans
et al., 2005). This section is divided into two parts. The ﬁrst part focuses
on institutional POS. It describes the individual rights granted to migrants
in both cities, then looks at the cultural groups' rights, and ﬁnally at the
local access to institutional channels. In the second part, discursive POS are
described. While the level of analysis is local, some aspects of the POS are
deﬁned at the national level (such as access in both countries to national
competence and some aspects of access to citizenship).3
3.3.1 Individual rights
The ﬁrst dimension of the speciﬁc institutional POS in the ﬁeld of immi-
gration and ethnic relations focuses on diﬀerent aspects of individual rights
granted to immigrants (see table 3.1). Basically, it refers to the conditions for
migrants to access the community by looking at the conditions of entry and
stay in the receiving country and the conditions required for naturalizations.
It also looks at equality of social and economic rights between migrants and
nationals, that is, to what extent migrants have access to the labor market
and to the welfare state. Finally, it considers whether anti-discrimination
rights are foreseen and whether the states grant migrants political rights
(table 3.1 on page 66 summarizes the scores for both cities).
3Institutional opportunities are measured through a series of indicators. Scores range
between -1 and 1. -1 is assigned for closed opportunities, 1 for open ones, 0 for neutral.
Scores have been assigned in a comparative perspective. The description of the data
collection for the POS indicators in to ﬁnd in Appendix ?? on page ??. The full list of
indicators is to be found in Appendix ??, table ?? on page ??.
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To measure access to the community, three indicators are considered:
access to diﬀerent type of permits (long and short-term) and conditions for
naturalization. Access to short-term permits is more open in Vaux-en-Velin
than in Zurich. If conditions to enter are quite similar, France allows par-
ents of a minor national child access the territory, which is not the case in
Switzerland. Another diﬀerence lies in the relationship between the work
regime and work permits. Whereas in France foreigners can stay in the ter-
ritory to search for a job, this is not the case in Switzerland, except for UE
nationals. For the second indicator, access to long-term permits, we ﬁnd
a greater diﬀerence between the two cities. In France, access to long-term
permits is much less restrictive than in Switzerland, be it by marriage with
a national, for the parents of a minor national, or in terms of length of stay
or economic requirements. The last indicator of access to the community is
family reunion. On this aspect, Switzerland is much more restrictive than
France.
Like access to long-term permits, access to nationality is also more re-
strictive in Switzerland than in France. Naturalization is a cantonal as well
as a local competence. Communes and cantons are primarily responsible for
naturalizations. The federal law on acquisition and loss of Swiss nationality
(LN) gives only general orientations on the required conditions for natural-
izations. The communes and the cantons can set their own requirements in
terms of length of stay, economic resources, language knowledge, and inte-
gration. Thus, Swiss citizenship is a three-level citizenship: one needs to
obtain the national citizenship, the cantonal, and the local one. The main
diﬀerence between the two cities is found in the required length of stay to be
eligible and provisions for second and third generations. While Switzerland
follows a jus sanguinis logic, France tends toward a jus solis logic. First,
the required time of residence is much higher in Switzerland (12 years) than
in France (less than 5 years). Furthermore, Zurich requires two years of
residence in the canton. Second, and third-generation immigrants are not
granted automatic citizenship as in France, for example. They can only ben-
eﬁt from a facilitated naturalization, for which the years between the ages
of ten and twenty count double in the calculation of the length of stay.
Access to the labor market varies considerably in each city according to
the type of permit (long- or short-term) and the origin of the immigrants.
UE and EEA nationals have much easier access to the labor market than
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immigrants from third countries in both countries. However, as opposed to
access to citizenship, Switzerland seems to be a little more liberal in terms of
access to the labor market. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that immigrants
from non-EEA or non-EU countries have almost no other way of entering the
Swiss territory than with a work contract. That is, if third-country nationals
have a stay permit (long- or short-term), they are already integrated into the
labor market. As a consequence no speciﬁc restrictions need to be legally
made; restrictions are at the entry stage. Social rights granted to immigrants
are also greater in France than in Switzerland. In France, we ﬁnd a very open
access to a well-developed welfare system. Illegal immigrants have access
to a wide range of beneﬁts, which is not the case of illegal immigrants in
Switzerland. Although they can access a wide range of social beneﬁts, they
usually do not subscribe to insurance because the possible discovery of their
illegal status entails a risk of return in their country of origin. For holders
of long term permits, Switzerland and France do not diﬀer much. Still, in
Switzerland, the use of the right can have negative consequences because
dependence on welfare can be grounds for withdrawal of the permit.
As far as anti-discrimination regulations are concerned, France has a
more developed regulation than Switzerland. If both countries have anti-
discrimination laws, France has more power for implementing it. Indeed,
the types of sanctions for racially discriminatory hiring are higher in France.
Moreover, the public structure on ethnic discrimination has stronger pow-
ers such as responsibilities for processing complaints, reporting and making
proposals to the government. In Switzerland there is no such structure.
The national structure dealing with racial discrimination has only a consul-
tative power. Furthermore, the anti-discrimination legislation is regularly
questioned by the Swiss People's Party as well as the mere existence of the
Federal Commission against Racism.
Finally, in terms of political rights, Lyon and Zurich do not diﬀer. None
of the cities grant immigrants local voting rights, with the exception of EU
migrants at the local level in France. The issue has been discussed in France,
speciﬁcally in 1981, just after the election of François Mitterrand. The ob-
jective of granting immigrants voting rights at the local level, faced many
objections from the right, but also from public opinion. The main reason
why voting rights for migrants on the local level raised so many oppositions
lies in the French conception of the political community. In French history,
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citizenship and voting rights have always been deeply linked to one another.
Moreover, national and local citizenship have never been separated (Weil,
2004, p.227). The issue has also been addressed several times in Zurich. The
right of immigrants has been an issue in Zurich since at least 1998, when the
State Council deﬁned guidelines for immigrants' integration. One of the ob-
jectives of these guidelines was to grant voting rights to immigrants. So far,
attempts to change the cantonal constitution have been made via popular
initiatives to introduce an article giving the communes the competence to
grant immigrants voting rights at the local level (facultative voting right).
But all these attempts have failed. The last attempt was in 2006 with an
initiative asking for the facultative voting rights for immigrants at the local
level. This initiative requested a change in the cantonal constitution that
would allow communes to grant immigrants voting rights.
To sum up, the overall score for individual rights is higher in Lyon than
in Zurich, mainly due to less restrictive access to French citizenship and to
the welfare system. Immigrants in France and speciﬁcally in Lyon have more
open opportunities in terms of individual rights than in Zurich.
Table 3.1: Individual rights
Lyon Zurich
Access short term permit 0.8 0.2
Access to long term permit 0.7 -0.5
Family reunion 0.4 -0.2
Access to nationality -0.2 -0.4
Labour market rights 0.0 0.5
Welfare state access 0.7 -0.3
Anti-discrimination rights 1 0.3
Political rights -1 -1
Individual rights 0.3 -0.2
3.3.2 Collective group rights
The collective group rights dimension looks at the extent to which the host
country grants cultural rights to cultural immigrant minorities. Diﬀerent
indicators are used to measure this dimension: cultural requirement to access
short and long term permits and citizenship. Programs for host country
languages, cultural diﬀerence in schooling, religion and cultural diﬀerence in
the media (the scores are summarized in table 3.2 on page 70). Collective
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group rights refer to the extent to which the host society requires assimilation
to migrants or promote cultural pluralism.
France and Switzerland are both deﬁned as assimilationist countries. Yet,
assimilationism follows a diﬀerent logic in the two cities. French assimila-
tionism follows a republican logic deeply anchored in the deﬁnition of the
nation-state, whereas Switzerland follows an ethno-nationalist logic (Giugni
and Passy, 2006). The same scores on cultural requirement to access the
community illustrates this tendency to assimilationism.
In Lyon, new or strengthened cultural requirements have recently been
deﬁned. Language and civic knowledge is assessed for the renewal of short-
term permits, for the issue of the long-term permits, and for naturaliza-
tion. Yet, these conditions do not apply to UE nationals and Algerians and
Tunisians, because of special regulations for these groups. Still, the prac-
tice might be diﬀerent, and the prefecture might assess language and civic
knowledge of Algerians and Tunisians when they are applying for long-term
permits or naturalization Bozec (2007). In Zurich, cultural requirements con-
stitute a key element of the naturalization procedure. So far, there are no
cultural requirements for short-term or long-term permits, although chang-
ing for long-term permits.
Lyon also diﬀers in terms of multiculturalism in schools. First, in France,
there is a possibility of public funding for Muslim or other minorities, private-
owned schools, but not in Zurich. Furthermore, in France, there are publicly
funded programs of language courses for minorities in public schools. These
programs also exist in Zurich, but they are only partly funded by the city.
However, in both cities, these programs are not aimed at promoting multicul-
turalism, but are leftovers from previous labor-related immigration policies,
which funded and implemented these programs to maintain immigrants' links
to their homelands because they were expected to return (Weil, 2004). How-
ever, Zurich is starting to take into account cultural diversity and introduced
recently courses on the history of religions (Eggert and Morariu, 2007). In
France, no such changes have been made to the public school curricula. In-
deed, according to the republican ideal, the school is the central element of
integration.
To assess the level of acceptance of particularistic identities, indicators
focus on the tolerance of religious identities, more speciﬁcally on Islam. In-
deed, religion is the less negotiable identity for minorities, but is also the most
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problematic one in terms of political handling of ethnic relations (Giugni
and Passy, 2006)? In both cities, there is no religious education in public
schools. The republican tradition of a secular school, aimed at promoting a
civic and national identity excluding traditional and primary identities (re-
ligious, but also social or local identities), remains prevalent. Religion is
present in schools only in an historical perspective. Religious education is
totally conducted outside the public school. The high score of Switzerland
on the religious aspect is mainly related to the fact that there is no regula-
tion about religious signs in the public and the private sectors, as opposed
to France, which strictly regulates religious signs in the public sector.4
Until 2001, the cantonal decree on cemeteries did not allow creation of
separate spaces in cemeteries. The canton and the City of Zurich, in a
dialogue initiated by the city at the end of the 1990s, did not reach any
agreement. The most plausible envisaged solution at that time was to create
private cemeteries for Muslims. But the lack of resources of Muslim asso-
ciations in Zurich made this impossible. The dialogue with the canton was
then re-opened and in 2001, the decree on cemeteries was modiﬁed to allow
separate spaces for other religions in public cemeteries. This allowed the
creation of a space for Muslims in 2004 in the City of Zurich, where burials
according to Islamic rite are allowed.
In France, the 1905 law on separation between church and state prohib-
ited the presence of religious signs in the public areas of cemeteries. Yet,
funerals can be conducted following the religious ritual of the deceased, and
religious signs are allowed in the private parts of cemeteries (graves and
places of worship). The presence of an important Muslim population in
France led to some adjustments in this ﬁeld. No law explicitly forbids re-
serving some parts of cemeteries for diﬀerent religions, so setting up Muslim
squares and other speciﬁc places for minority religions became a common
practice. Speciﬁc burial places can be reserved but must not be separated
by any material means, such as wall or hedges. There are several Muslim
squares in the Lyon urban area, but Vaulx-en-Velin forbids such Muslim
squares.
4It has to be noted that in Switzerland given the high decentralization and the compe-
tences for dealing with such issues ate the local level, the situation diﬀers from one canton
to another. For example, Geneva has special regulations concerning islamic veil in public
schools where it has been prohibited.
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Finally, neither city grants any public funding to mosques. What dis-
tinguishes the cities is that in Lyon, or in France in general, there are such
funding for other religions, and public funding is available for their build-
ings, which is not the case of Zurich. In line with the republican tradition of
laïcité and secularism, the score for religious diversity is lower in Lyon than
in Zurich.
Cultural diversity can also be promoted via the media, by the promo-
tion of cultural diversity and immigrants' integration. Recently in France, a
policy of promotion of ethnic diversity in the media has been deﬁned (HCI,
2009), but not in Switzerland. Moreover, in neither of the countries can
programs for minorities or immigrants be found in public broadcasting.
The last indicator is related to group rights in the labor market. In other
words, do diﬀerent countries or cities deﬁne aﬃrmative action for the inte-
gration of minorities in the labor market? The issue of integration and the
ﬁght against ethnic discrimination, especially in the labor market, has been
a priority on the political agenda in the last several years in France. The
ACSE (former FAS), a public organization intervening in the ﬁeld of immi-
grants' integration, and the DPM (Migration and Population Department in
the Ministry of employment and Social Aﬀairs) have been key public actors
in the domain. They have ﬁnanced and developed various actions directed to
private companies, organizations operating in the ﬁeld of employment, and
disadvantaged populations. The initiatives have been numerous and diverse,
and have mainly been conducted through the signing of agreements between
state and labour market actors. The objectives of such actions are to ﬁght
against ethnic discrimination and to favor cultural diversity inside private
ﬁrms. But these actions have not conducted as true aﬃrmative actions, such
as the creation of ethnic quotas. The only existing aﬃrmative action is based
on a local and socio-economic criteria: in other words, they are directed to-
wards persons disadvantaged areas. But immigrants and ethnic minorities
are de facto the targets of these actions. The same approach has developed
in the public sector, in which aﬃrmative actions are based on socio-economic
criteria Bozec (2007).
In Zurich, there are no such actions for the private sector. Nevertheless,
there are some guidelines for abolishing barriers to employment of foreigners,
speciﬁcally in the public sector, in which a settlement permit is required.
However, the City of Zurich deﬁned some programs to further the integration
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of foreigners in the labor market. In the mission statement for integration,
the local council identiﬁes the problem of integration in the labor market
of immigrants and more speciﬁcally the high unemployment rate of young
immigrants and immigrants with low education levels. Diﬀerent measures are
implemented: integration programs for young unemployed immigrants, with
a particular attention to the transition from school to the labor market, for
young women, and for the promotion of independent work. In Lyon, there are
no such programs and no well-developed policies. However, since foreigners
and ethnic minorities represent in large part of the disadvantaged population,
they are often the actual target of the policies conducted in the ﬁeld of
employment and vocational training. The creation of a new public service
of welcome and integration in 2004 may pave the way to more developed
policies in the ﬁeld. Indeed, in addition to language and civic courses, newly
arrived foreigners can get help to access diﬀerent public services, such as
health, social security, and public employment agencies. But the actions are
very diverse from one local area to another and not well developed so far in
Lyon.
Table 3.2: Collective group rights
Lyon Zurich
Cultural requirement to access community 0.3 0.3




Group-rights on the labour market 0.0 -0.3
Collective group rights 0.1 -0.1
3.3.3 Local institutional access
The last dimension of the speciﬁc institutional POS refers to local institu-
tional access for migrants and their organizations. Indeed, since migrant
associations are active on the local level and since communes have some
political autonomy, their access to local political institutions may have an
eﬀect on their strategies for collective action and how they build alliances
(the scores for local institutional access is summarized in table 3.3 on page
73).
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Both cities were confronted very early with immigration and started com-
paratively early (compared with national political actors) to be concerned
with the integration issue. Zurich wrote its ﬁrst integration statement in
the 90's (Mahnig, 2005b), and Lyon developed its integration measures in
the 80's (Loch, 2005). Still, the cities have diﬀerent degrees of autonomy in
deﬁning and implementing integration measures in both countries. The high
degree of decentralization of Switzerland gives the competency to cantons
and cities in many domains and also for integration. Before the ordinance
of 2000 and the ﬁrst national level mention of integration, integration was a
local and cantonal competency. While the Swiss national law on foreigners
now mentions integration and describes its broad objectives, the deﬁnition
and the implementation of the policy still remains at the local level.
Consequently, Zurich has a clearly deﬁned integration policy, and the
target of this policy are foreigners. A department is devoted to integration,
and the main objectives are integration into the labour market, transition
from school to work for young immigrants, and language programs.
In France, the decentralization law of 1981 gives some autonomy to cities,
mainly the biggest cities, such as Paris, Marseille, Lyon, and Strasbourg in
some areas. The Politique de la Ville more speciﬁcally is decentralized and
works at the levels of the departments, with the Prefet being the repre-
sentatives of the central state, but also with mayors of single communes.
Vaulx-en-Velin, and other East Lyon communes are privileged targets of the
Politique de la Ville. While the Politique de la Ville is not directly a policy
aimed at promoting immigrants' integration, because its target are disad-
vantaged areas and populations, immigrants are de facto the targets of these
policies. Indeed, the cities that comprise the Politique de la Ville often have
high concentrations of immigrants, high unemployment rates, poverty, and
many other social disadvantages. The central idea of this policy is the con-
tract that local communities agree on with the central state. These contracts
deﬁne speciﬁc objectives in diﬀerent areas, such as education, employment,
housing, and discrimination, and are implemented at the local level. The
Politique de la Ville is integrating local associations into the process. Re-
lying on local associations, one of the objectives is to encourage citizens'
participation, and in the long run, the emergence of an elite from the immi-
grant population. The main aspect of this policy in Lyon is urban renewal,
which is much more developed than the social inclusion dimension of the
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policy. Hence, integration policies are better developed in Zurich than in
Lyon.
The political representation of immigrants is also diﬀerent in both cities.
Zurich created a consultative body of foreigners, which has recently been re-
newed. It can make proposals to the local authorities about integration and
is also consulted by authorities on issues related to integration. Members of
this body are selected on the basis of a call made by the city. The city coun-
cil then selects the members to reﬂect the proportion of diﬀerent immigrant
groups in Zurich. Lyon has no speciﬁc institution aimed at representing im-
migrants. The Forum de la Ville (consultative bodies) are addressed to all
citizens. Thus, no distinction is made on the basis of nationality or ethnicity.
If the score is higher in Zurich, it is only because the city created a consulta-
tive body speciﬁcally for immigrants, which reﬂects the more diﬀerentialist
approach in Zurich than in Lyon, where, according to the Republican prin-
ciple, no distinction is made in terms of ethnicity or nationality.
As far as policies towards association are concerned, which also refers
to funding of migrant associations, the diﬀerence between the two cities is
rather small. The main diﬀerence lies in the fact that in Lyon, no speciﬁc
policies are directed toward migrant associations, and migrant associations
have no funding possibilities. In Zurich, migrant associations can get funds
for speciﬁc projects. However, the budget is very low, and projects have to
be developed with autochthonous associations. The low score for Lyon lies in
the fact that no speciﬁc funding is foreseen for associations organized on an
ethnic basis. Associations with constituencies composed mainly of migrants
that are active in the areas of political or social inclusion have the possibility
of getting subsidies from the state. Moreover, there is a speciﬁc department
in Vaulx-en-Velin that informs associations about possibilities for funding
and also provide assistance for applying for such subsidies.
Finally, the political audience of anti-immigrant parties is relatively high
in both cities. At the last local elections, the share of the Swiss People's
Party reached 19% and the Front National in Lyon over 15%.
3.4 Discursive opportunity structures
Institutional opportunities enlarge or restrict access to the political system
for actors. Discursive opportunities refer to the main vision of national
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Table 3.3: Speciﬁc POS
Lyon Zurich
Development of immigrants' integration 0.2 1.0
Political representation of immigrants -0.3 1.0
Attitude towards minorities -0.5 0.25
Attitude towards organizations integration ﬁeld -0.5 0
Political audience of anti-immigrant parties -1.00 -1.00
Speciﬁc POS -0.4 0.3
identity and consequently to the deﬁnition of who belongs to the national
community and who does not. Discursive opportunities refer to the symbolic
and cultural aspects of citizenship and reﬂect the saliency of the symbolic
ethnic cleavage. In this respect, Lyon and Zurich have diﬀerent approaches.
These symbolic and cultural aspects of citizenship can be traced back to the
formation of the nation-state (Brubaker, 1992) and the conception of national
identity. The most common example of these discursive aspects is the very
deﬁnition of immigrants in diﬀerent European countries. While migrants
are labeled "foreigners" (Ausländer, Etrangers, Stranieri) in Switzerland, in
France they are referred to as immigrants (Immigrés).
Consequently, these symbolic and cultural opportunities are reﬂected in
the public discourse on immigration. How are migrants categorized in the
public debate in the ﬁeld of immigration? Discursive opportunities are not in-
dependent from institutional opportunities; they are in constant interaction,
and institutional opportunities are shaped partly by discursive opportunities
and vice and versa. Furthermore, immigrants are not mere objects of these
opportunities. With their claims and mobilization, they also participate in
the formation of the changes of these opportunities. The best example is the
beur movement in France and its claim to a droit à la diﬀérence and the
public debate that followed (Wihtol de Wenden and Leveau, 2007). While
the institutional POS has been shown to impact strategic choices of collec-
tive actors, the discursive aspect of POS is expected to have an eﬀect on the
collective identities of actors mobilizing in a speciﬁc ﬁeld. Koopmans et al.
(2005) and Cinalli and Giugni (2011) showed the importance of the discur-
sive aspect of opportunities for mobilization and development of collective
identities of immigrants for mobilization.
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To examine the symbolic and cultural aspects of citizenship, we rely on
political claims analysis. Political claims analysis draws on protest event
analysis but extends it to all claims made in the public sphere. It records
claims made by all actors intervening in the public sphere on a speciﬁc issue
by drawing on newspaper articles. The main variables that are coded are
the actor making the claim, the issue of the claim, the identity of the object
of the claim, and the position of the claim. This allows us to assess the
discursive opportunities in a given ﬁeld.5
To see how migrants are deﬁned in the public sphere, the identity of
the object of claim is used as an indicator. As mentioned previously, the
most common examples are the use of racial identities in Great Britain, and
the deﬁnition as "foreigners" in Switzerland. Table 3.4 shows how immi-
grants are deﬁned in the claims in the ﬁeld of immigration in both cities and
whether they are referred to as status groups (asylum seekers, sans-papiers,
immigrants, or minorities) or as racial minorities, religious minorities, etc.
Consistent with previous ﬁndings, the deﬁnition of migrants diﬀers signiﬁ-
cantly between the two cities. In Lyon, the most important categories are
sans-papiers and Muslims. Immigrants are almost never referred to as
racial minorities or as ethnic or national groups. In Zurich, immigrants are
referred to as asylum seekers and foreigners. "Muslim" is used on both cities
to a very similar extent. The reference to speciﬁc national groups is also
higher in Zurich than in Lyon.
Discursive opportunities give signals to actors in a ﬁeld about the legiti-
mate collective identities. The results conﬁrm previous ﬁndings on legitimate
collective identities of immigrants in France and Switzerland and also on the
access of minorities to the public sphere. In Lyon, immigrants are mainly
referred to as immigrants, and racial minorities are almost absent from the
debate on immigration, with the exception of religious minorities such as
Muslims. But the reference to Muslims is not speciﬁc to the French context
because it also occurs in Zurich. In Zurich, on the other hand, immigrants
are mainly deﬁned as foreigners and speciﬁc national groups. The prevalence
of some identities over others might have an eﬀect, as it has been already
hypothesized and suggested by previous studies on migrants' mobilization
and organizing processes, on the way migrants organize, how they deﬁne
5Section ?? in Appendix ?? on page ?? describes in more details political claims anal-
ysis and the data collection method.
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Table 3.4: Identity of object of the claim
Lyon Zurich Total
Extreme right 9.4 3.1 7.2
Foreigners/aliens 4.4 17.4 9.0
Minorities .6 .5 .5
(Im)migrants 8.3 7.2 7.9
Asylum seekers 5.6 33.3 15.3
Ilegal aliens, sans-papiers 36.9 2.6 24.9
Other status groups 1.9 2.1 2.0
Racial minorities/groups 3.3 .5 2.3
Religious minorities/groups .8 4.6 2.2
Muslim 15.8 10.8 14.1
Other religious minorities/groups 4.7 1.0 3.4
Ethnic minorities/groups 3.1 .0 2.0
Speciﬁc national or ethnic group 3.6 8.2 5.2
Migrants and minorities not speciﬁed 1.4 8.7 4.0
Total 100 100 100
N 360 195 555
Cramer's V .605***
themselves, and, most importantly for our purpose, how they relate to each
other.
3.4.1 What consequences for migrant organizational networks
and political integration?
The discussion shows that Lyon and Zurich display diﬀerent institutional and
discursive POS in the ﬁeld of immigration. Generally speaking, the context
is less exclusive in Lyon than in Zurich. Access to the community is more
favorable to migrants in Lyon since the conditions for entering the territory
as well as access to naturalization are less restrictive. Moreover, migrants in
Lyon beneﬁt from easier access to the welfare state, and anti-discrimination
rights are more developed. In Zurich, access to citizenship is very restricted
(and remains one of the most restrictive policies of naturalization in Europe)
as is access to the territory. Access to the labor market is less restrictive
for migrants in Zurich than in Lyon. However, since entry to the territory
is dependent on a work contract for most of the migrants in Switzerland,
in practice access to the labor market is more restrictive in Zurich than
in Lyon. Finally, anti-discriminations rights are less developed in Zurich.
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As a consequence, migrants in Lyon beneﬁt from greater individual rights.
The diﬀerences between the cities on individual rights granted to migrants
reﬂect diﬀerent conceptions of citizenship. The results for Lyon are in line
with the French conception of citizenship based on jus solis, that is, a civic
territorial conception. Zurich follows a diﬀerent approach, relying on an
ethnic conception of citizenship.
The two cities show less diﬀerences in terms of collective group rights.
However, migrants in Lyon also face a more open context on this dimension.
The scores for cultural requirements to access the community and for host-
country language programs are similar. In both cities, migrants are expected
to assimilate into the majority culture. The existence of home-country lan-
guage programs for pupils are left overs from the guest-worker period, when
host countries were expecting migrants to stay only temporarily. The diﬀer-
ences are mainly in the way both cities deal with religion and representation
of minorities in the media. The laïcité principle in France does not allow any
public expression of religious identities, while in Zurich, such regulations are
inexistent. And while France has started to deﬁne policies aimed at fostering
the presence of minorities in the media and the labor market, such policies
do not exist in Zurich. On the collective group rights dimensions, both cities
leave little space for the expression of cultural pluralism and expect migrants
to assimilate into the majority culture. However, the request for assimilation
follows two diﬀerent logics. The French ideal is one of universalism, republi-
canism, stemming from the revolution (Giugni and Passy, 2006) and deeply
anchored in its deﬁnition of the nation state. In contrast, Switzerland relies
on an ethno-assimilationist approach of to citizenship.
On the last dimension of institutional POS, Zurich oﬀers more open op-
portunities than Lyon. This dimension refers to integration policies devel-
oped at the local level and the local access of migrants and their organi-
zations to institutional channels. However, the discussion showed that the
overall higher score of Zurich on this dimension refers to its explicit men-
tion of migrants as targets of integration programs. In Lyon, following the
French republican model, targets of integration policies are disadvantaged
populations and areas.
Finally, on the discursive dimension of the POS that expresses the sym-
bolic ethnic cleavage, Lyon also displays a more favorable context for mi-
grants. The symbolic ethnic cleavage is less salient in Lyon because migrants
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are mostly referred to as migrants, whereas in Zurich, migrants are deﬁned
as foreigners or as speciﬁc national groups. In both cities, however, claims
refer to a large extent to Muslims.
To conclude, these results show how migrants are embedded in diﬀerent
institutional and discursive POS and allow a better understanding of the
collective conceptions of citizenship in both cities. On the cultural level,
both countries require assimilation from migrants into the majority culture
to access the national community. However, France relies on a universal-
ist conception of the nation stemming from its revolution, and republican
principles are at the center of the nation-state. As a consequence, France
denies ethnic, religious, and regional identities in favor of a civic allegiance
to the political community and tends toward a civic-assimilationist model of
citizenship. Switzerland, has a diﬀerentialist conception of citizenship and
an ethnic conception of the nation. Access to the national community is very
exclusive, and citizenship is considered the last step of incorporation of mi-
grants into the ethnic community. Switzerland is thus approaching an ethno-
assimilationist model of citizenship. In France, citizenship is the ﬁrst step
towards incorporation of migrants into the national community. However,
the relationship to particularistic identities is more supple in Zurich, and
social categories based on particularistic identities are not denied (Giugni
and Passy, 2006). The Swiss ethno-assimilationist approach excludes mi-
grants from the public sphere, but at the same time allows them to keep
their ethnic/national identities and to express them publicly (Giugni and
Passy, 2006).
As a consequence, migrant associations face a more favorable context in
Lyon than in Zurich, giving them more symbolic and material resources for
collective action. As outlined in chapter 2, institutional and discursive POS
in the ﬁeld of immigrations are expected to shape network structures in the
ﬁeld. Discursive opportunities act as a symbolic cleavage, while institutional
opportunities deﬁne the chances of access of migrant organizations to the
political system.
These contextual aspects are expected to shape patterns of interaction by
aﬀecting the logic of inter-organizational linkages of resource exchange and
boundary deﬁnition. The structure of the organizational network in the ﬁeld
of immigration and ethnic relations, and its level of integration depend upon
the speciﬁc POS in this ﬁeld. These contextual factors are expected to aﬀect
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on the modes of coordination of collective action, which in turn shape the
global network structure. The combination of the institutional aspect of the
speciﬁc POS in the ﬁeld of immigration as part of opportunities of access
of migrants to the political system and the cultural aspect of citizenship
regimes, as part of a nation's symbolic cleavage structure are expected to
aﬀect the network structure of migrant organizations.
The ﬁrst set of hypotheses outlined in chapter 2 refer to the relation,
between POS and network structure (arrow 1 in ﬁgure 2.1 on page 17). How
will these observed diﬀerences aﬀect the network structure in the ﬁeld of
immigration? The institutional dimension of speciﬁc opportunities in the
ﬁeld of immigration deﬁnes the access of migrants to the political system.
Speciﬁc POS determine whether migrants are recognized as legitimate ac-
tors and have access to the public sphere. The civic-assimilationist model in
Lyon recognizes migrants as legitimate actors for intervening in the public
space, via its inclusive access to citizenship. Since migrants can access in-
stitutional channels, migrant organizations also have access to resources and
representation, as well as recognition. In this context, migrant associations
are expected to concentrate their available resources on intervention in the
political process. This might encourage the formation of professionalized and
centralized associations in Lyon. Indeed, migrant organizations in Lyon, in
the condition that their activities are related to social and political inclu-
sion without any reference to particularistic identities, have, for example,
access to public funding. Associations having fewer resources would invest
in alliance-building with professionalized associations to indirectly access the
political process. Moreover, because of the recognition of migrant organiza-
tions as legitimate actors, migrant associations in Lyon would have to rely
less on strong collective identities for collective action and are thus expected
to invest less in ties reﬂecting boundaries (mainly because of the costs in-
volved in creating and maintaining such ties). As a consequence, migrant
organizations in Lyon are expected to be mainly linked through ties of re-
source exchanges and to be embedded in organizational or coalitional modes
of coordination of collective action, in which boundaries do not cut across
single organizations. Therefore, the network in Lyon is expected to be hier-
archical and dominated by a few specialized associations acting as brokers
between the system and more grassroots organizations.
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In contrast, in Zurich, resources for collective action are scarce since ac-
cess to the political system is rather closed and migrant associations do not
have the legitimacy to intervene in the public sphere. Ethno-assimilationist
models of citizenship exclude migrants from the majority political commu-
nity, and symbolic as well as material resources for collective action are
scarce. While there are funding possibilities for migrant associations in
Zurich, subsidies are granted on a project basis as opposed to Lyon, and
amounts are very low. As a consequence, in Zurich, migrant associations
have fewer opportunities to develop alliances that cut across ethnic origins
and will have to rely mainly on their constituencies for collective action.
Creating alliances with other associations in such a context is encouraged
to mobilize as many adherents as possible. Therefore, associations are ex-
pected to develop collective identities cutting across single associations to
increase the number of members they can mobilize. Organizations would
thus invest more in ties reﬂecting processes of boundary deﬁnition. The
higher dependence of associations on their members would prevent associa-
tions from forming alliances that would require a negotiation of their identity.
The network of migrant associations in Zurich is expected to display higher
densities of ties reﬂecting boundary deﬁnition. The diﬀerentialist context of
Zurich, which allows to some extent the expression of ethnic identities, is
expected to favor boundary deﬁnition on an ethnic/national basis. There-
fore, the associations would be embedded in social movements or community
modes of coordination of collective action based on ethnic identities. As a
consequence, the network is expected to be more horizontal but also highly
fragmented. Indeed, the high investment in ties reﬂecting boundaries is ex-
pected to favor a network with diﬀerent highly interconnected clusters with
distinct collective identities that are only slightly connected to one another.
Migrants and their organizations are also facing diﬀerent discursive op-
portunities in both cities. Recall that speciﬁc opportunities are expected to
shape migrants identities and patterns of organizations. Discursive oppor-
tunities have been deﬁned as reﬂecting the salience of the symbolic ethnic
cleavage. By deﬁning the legitimacy, resonance and visibility of migrants
in the host society the cleavage is expected to have an eﬀect on the lines
along which immigrants' organizational networks are segmented. In other
words, discursive opportunities and the recognition of identities in the ﬁeld
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of immigration are expected to aﬀect the fragmentation principle at work in
the network of migrant organizations.
As previously mentioned, in the civic-assimilationist model that char-
acterizes Lyon, migrants are recognized as legitimate when they mobilize
and organize on a civic basis, that is, as citizens without any particularistic
identity such as ethnicity. Consequently, the network of migrant organiza-
tions is expected to be fragmented along functional lines, on the basis of a
division of labor in the ﬁeld of immigration, because migrant organizations
are expected to form alliances that cut across ethnicity. In other words, in
Lyon, the network is expected to be fragmented along the type of activities
migrant associations engage in. More precisely, since integration is framed
in terms of social and political inclusion, collaborations will be found be-
tween associations with deﬁnitions and activities that are centered around
these activities. In contrast, the saliency of the ethnic cleavage in Zurich,
where migrants are deﬁned on the basis of their national origin, is expected
to fragment the network along ethnic lines.
To summarize, the hypotheses concerning the impact of political oppor-
tunity structure on the network structure are the following:
In Lyon, characterized by a civic-assimilationist model, the network of mi-
grant organizations is expected to display organizational or coalitional
modes of coordination, a hierarchical structure with a lower level of
fragmentation. In Zurich, characterized by an ethnic-assimilationist
model, the network of migrant organizations is expected to display
social movements or community modes of coordination of collective
action, a horizontal structure, and a high level of fragmentation.
In Zurich, where the symbolic ethnic cleavage is more salient as expressed
by discursive opportunities, the network of migrant organizations is
expected to be fragmented along ethnic lines. When this cleavage is less
salient, as in Lyon, the network of migrant organizations is expected
to be fragmented along functional lines.
The second set of hypotheses refers to the eﬀect of the interaction of
POS and network structure on the political inclusion of migrant associations
(arrow 3 in ﬁgure 2.1 on page 17). As discussed in chapter2, similar network
structures can be found in similar contexts. Still, the network structure in
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Lyon and Zurich is hypothesized to vary, as the resources available to migrant
associations for political inclusion deriving from the combination of the net-
work structure and the POS. The combination of an ethno-assimilationsit
context, in which the ethic cleavage is salient, and the network structure
based on social movements or subcultural modes of coordination of collective
action is expected to inhibit the political inclusion of migrant associations
in Zurich. Social movement modes of coordination would be expected to
favor political inclusion since the combinations of a collective identity with
instrumental resources would give associations embedded in such contexts
the resources to participate politically. In the ethno-assimilationist context
of Zurich, however, these network structures would exclude migrants from
the political sphere because their organization around ethnic identities is
not recognized as legitimate for intervening in the public sphere. As a conse-
quence, migrant organizations embedded in the latter context are expected
to engage more in client-oriented activities (i.e., oriented toward their con-
stituencies rather than towards the public sphere), show lower levels and
more contentious forms of political activities, and ﬁnally have fewer contacts
with political institutions.
As outlined previously, the network in Lyon is expected to display more
hierarchical forms and organizational or coalitional modes of coordination of
collective action. Moreover, the network will be fragmented along functional
lines. In this context, migrants can access institutional channels as long as
they do not organize on an ethnic basis. This institutional openness and
the absence of a symbolic ethnic cleavage are expected to have a positive
eﬀect on political inclusion of migrant associations. The combination of
POS and network structure is thus expected to have a positive eﬀect on the
political inclusion of migrant organizations. In such as conﬁguration, migrant
associations are expected to engage more in policy-oriented activities than
in the ethno-assimilationist model. While associations are also expected to
have more contacts with political institutions, their forms of participation
will be less contentious.
To summarize, the hypotheses concerning the impact of the interaction
of speciﬁc POS and network structures on political inclusion are:
In Zurich, the combination of an ethno-assmilationist model and social
movements or subcultural modes of coordination of collective action
is expected to favor more client-oriented activities, few contacts with
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political institutions, but more contentious forms of political partici-
pation.
In Lyon, the combination of a civic-assimilationist model of citizenship and
a hierarchical network based on coalitional or organizational modes of
coordination is expected to favor engagement in policy-oriented activ-
ities, show higher levels but less contentious forms of political partici-
pation and have more contacts with political institutions.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the speciﬁc institutional and discursive POS in the
ﬁeld of immigration in Lyon and Zurich. It showed how migrants in Lyon are
embedded in a civic-assimlationist model combined with a less salient ethnic
cleavage. In Zurich, the citizenship regime is characterized by an ethno-
assimilationist approach, and the symbolic ethnic cleavage is more salient,
as reﬂected by the discursive POS. These variations in context have been hy-
pothesized to aﬀect the network structure in the ﬁeld of immigration as well
as the political inclusion of migrant organizations. The description of the
political opportunities in both cities allowed us to articulate the hypothesis
formulated in Chapter 2. Networks in the ﬁeld of immigration and the conse-
quences for political inclusion of migrant organizations are expected to vary
according to the context. The next three chapters will test these hypotheses.
Chapter 4 will focus on the modes of coordination of collective action and
look at how resource exchange and ties reﬂecting boundary deﬁnitions are
distributed within the networks in Lyon and Zurich. Chapter 5 will examine
the fragmentation principles at work in the network. Finally, in chapter 6,
the consequences of the interaction of POS and network structures for the






The following two chapters test the hypotheses on the eﬀect of the insti-
tutional and discursive POS on the network structure in the ﬁeld of im-
migration in Lyon and in Zurich. Drawing on social movement studies, the
network structure in the ﬁeld of immigration is expected to vary according to
the diﬀerent political opportunity structures in which migrant associations
are embedded. Two aspects of the networks are examined. While the next
chapter analyzes the fragmentation principles at work in the networks in
both cities and looks more deeply at the characteristics of associations, this
chapter focuses on the modes of coordination of collective action. Two ana-
lytical dimensions will guide the analysis: resource exchange and boundary
deﬁnition. First, the networks of resource exchange and boundary deﬁnition
in the two cities are compared. The following section looks at the position
of associations within the network of resource exchange. Then it analyzes
the modes of collective action of immigrants' associations by examining the
distribution of resource exchanges and ties reﬂecting boundary deﬁnition.
Comparing the networks in two cities, it tests the hypothesis of the impact
of POS on the logics of interactions of immigrants' organizations. The main
argument is that the closed opportunities in Zurich favor a more segmented
network and high investment in ties of boundary deﬁnition. In Lyon, the
more open opportunities are expected to lead to a better integrated network
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that is more hierarchical and based mainly in instrumental exchanges. Re-
sults show that the ﬁeld of immigration displays diﬀerent structures in Lyon
and Zurich. The chapter concludes by discussing the results.
4.2 Measuring modes of coordination of collective
action
Recall the hypothesis outlined in chapter 3:
In Lyon, characterized by a civic-assimilationist model, the network of mi-
grant organizations is expected to display organizational or coalitional
modes of coordination, a hierarchical structure with a lower level of
fragmentation. In Zurich, characterized by an ethnic-assimilationist
model, the network of migrant organizations is expected to display so-
cial movement or community modes of coordination of collective action,
a horizontal structure, and a high level of fragmentation.
This chapter focuses on the overall network structure and examines the
modes of coordination of collective action in the ﬁeld of immigration in Lyon
and Zurich. The analysis of patterns of relationships of migrant associations
draws on a typology of modes of coordination of collective action (Diani,
2009, 2011). As discussed in chapter 2, to examine the modes of coor-
dination, two types of ties are considered: ties of resource exchange and
ties reﬂecting processes of boundary deﬁnition (see ﬁgure 2.2 on page 24).
Resource exchanges refer to ties such as exchange of information, collabo-
rating on projects, or the exchange of any type of other resource. In other
words, ties of resource exchanges present a pronounced instrumental dimen-
sion. Boundaries imply a symbolic deﬁnition of "us" and "them" and are
thus a fundamentally relational concept (Melucci, 1996; Lamont and Mol-
nar, 2002; Tilly, 2005). At the individual level, boundaries refer to networks
of relationships resulting from individual acts of connecting and distancing
(Wimmer, 2008). In the case of voluntary associations, what type of ties
implies deeper bonds between alliance partners that go beyond speciﬁc ini-
tiatives or projects and also implies long-term mutual commitment, that is,
a collective identity? Following a non-essentialist deﬁnition of identity based
on processes and activities (de la Rúa, 2007), in the case of voluntary associ-
ations, links through core members and friendship ties can serve as a proxy
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for ties reﬂecting boundary deﬁnition. Indeed, activists will tend to draw
their acquaintances from milieus directly connected to the core group they
belong to. As for shared core members, while business organizations shared
core members may reﬂect mechanisms of control, the process is diﬀerent in
the case of voluntary associations drawing largely on solidarity incentives.
Indeed, in this case, multiple involvements of members can serve as an indi-
cator of whether they consider associations close enough to share their com-
mitment between them. In other words, boundaries emerge when multiple
membership and personal connections cut across organizational boundaries.
The combination of these diﬀerent types of relationships between associ-
ations and the density of those ties yield diﬀerent modes of collective action
(Diani, 2009). Social movements are characterized by dense networks of re-
source exchange as well as a process of boundary deﬁnition, that is, a network
of dense interpersonal networks and multiple aﬃliations cutting across or-
ganizational boundaries. Coalitional processes are deﬁned by dense resource
exchange, but no process of boundary deﬁnition is found in such networks.
Indeed, resource exchanges may be read as mainly instrumental. The orga-
nizational process consists of modes of resource coordination and boundary
deﬁnition that ignore interorganizational networking and take place within
speciﬁc groups or organizations. In this conﬁguration, there is no dense ex-
change of resources nor any boundary formation through identity ties. In this
case, organizations work on their own, and identity boundaries are located
within organizations. Finally, subcultures or communities are characterized
by sparse interorganizational linkage combined with strong boundary deﬁni-
tion in which actors share a distinctive sense of belongingness and norms.
To examine what modes of interaction are taking place in the networks of
immigrant associations in Lyon and Zurich, the network of resource exchange
and boundary deﬁnition between immigrant associations in both cities will
be analyzed. Immigrants' associations were asked about diﬀerent relation-
ships with a closed list of other migrant organizations in the city.1 In each
city, and for each type of ties, a binary adjacency matrix was created (52
by 52 in Lyon and 39 by39 in Zurich). Migrant organizations were asked
about diﬀerent types of relationships. Indeed, actors in a network are more
than likely involved simultaneously in diﬀerent types of ties. They can be
involved in exchange of information, exchange resources, or have more per-
1Question 53 in Appendix ??
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sonal relationships such as sharing core members or personal relationships
between members. To identify resource exchange and processes of bound-
ary deﬁnition, two matrices were created. The resource exchange matrix
combines exchange of information, project collaboration, and exchange of
resources. Two associations exchange resources if one type of relationship is
present between them. The matrix of boundary deﬁnition combines sharing
core members and friendship ties between members.2
To test the hypothesis, ﬁrst the networks of resource exchange and bound-
ary deﬁnition will be analyzed separately. The overall connectedness of the
networks will be assessed by measuring the density of ties. In a second step,
the network of resource exchange will be reduced in subgroups in order to
identify subgroups of associations being embedded in similar patterns of in-
teraction. To identify modes of coordination of collective action in the ﬁeld
of immigration, ﬁrst the distribution of ties of resource exchange between
and within these subgroups will be examined and will allow us to see where
exchange of resources take place within the networks. The second step will
consist of looking at how ties reﬂecting processes of boundary deﬁnition are
distributed within and between the subgroups identiﬁed earlier. In the pres-
ence of a social movement mode of coordination, resource exchanges and
ties of boundary deﬁnition overlap within a subgroup, that is, when actors
are simultaneously involved in resource exchanges and boundary deﬁnition.
In a subcultural mode of coordination, only ties reﬂecting boundaries will
be observed. Organizational modes of coordination are present when nei-
ther boundary deﬁnition nor resource exchange take place in the ﬁeld. And
ﬁnally, in the presence of coalitional modes of coordination, organizations
engage mainly in resource exchanges with others.
4.3 The network of immigrant association in Lyon
and Zurich
Before looking at the modes of coordination of collective action, networks in
both cities will ﬁrst be described. Table 4.1 shows the densities of the net-
works of resource exchange and boundary deﬁnition in Lyon and Zurich. The
density is a measure of cohesion and tells how well the network is connected
2For a description of the matrix construction see Section ?? in Appendix ?? on page
??
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by measuring the proportion of all possible ties that are actually present. In
all networks, the densities seem to be rather low at ﬁrst sight. Indeed, the
network of resource exchange in Lyon displays the highest density, with 8%
of all possible ties being present. However, these densities lie in the range of
those found in similar networks where densities range from .05 to .1 (Diani,
2003a; Ansell, 2003). Both networks in Lyon are better connected than the
networks in Zurich. Indeed, in the resource exchange network in Zurich, less
than 4% of the ties are present. Yet, in both cities a better connected net-
work of resource exchange is found, while networks of boundary deﬁnition
are rather sparse in both Lyon and Zurich.3
Table 4.1: Network densities in Lyon and Zurich
Lyon Zurich
Resource exchange .0833 .0371
Boundary deﬁnition .0211 .0169
In both cities, the network of resource exchange is more densely con-
nected than the network of boundary deﬁnition. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show
the networks of resource exchanges in Lyon and Zurich. These ﬁgures give a
better idea of the density of exchanges in both cities. The network in Lyon
is better connected, and seems also better integrated. In Zurich, more asso-
ciations are isolated from the network, but the ﬁgure also suggests that the
network is highly fragmented. Indeed, while in Lyon we see one integrated
graph, in Zurich, three regions can be identiﬁed that seem to be only weakly
connected. Resource exchanges are denser in Lyon, where opportunities are
more favorable for migrant associations, which points in the hypothesized
direction.
The ﬁgures of the networks of boundary deﬁnition in both cities draw
a ﬁrst picture of the conﬁguration of the ﬁeld of immigration and also give
a ﬁrst insight about the fragmentation level of networks (ﬁgures 4.3 and
4.4). The boundary deﬁnition network in Lyon displays a diﬀerent structure
3It has to be noted that the density of networks is dependent on the size of the network,
a comparison of the densities of two networks from diﬀerent sizes is thus problematic. To
overcome this limitation, a test was run for each network comparing the observed density
of the networks against a theoretical parameter of value 1 (a completely connected graph).
Using a bootstrap method for constructing thousands of random graphs, it test wether
the observed density is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the theoretical value. The test was
signiﬁcant for all networks (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). The test was run on UCINET
6 (Borgatti et al., 2002)
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Figure 4.1: Resource exchange network in Lyon
Figure 4.2: Resource exchange network in Zurich
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than the network for resource exchange. It is much sparser but also seems
to display a center-periphery structure, with a few central nodes connecting
many other unconnected nodes. In Zurich, the network of boundary deﬁni-
tion follows the structure of the resource exchange network. However, it is
totally disconnected. Many associations are isolated from the network, and
the network is divided in three components. Associations in Zurich seem to
draw boundaries within three diﬀerent clusters that are totally disconnected.
Figure 4.3: Boundary deﬁnition ties in Lyon
The description of the networks in both cities suggests that they diﬀer in
their structure and their degree of integration/fragmentation. The densities
and the ﬁgures point in the direction of the hypotheses, according to which
the network in Zurich is expected to be more fragmented and to display
higher levels of boundary deﬁnition and associations in Lyon are expected
to be embedded in denser networks of resource exchanges. The following
section will look more in depth at these networks and analyze the overall
structure as well as the distribution of the diﬀerent ties within networks and
test the hypotheses about the modes of coordination of collective action.
4.4 Identifying network structures
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Figure 4.4: Boundary deﬁnition ties in Zurich
One way to look at a network structure and to identify subgroups of actors
embedded in similar patterns of interaction is to use structural equivalence.
Structural equivalence is a widely used concept in social network analysis
and draws on theories of roles and positions (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
Two actors are structurally equivalent if they have identical ties to and from
all actors in the network. Social network analysts have developed diﬀerent
procedures for analyzing structural similarities of actors and patterns of rela-
tionships in networks. The main objective of these procedures is to represent
patterns in complex networks in simpliﬁed form to identify subsets of actors
that are similarly embedded in a network of relations. They do so by par-
titioning actors into mutually exclusive classes of equivalent actors having
similar patterns of relationships Borgatti and Everett (1992).
According to Lorrain and White's (1971) deﬁnition, actors are struc-
turally equivalent if they are connected to the rest of the network in iden-
tical ways. Since it is unlikely that two actors will be exactly structurally
equivalent, the measures of structural equivalence seek to locate and identify
subsets of actors who are approximately structurally equivalent. Structural
equivalence thus allows us to identify actors having the same patterns of
relationships to other actors in the network. To identify structurally equiv-
90
alent actors, the CONCOR algorithm is used. Proposed by Breiger et al.
(1975), CONCOR is a measure of structural equivalence based on Pearson's
correlation product-moment. Although the CONCOR algorithm has been
the target of criticism by some social network analysts (Borgatti and Ev-
erett, 1992; Faust, 1988; Wasserman and Faust, 1994), it is still widely used
and ﬁts the purpose of our analysis. One of the main criticisms relates to
what CONCOR is actually measuring. The comparison of diﬀerent equiva-
lence measures and the discussion of the underlying assumption suggest that
CONCOR does not measure only structural equivalence, but that it is also
dependent on proximity (Borgatti and Everett, 1992; Faust, 1988). Yet, this
is precisely the aim of our analysis. The focus is on factors that inﬂuence
actors in their choices of their closest allies who have similar patterns of
relationships to other actors in the network. Using CONCOR allows us to
identify subsets of actors having similar neighborhoods and similar patterns
of relationships. Moreover, this procedure tends to generate substantively
interpretable results as opposed to other procedures such as hierarchical clus-
tering (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982; Scott, 2000). The heuristic superiority of
the procedure over other clustering methods has also been supported recently
(Lincoln and Gerlach, 2004; Pavan, ress). Finally, CONCOR being an indi-
rect measure of structural equivalence (Batagelj et al., 1992), the algorithm
in itself does not provide a goodness of ﬁt measure. Using blockmodels to
identify the underlying structure of a network, the solution provided has to
be tested to see whether it ﬁts the actual data. Wasserman and Faust (1994)
suggest using a measure that is constructed in terms of expected densities
within and between blocks. A randomization test will thus be used to test
the goodness of ﬁt of the blockmodel.
4.4.1 Structural equivalence in Lyon: Chain structure
The structural equivalence analysis in Lyon gives four blocks.4 Table 4.2
shows the densities of resource exchange of associations within and between
the structural equivalent blocks. The overall density of the organizational
4The depth of split in Lyon was stopped at 2. One split and three splits didn't give any
meaningful results. The goodness of ﬁt of the blockmodel solution by CONCOR has been
tested using a relational contingency table analysis in UCINET 6 Borgatti et al. (2002)
The procedure is similar to a chi square test, but instead of using a chi square distribution
the underlying distribution is constructed using a randomization distribution. The result
is consistent with the blockmodeling solution and signiﬁcant
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network in Lyon is .0833. The composition of the blocks is shown in table
4.3.
Associations in block 1 are totally disconnected. They are similar in that
they do not exchange with structurally equivalent actors, nor do they ex-
change with other blocks, since the density of outgoing ties to other blocks
is lower than the overall density of the network.5 The ﬁrst block is a rather
small one, composed of only ten associations. These associations are mainly
charity and humanitarian associations. Moreover, most of them make an ex-
plicit reference of the ethnic origin of their members or their scope of activ-
ity. For example, associations include the Association of Chaldo-Assyrians in
Lyon (AACL), the Franco-Moroccan Association of Vaulx-en-Velin (AFM),
or the International Tamil Cultural Association (ACTM). Besides the hu-
manitarian associations, three resident associations of mixed origin that are
mainly active at the neighborhood level can be found (a joint-ownership as-
sociation (ACRC), and two neighborhood associations (ALGB and Thé à la
Menthe)).
The second block is mainly composed by isolates that not have organiza-
tional ties with associations in a similar position. In this block, associations
tend not to be related to associations outside their own block. Associa-
tions in this cluster share some similarities with the ﬁrst block. They also
make explicit reference to their origin in their names and are primarily ac-
tive in charity and sports. Moreover, the sports clubs are ethnic sports
clubs (Sports and Cultural Association of Central Africans (ASCC) and the
Franco-Malagasy Association).
Associations in block 3 are connected to one another, but the density of
organizational exchanges within the block is rather low (.033). While associ-
ations in this structural position are related to all other blocks, the density of
organizational ties is very low with the non-connected blocks (blocks 1 and
2). Associations in this equivalent class are characterized by sparse connec-
tions within the class but dense outgoing ties to another class, block 4. We
still ﬁnd associations with explicit mention of origin in the third block, but
they represent only a third of the associations in the block (The Association
for Portuguese Tradition (ACC Folklo) a Comoran association (Cercle) or
5Using the density as a cut oﬀ value can be problematic because of the problem of
density and size of networks. To check for the robustness we also compared the densities
within and between clusters using as a cut oﬀ value the overall density of the network plus
one standard deviation. The pattern remains even using a more restrictive cut oﬀ value.
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the Association for the Promotion of Somalis (APS)). Two sports associa-
tions are also found in this block. However, as opposed to the sports clubs
in the second block, they are not ethnic associations but rather local clubs
that happen to be composed mainly of migrants (Lyon Villeurbanne Rhône
XIII, a rugby club (LVR13), and the Roller Olympique de Vaulx, a rink
hockey club (ROCVV). The remaining associations in this block focus on
social activities for the disabled (Collectif Handicap (Coll-Handicap)) or the
elderly (Bâtir Ensemble (BE)). Others are mainly active on social inclusion
(Canelle Solidarité (C-solidarité) Association d'entraide vaudaise (AVEC))
or after-school programs such as the Institut Méridien (Méridien).
Finally, block 4 is the most connected block. Not only are incumbents of
this position densely interconnected, but associations within this block are
also densely connected to block 1. It is involved in organizational exchange
with block 1, but receives more ties than it sends. The third and the fourth
blocks also share some similarities, but associations in these blocks diﬀer from
those in the ﬁrst two blocks. The fourth and most interconnected block is
composed of ﬁfteen associations. In this block, only two associations refer
explicitly the their origin in their names (Center for Arab and Mediterranean
Culture (CCAM) and Horizon Solidaire Cameroun (HSC)). The speciﬁcity of
this block is that the social centers are all part of it. These centers are oﬀering
social, recreational, and cultural activities for kids and youth (CS Peyri, Cs
Reel, and CS Lévy). Other associations are active in similar domains such
as Cultures-Elles (C-elles), which oﬀers cultural and sports activities for
girls. Two associations oﬀer cultural activities (MJC and Vaulx-Premières
Planches (VPP)), and ﬁnally, others are mainly active in education, such
as Frameto, which is an after-school club, and the CGV, which is active in
popular education.
In sum, the network of organizational ties in Lyon displays a chain struc-
ture. The chain begins with block 3, which shows a low level of interconnec-
tion and sends ties to block 4. Block four is the link in the middle of the
chain and is also densely interconnected. The chain ends with block 1. Asso-
ciations in this position are totally disconnected. Finally, block 2 is isolated
from the whole network. Moreover, the brief desc-ription of the four blocks
identiﬁed in Lyon gives an initial overview of how the ﬁeld is organized and
suggests some substantial diﬀerences between blocks. While the less con-
nected and smaller blocks are organized around charity and humanitarian
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work related to their country of origin, which is also explicitly referred to in
the names of the associations, the two larger blocks focus mainly on social
inclusion and integration.
Table 4.2: Density matrix of network of resource exchange in Lyon
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4
Block 1 .000 .011 .006 .033
Block 2 .044 .000 .012 .000
Block 3 .056 .006 .033 .259
Block 4 .127 .000 .052 .400
Table 4.3: Associations in blocks Lyon
Block Freq. Members
1 10 LCA AACL ACTM ASEM A2NF FCAV
AMR AFM ACRC ThéMenthe
2 9 AML ACFM Sifaka Oxygène AFV ALGB
Comara ASCC GFC
3 18 ROCVV Cercle AMAFI BE Méridien
Coll-Handicap ACC folklorique Aid Auto
AVEC AAE Imazighen AVSS CDS.RA
LOM CSR LVR XIII C-Solidarité APS
4 15 AA MJC CCAM EPI CS Peyri CS Lévy
CS réel C-Elles Frameto HSC Futsal Cen-
tre Vie VPP CGV C&P
4.4.2 Structural equivalence in Zurich: Fragmented network
The network of resource exchange in Zurich displays a diﬀerent structure
than the network of immigrant associations in Lyon. The CONCOR al-
gorithm with two splits (interactive: second split block 2 with 21 nodes, r
square .083) gives three blocks (see table 4.4 and table 4.5 for the composition
of the blocks). The network of resource exchange in Zurich has a density of
.0371. In the ﬁrst block, associations are structurally equivalent in that they
tend to be tied to structurally equivalent others rather than to associations
not holding the same position. The density of organizational links within
this block (.098) is higher than the density of the whole network (.037). Fur-
thermore, these associations tend not to be identiﬁed as organizational allies
by associations in the other blocks. As opposed to Lyon, all associations
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in the ﬁeld explicitly mention their origin in their names. Associations in
the ﬁrst block are mainly Italian and Spanish associations. Two types of
Italian associations can be found in this block. The ﬁrst type is the regional
associations, focusing mainly on cultural activities (FALS, CLZ, AVV, CT).
The second type of Italian associations is mainly active in assisting migrants
and defending their interests (FCLI, COMIT, ITAL). One association is a
political party of second-generation migrants of mixed origins who defend
migrants' interests (SPZ). Two associations are of Spanish origin and pro-
vide assistance and cultural activities (TE and CNZ). Religious associations
are also to be found in this block, more precisely, religious associations from
Spain and Italy (MCLI, MCLE and CELI). Finally, Tamil associations are
also in this block, and they focus mainly on cultural and sports activities
(TESS, TCCZ, and SLCCZ).
The second block is characterized by associations sending ties rather
within their equivalent class (.051) rather than outside. As for the ﬁrst
block, these associations are structurally equivalent in that they do not re-
ceive ties from associations holding diﬀerent positions. The second block is
less homogeneous in terms of the origin of migrants. However, most of the
associations in this block are associations from Eastern Europe and Turkey.
Parents' associations from diﬀerent origin can be found here, from Kosovo
(LAPSH), Turkey (TEVS), or Kurdish (KS). They provide home-country
language courses for pupils. Other associations engage mainly in cultural
activities, such as the Slovak Association (VSS), the Croatians from Herze-
govina (HKS), and a Turkish Library (MOZ). Finally, all associations from
Kosovo are in this cluster (Studenti, LDA, AKV, and VABS).
The third block is the most densely interconnected (.232), but sends no
ties to block 1 and does not receive ties from non-structurally equivalent asso-
ciations. This block is more homogeneous than the second one, as it clusters
mainly religious associations. Mainly Muslim and Christian Orthodox (from
Russia (ROAK) and Serbia Montenegro (SOKG and SOKGZ)) associations
are in this block, although they are of various origins. Four Muslim associa-
tions are to be found (SIGZ, TISS) and the federation of Muslim organiza-
tion in Zurich (VIOZ) and a women's association (ZAHRA). To summarize,
the organizational network in Zurich is characterized by a totally segmented
structure, with three blocks internally interconnected.
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Table 4.4: Density matrix of network of resource exchange in Lyon
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Block 1 .098 .000 .000
Block 2 .013 .051 .000
Block 3 .007 .000 .232
Table 4.5: Associations in blocks Zurich
Block Freq. Members
1 18 MCLI FALS CLZ ITAL MCLE TE CNZ
VAF TESS TCCZ SPZ SLCCZ FCLI AVV
GAIZ COMIT CT CELI
2 13 SPE VTJE FCGZ TEVS VSS HKS
LDD LAPSH STUDENTI MOZ KS AKV
VABS
3 8 SOKG VIOZ SIGZ ZAHRA SOKGZ KO-
RAC TISS ROAK
Figure 4.5 summarizes these results by showing the image matrix of the
blockmodels. The squares are the blocks, and the sizes of the squares rep-
resent the density within blocks. The arrows indicate whether there is a
connection between blocks and the direction of the relationhip. These ﬁrst
results are consistent with the hypothesis of a more segmented network struc-
ture in Zurich than in Lyon. It suggests that associations in a more closed
context tend to exchange resources only with associations in the same po-
sition. The diﬃculty of accessing the decision-making structures and the
scarcity of resources for immigrant associations favor a concentration of ex-
changes with their closest allies holding the same position. In Lyon, the
structure of the resource exchange network tends toward a hierarchical struc-
ture, as links between blocks go only in one direction, from the bottom of the
chain to the top. Moreover, resource exchanges take place between diﬀerent
positions, with the exception of one block, the middle link of the chain. How-
ever, the analysis of structural equivalence only gives a ﬁrst picture of the
network structure. To see what modes of collective action immigrant associ-
ations display in the two cities, we need to look at how resource exchange and
boundary deﬁnition processes are distributed between the diﬀerent positions.







Figure 4.5: Blocks in Lyon and Zurich
4.5 Modes of coordination of collective action
The analysis of blocks allows us to draw a general picture of structurally
equivalent associations in the network but does not show how diﬀerent types
of relationships are distributed between positions of groups. The distribution
of ties within and between blocks will show what type of collective action
is prevalent in each context. To see how diﬀerent type of relationships are
distributed among the blocks, we run an analysis of variance of autocorre-
lation testing for variable homophily.6 The analysis of variance will ﬁrst be
run on the network of resource exchange and then on the network of identity
ties, that is, on the boundary deﬁnition network, to identify the modes of
coordination. Associations that display a social movement mode of coor-
dination will hold the same position and send resource exchange as well as
boundary deﬁnition ties to structurally equivalent associations. In that case,
we will ﬁnd a positive relationship between the membership in block and the
relationship. In other words, resource exchange and boundary deﬁnition will
overlap. For an organizational mode of coordination, neither the resource
6The procedure tests wether a relation is patterned by a categorical attribute, in this
case the membership of actors in a block. It is based upon the densities in each block and
is similar to an analysis of variance. Variable homophily assumes that the tendency to
homophily varies between diﬀerent groups. It takes into consideration the fact that some
groups might have a higher tendency to homophily than others and tests the model that
ties within each group diﬀer from all ties that are not within-group. The same procedure
will be used in the following two chapters and for simplicity will be referred to as analysis
of variance (Borgatti et al., 2002; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005)
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Table 4.6: Analysis of variance for resource exchanges in Lyon
Stdized Coeﬀ Sig.
Intercept 0.000000 0.9998
Group 1 -0.042148 0.0816
Group 2 -0.037831 0.1204
Group 3 -0.036593 0.2164
Group 4 0.327943 0.0000
Adj. R2 .117 0.0000
N 2652
exchange network nor the boundary deﬁnition network will be related posi-
tively to membership in the block. If associations display a community mode
of coordination, only the boundary deﬁnition network will be positively re-
lated to block membership. And ﬁnally, a coalitional mode of coordination
will give a positive relationship for resource exchange but not for boundary
deﬁnition.
4.5.1 Lyon
As hypothesized previously, in Lyon, the network is expected to display an
organizational or coalitional mode of coordination. The results for Lyon on
the network of resource exchange are shown in table 4.6. The coeﬃcients
show whether the associations in blocks tend to send organizational ties to
similar others (to structurally equivalent associations). The coeﬃcient of the
intercept gives the probability of a tie between any two members of diﬀerent
groups. Although the explained variance is rather low, the model is signiﬁ-
cant.7 The relationship is signiﬁcant in block 1 (although only marginally)
and in block 4.
Block 1 is the block at the top of the chain in Lyon. In this block,
the probability of resource exchange between members of the block is lower
than the probability of a tie between any two members of diﬀerent groups.
In other words, resource exchange in this block is not concentrated within
the block, but rather with associations holding diﬀerent positions. Block 4
shows a high tendency to exchange resources within the block. This block is
the link in the middle of the chain, and incumbents of this position tend to
exchange resources with similar others. These associations exchange more
7Low R square are common in this kind of analysis. See Mizruchi (1993)
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resources between them than with other associations in the network; they
show a strong tendency to homophily. Finally, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant rela-
tionship in block 2 and 3. These results suggest an overlap of structural
position and organizational exchange in block 4. Not only is block 4 the
most interconnected block, but actors in this blocks also tend to have more
organizational ties within the block.
Since modes of coordination of collective action are deﬁned by the dis-
tribution and density of resource exchanges and boundary deﬁnition, we run
the same analysis on the network of boundary deﬁnition. Indeed, this al-
lows us to examine the type of collaboration process migrant associations
are involved in. Do personal ties overlap with organizational ties? Are
structurally equivalent actors also linked by personal ties? Results in table
4.7 show the tendency to homophily in the network of boundary deﬁnition
within blocks. In Lyon, only associations in block 4 show a propensity to
be tied by personal relationships. In the other blocks, there is no signiﬁcant
relationship between the structural position of an association and its propen-
sity to boundary deﬁnition. Thus, associations in block 4 are not only more
densely interconnected by resource exchange relationships but also by per-
sonal relationships. This suggest that associations holding this position tend
to collaborate with one another but also that they share a collective identity.
Organizational and personal ties are overlapping in this block. Furthermore
this block, which is the central link of the chain, associations display a so-
cial movement mode of collective action. Indeed, dense resource exchange is
overlapping with processes of boundary deﬁnition. The three other groups
show little internal density in terms of resource exchange, nor do they send
ties reﬂecting boundaries within their block. These blocks display coalitional
mode of coordination, that is, associations tend to invest in resource exchange
with other associations. These results suggest that immigrant associations
in Lyon follow rather an organizational logic of interaction. Indeed, with the
exception of the most central block, associations are only sparsely intercon-
nected and do not share a collective identity. Thus, we ﬁnd a combination
of two modes of coordination in Lyon, an organizational one and a social
movement.
To conclude, the network structure of immigrant associations in Lyon dis-
plays a chain structure. One subgroup is close to a social movement mode of
collective action because it combines dense resource exchange with common
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Table 4.7: Analysis of variance for boundary deﬁnition in Lyon
Stdized Coeﬀ Sig.
Intercept 0.000000 0.9880
Group 1 -0.021692 0.2602
Group 2 -0.019470 0.3382
Group 3 0.019822 0.2400
Group 4 0.092862 0.0064
Adj. R2 .010 0.0304
N 2652
boundaries. Associations in other blocks are closer to coalitional mode of
coordination. The density of resource exchange and ties reﬂecting boundary
deﬁnition is rather low. What accounts for this structure of immigrant as-
sociations' network? Opportunity structures are rather open in Lyon. The
network is better integrated than in Zurich, since ties are not concentrated
within blocks. The diﬀerent clusters are connected to each other. The main
component of the network is connected, resource exchanges cut across struc-
tural positions, but no deep bonds are involved. Although immigrant as-
sociations do not have access to funding as such, the political opportunity
structure provides them with more resources than in Zurich. These results
partly conﬁrm our expectations of the network structure in Lyon. Then open
institutional opportunities as well as the rather favorable discursive opportu-
nities provide associations with material and symbolic resources. Boundary
deﬁnitions seem to take place within organizations. However, one subgroup
of associations concentrates resource exchanges and boundary deﬁnition ties
with structurally equivalent associations.
4.5.2 Zurich
Looking at the network of immigrants' associations in Zurich, we ﬁnd a to-
tally diﬀerent pattern of interaction. Table 4.8 shows the results for resource
exchange within blocks. Associations in Zurich tend to exchange resources
with associations holding the same positions in the network because all coeﬃ-
cients are signiﬁcant and positive. All subgroups in Zurich exchange densely
resources with associations in the same structural position. The network of
resource exchange is much more segmented than in Lyon, because the po-
sition of associations within the network has an impact on the allies that
100
Table 4.8: Analysis of variance for resource exchange in Zurich
Stdized Coeﬀ Sig.
Intercept 0.000000 0.9998
Group 1 0.201043 0.0000
Group 2 0.076518 0.0190
Group 3 0.229976 0.0000
Adj. R2 .082 0.0000
N 1482
Table 4.9: Analysis of variance for boundary deﬁnition in Zurich
Stdized Coeﬀ Sig.
Intercept 0.000000 0.9998
Group 1 0.127011 0.0000
Group 2 0.056160 0.0528
Group 3 0.155570 0.0010
R-square .036 0.0002
N 1482
associations select for resource exchanges. Associations in Zurich concen-
trate their exchanges with structurally equivalent associations that do not
cut across their position. The result is a highly fragmented network of re-
source exchanges.
What about boundary deﬁnition? Does it overlap with resource ex-
change, in which case we would observe a social movement mode of co-
ordination within blocks? Table 4.9 shows the results for the network of
ties reﬂecting boundary deﬁnitions. The probability of a personal tie being
present between two associations is also higher within blocks than across
blocks. As for resource exchange, this tendency is higher in the better in-
terconnected blocks. Overall in Zurich, organizational as well as personal
ties are concentrated within structurally equivalent blocks. The structural
position of actors seems to be related to their networking strategies. As-
sociations in Zurich that are tied by organizational relationships are also
tied by personal relationships. This suggests a logic of interaction close to
a social movement mode of coordination. The fragmentation of the network
in Zurich take place not only through resource exchanges, but also through
boundary deﬁnition.
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These results seem to conﬁrm the expectations about the network in
Zurich, where the closed opportunities favor a social movement mode of co-
ordination of collective action. Moreover, the network is highly fragmented,
as expected. The closed opportunities favor strong boundaries because as-
sociations have to rely on their members for collective action. Moreover, al-
though speciﬁc opportunities at the local level are more open than in Lyon,
resources for immigrants associations remain scarce. Funding, for example,
is only granted on the basis of speciﬁc projects. Immigrants' associations
in Zurich seem thus to rely heavily on their members for collective action,
and this has an eﬀect on their networking strategies. Boundaries do not cut
across clusters, neither do resource exchanges. Rather, they are concentrated
within clusters of similar others.
The modes of coordination of collective action thus diﬀer across cities and
tend to conﬁrm the hypotheses. In a more exclusive context, associations
engage in dense resource exchanges that overlap with boundary deﬁnition.
That is, associations only create alliances with associations they identify as
similar and with whom they share a collective identity. As suggested by
the social movement literature, closed opportunities favor strong collective
identities. However, we do not ﬁnd one collective identity; the fragmenta-
tion in the network suggests that there are three diﬀerent subgroups sharing
diﬀerent collective identities. Thus, the network in the ﬁeld of immigration
in Zurich is not homogeneous, and consequently, mobilizing as "immigrants"
seems rather diﬃcult in such a closed context. However, these three sub-
groups displaying a social movement mode of coordination should have the
resources to mobilize on their own. Nevertheless, this will depend greatly on
the identities along which they are organized. If these identities are salient
in the Zurich context, resources for mobilizing would be available, but if
these identities are not publicly recognized, this mode of coordination could
also have a negative eﬀect on political inclusion. Thus, two scenarios are
possible for the network of migrant associations in Zurich. In the ﬁrst, the
collective identities along which they are clustered are salient in the Zurich
context, in which case they would be endowed with resources that would
allow them to be politically active. If these identities are not salient, we
would observe subgroups of migrant associations not only disconnected from
each other, but also politically excluded. The brief overview of associations
102
in blocks suggests that their origin is organizing the ﬁeld, which points in
the direction of a low political inclusion.
The more open context in Lyon seems to favor a more integrated net-
work. Migrant associations engage in denser resource exchanges than in
Zurich, and these exchanges cut across structural positions in the network.
Strong collective identities are only found in the middle link of the chain
structure. The collective identity in this cluster does not seem to have the
same exclusion potential as in Zurich, since associations sharing a collective
identity are connected to other subgroups of the network. However, this will
also depend on the identity around which this cluster is connected. The ﬁrst
description of associations suggests that in the context of Lyon, these iden-
tities are salient, since they make no reference to ethnic identities and are
mainly engaging in activities recognized as legitimate by the system, namely
social inclusion. Nevertheless, the open opportunities in Lyon seem to favor
coalitional modes of coordination. Resource exchanges take place in this
network, and to a greater extent than in Zurich, but these exchanges are not
concentrated within structural equivalent groups. To fully understand the
relational patterns that are taking place in the networks in both cities, the
characteristics of associations holding diﬀerent structural position have to
be examined. This will give us a better idea of the collective identities along
which associations are connected.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter looked at structural equivalence in both cities and at modes of
coordination of collective action of immigrants' associations. Starting from
the hypothesis that the more open context in Lyon would favor organizational
or coalitional modes of coordination and that more closed opportunities in
Zurich would favor social movement or community modes of coordination,
the networks of resource exchange and boundary deﬁnition were analyzed.
The results show that the network structure varies in both cities and that
these diﬀerent structures can be related to the political opportunity struc-
ture in the ﬁeld of immigration. Networks of immigrants associations are
not homogeneous across contexts nor within contexts. Indeed, in Lyon, im-
migrants' associations tend to display a coalitional mode of coordination.
However, one block, the middle link of the chain structure, is closer to a so-
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cial movement mode of interaction. In Zurich, immigrants' associations are
embedded in highly delimited clusters. Resource exchanges and boundary
deﬁnition take place within clusters, and associations do not build alliances
outside their structural position. This suggests that associations in Zurich
do not have the resources to invest in alliances outside the boundaries of the
cluster in which they are embedded. The network in Zurich is highly frag-
mented compared to the one in Lyon. These results suggest that modes of
incorporation of immigrants and that speciﬁc opportunities at the local level
inﬂuence alliance strategies of immigrant associations. They are consistent
with previous studies of immigrants' associations' networks in France and
in Switzerland that suggested a more integrated network in France than in
Switzerland (Ireland, 1994). However, to get a better idea of immigrants as-
sociations' networking strategies, we need to look at the composition of these
blocks. Do associations holding the same structural position share similar
characteristics, as hypothesized by theories of social roles positions? What
distinguishes associations in diﬀerent clusters? What fragmentation prin-
ciple takes place within the network? Are the networks organized around
speciﬁc interests of associations, that is, is the network fragmented along
functional lines or along ethnicity or any other principle? In both cities,
we ﬁnd clusters displaying strong collective identities. What identities are
salient? How do diﬀerent identities and interests of associations shape rela-
tionships between associations? Answering these questions will be the task
of the next chapter, in which we will look at the compositions of these blocks






This chapter explores the fragmentation principles at work in the networks
of immigrant associations in Lyon and Zurich. In the previous chapter, the
networks in both cities were found to display diﬀerent modes of coordina-
tion of collective action related to their embeddedness in diﬀerent political
opportunity structures. Moreover, the network is less fragmented in Lyon
than in Zurich. The aim of this chapter is to examine the lines along which
the networks in both cities are fragmented. The ﬁrst section summarizes the
theoretical approach and recalls the hypothesis about network fragmentation
lines. It discusses the link between speciﬁc political opportunity structures in
the ﬁeld of immigration and how these opportunities can shape the fragmen-
tation of a network by deﬁning the saliency of speciﬁc identities and interests
of associations. It discusses how opportunities in Lyon are expected to favor
boundaries based on interests, while the network in Zurich is expected to be
fragmented along ethnic/national lines. The next section presents descrip-
tive ﬁndings on the diﬀerent fragmentation lines in both cities. It is followed
by a test of the eﬀect of the position of associations on their similarity on the
previously deﬁned boundaries. It concludes with a discussion of the results
in light of the previous ﬁndings on diﬀerent modes of coordination of collec-
tive action and the implications of these network structures for the inclusion
potential of migrant organizations.
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5.2 Political opportunity structures and boundary
deﬁnition
Community power studies as well as social movements analysts examin-
ing network structure found not only diﬀerent fragmentation degrees, but
also diﬀerent fragmentation lines. Community power structures found net-
works fragmented along functional area, i.e., around organizations' activities
(Laumann and Pappi, 1976; Galaskiewicz, 1979; Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz,
1993). Social movement networks are found to be fragmented along diﬀer-
ent lines. For example, it can be fragmented along the generation to which
associations belong, with more established ones clustered together and more
recent ones in other blocks (Diani, 2003a). Other social movement networks
are fragmented along ideological lines, such as the environmental movement
in Milan in the 70's, in which ideological cleavages prevented collaboration
between political ecology organizations and more conservationist organiza-
tions (Diani, 2003a). Networks of civic organizations have also been found
to be fragmented along diﬀerent principles, like shared interest and iden-
tity (Diani and Pilati, 2011). These few examples show how organizational
networks, community elite networks, and social movement networks can be
fragmented along diﬀerent lines.
Why and under what circumstances are networks fragmented along ide-
ology rather than, for instance, functional area? As pointed out by Knoke
(1990), ﬁndings in studies of community power structures and policy net-
works suggest that network structures and fragmentation principles of net-
works diﬀer in time and space and that the context in which these networks
are embedded might have an eﬀect on the structure as well as the fragmenta-
tion line of networks. In a similar vein, social movement analysts pointed to
the role of the political context, and more speciﬁcally of cleavages, for net-
work fragmentation (Diani, 2003a; Diani et al., 2010; Diani and Pilati, 2011).
Indeed, salient cleavages may prevent actors located on diﬀerent sides of the
cleavage from collaborating. The discursive opportunities in the ﬁeld of im-
migration may also have an eﬀect on the fragmentation lines of networks of
organizations. Deﬁning legitimate identities in the public sphere can have
an eﬀect on the salience of identities and/or interests in shaping a network.
Indeed, through the symbolic power of institutions in categorizing, some
identities and areas of interests achieve public recognition (Okamoto, 2003).
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This public recognition may have an eﬀect on associations self-identiﬁcation
and on their alliance building strategies, i.e., how they are connecting to
some actors and distancing themselves from others.
The ethnic boundaries approach (Wimmer, 2008) follows a similar rea-
soning, focusing not only on the categorical aspect of boundaries, but also on
a behavioral dimension, that is, the relational dimension of boundaries. This
approach also emphasizes the role of institutions for deﬁning the saliency of
boundaries. In this model, the institutional framework determines what
boundaries are salient, whether ethnic or an other in a speciﬁc ﬁeld. In
the ﬁeld of immigration, the discursive political opportunity structure de-
ﬁnes what identities or interests are salient. By deﬁning who belongs to the
national community and who the others are, the POS in the ﬁeld of immigra-
tion and ethnic relations provides incentives for drawing diﬀerent boundaries
at diﬀerent levels, according the context. Discursive opportunities thus have
an eﬀect on the collective identities that migrant mobilize and consequently
is expected to have an eﬀect on the boundaries drawn within the network of
migrant associations.
The discursive POS in Lyon, recognizes no particularistic identities, in-
cluding ethnic identities. As a consequence integration of migrants is consid-
ered in a political and social way. Integration policies are oriented towards
politically and socially excluded populations, not towards speciﬁc ethnic or
national groups. The public recognition of issues of social and political ex-
clusion in the ﬁeld of immigration will favor the organization of migrants on
this basis and may thus fragment the network along those lines. The network
of immigrant associations is thus expected to be fragmented along functional
areas, i.e., their activities. In other words, immigrant associations holding
the same position in the network and being embedded in similar patterns of
relationships are expected to be active in the same area of activity.
The Swiss ethno-assimilationist approach excludes migrants from the
public sphere, but at the same time allows them to keep their ethnic/national
identity and to express it publicly (Giugni and Passy, 2006). Migrants are
thus expected to be organized on an ethnic/national basis, and the network
of migrant associations is expected to be fragmented along those lines. Asso-
ciations holding the same position in the network are thus expected to have
the same origin.
To recall, the hypothesis in chapter 3 is formulated as follows:
107
In Zurich, where the symbolic ethnic cleavage is more salient as expressed
by discursive opportunities, the network of migrant organizations is
expected to be fragmented along ethnic lines. When this cleavage is less
salient, as in Lyon, the network of migrant organizations is expected
to be fragmented along functional lines.
5.3 Deﬁning and measuring fragmentation princi-
ples
To look at the fragmentation principles in the networks in Lyon and Zurich,
two aspects will be examined: the origin of associations and their area of
activity. Two indicators are considered for associations' origins. The geo-
graphical origin of associations will be considered as will whether they report
representing a speciﬁc group. The national/ethnic origin of associations is
based on interviewers' deﬁnition after the interview based on the question of
the origin of members.1 Because of the numerous national/ethnic origins of
associations, this variable was recoded in regional origins.
The second indicator examines whether associations represent a speciﬁc
group of people. Associations were asked whether they represent a speciﬁc
group of people, and if they said yes, they were asked to specify what group.
Answers can be recoded in four categories: no speciﬁc group of people, a
national/ethnic group, a religious group, or any other group.2 Adding to the
national origin of the associations the representation of a speciﬁc group allows
us to explore whether associations in diﬀerent clusters also work on behalf
of migrants and thus wether the ethnic background of their constituency is
also put forward in political activities.
The area of activities ﬁrst considers activities in which associations were
active in the two years preceding the interview.3 Activities were recoded in
broader areas based on a conception of civil society divided in three core
sectors: a social or leisure sector, a politics sector, and a economic sector
(Maloney and Roßteutscher, 2007). Family activities (child care, family, ed-
ucation and, parents), sports, and culture are activities in the social and
1QPOS3A in questionnaire. See also Tables ?? and ?? in Appendix ?? for national
origins of interviewed associations.
2Q15 and Q15a in questionnaire.
3Q2101-q2134 in questionnaire.
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leisure sector. The politics sector is composed of community concerns (com-
munity development, housing, crime, and neighborhood), politics, new poli-
tics (peace, human rights, women, and homosexuality), and the area related
to immigration (ethnic group related activities, immigration, and discrim-
ination). The economic sector regroups activities such as general welfare
(charity, poverty, and humanitarian aid), groups' speciﬁc welfare (health,
disabled, pensioners), and economic interest (business relations, labor rela-
tions, consumers' interest, and employment). Religion is a sector in itself,
and ﬁnally, a residual category regroups all other activities (research, inter-
national cooperation, and other activities).
A second indicator measures the functional diﬀerentiation, namely self-
deﬁnition of associations. 4 Self-deﬁnition also classiﬁes associations along
functional areas, but has to do with the associations' perception of their
function. Activities of associations are limited to the two years preceding
the interview. However, the area of activity of associations might vary over
time and be only contingent. The self-deﬁnition of associations is a more
stable aspect of their activity.
How are these characteristics of associations distributed across cities and
the diﬀerent blocks in the cities under study? Answering this question will
be the task of the following two sections. Both ﬁrst cross the characteristics
with the city and then with block membership, to see how national origin
and areas of activities are distributed in both cities. In a second step, an
analysis of variance is run on the similarity of associations on the previously
described characteristics. This will test the hypothesis according to which
associations in the same cluster should show similarity in origin or activities.
5.4 Origin of associations
Where do the members of the migrant associations in Lyon and Zurich come
from? Table 5.1 shows the distribution of origin of migrant associations in
both cities. The origin of migrant associations diﬀers signiﬁcantly between
the cities. Most of the associations in Lyon are from North Africa (almost
35 % of associations). The next most important group are of mixed origin
(while more than half of the members have an immigration background, no
dominant origin are to be found in these associations). Finally, the third most
4Q1301-q1329 in questionnaire.
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important group comes from Subsaharan Africa, that is a the more recent
wave of migrants to Lyon. In Zurich, most associations have a European
origin, that is, the migrants are from the ﬁrst immigration waves to Zurich.
The second most important group is from Eastern Europe and arrived more
recently. Finally, in Zurich we ﬁnd a higher share of associations from Turkey
and the Middle East than in Lyon but fewer associations with mixed origin.
Table 5.1: Regional origin of associations in Lyon and Zurich
Lyon Zurich Total
China .0 2.6 1.1
DOM 5.8 .0 3.3
EU-15 + EEA 1.9 38.5 17.6
Eastern Europe + Russia .0 25.7 11.0
Indian Subcontinent 1.9 7.7 4.4
Maghreb 34.6 .0 19.8
Mixed 30.8 10.3 21.0
Sub-saharan Africa 21.2 2.6 13.2
Turkey and Middle East Muslim 3.9 12.8 7.7
Total 100 100 100
N 52 39 91
Fisher's .000
Before comparing the distribution of associations across clusters in both
cities, we ﬁrst brieﬂy recall how the networks are structured. The network
structure and the modes of coordination of collective action of immigrant
associations have been shown to vary in the two cities under study. In Lyon,
the network is composed of four structurally equivalent blocks. The patterns
of relationships between these blocks display a chain structure. One cluster
is totally disconnected from the block (block 2). The three other blocks
are connected but show diﬀerent modes of collective action. The ﬁrst link
of the chain (block 3) shows a tendency to send resource exchange ties to
the middle link of the chain (block 4). This block is characterized by dense
resource exchange and high investment in boundary deﬁnition within the
block. However, it is also connected to the third and last link of the chain,
block 1. Associations in this block tend to send resource exchange ties outside
the block. In sum, in Lyon the network displays a chain structure, with a
middle link of the chain being densely interconnected in terms of resource
exchange but also investing much in boundary deﬁnition ties.
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In Zurich, the network is composed of three disconnected blocks. How-
ever, all three blocks show high levels of resource exchange within the block
but also of ties reﬂecting boundary deﬁnition. To sum up, the network in
Lyon is better integrated than the network in Zurich and displays an organi-
zational mode of coordination of collective action. In Zurich, ties reﬂecting
boundary deﬁnitions and resource exchange overlap in three disconnected
clusters, which resembles a social movement mode of coordination.5
What are the characteristics of the clusters in which associations invest
more in boundary deﬁnition, what characteristics do they share, and what
diﬀerentiate them from others? How are origins of migrant associations and
the areas of activities distributed among the clusters? Before testing the
hypothesis of the eﬀect of the structural position of associations on their
links to similar others in origin and area of activity, we will ﬁrst examine
whether we ﬁnd some diﬀerences across clusters. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show
the regional origin of associations in Lyon and in Zurich. While there is no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence across blocks in Lyon, the network in Zurich seems to
be fragmented along regional lines. However, some diﬀerences across blocks
can be observed in Lyon. Most of the associations in the ﬁrst block are North
African. In the second block, the most represented origins are Sub-saharan
Africa, but mainly associations from mixed origins. The third and the fourth
block are rather similar. Indeed, in both blocks associations are from mixed
origins or from the Maghreb. In Zurich, associations from European origin
are dominant in block 1. This block is mainly composed of migrants from the
early immigration waves to Switzerland, that is, Italians and Spaniards, and
Tamil . The second third blocks are mainly composed of associations from
Eastern Europe, Turkey, and the Middle East. Migrants from these regions
moved to Switzerland during later waves of immigration. These ﬁrst results
on the regional origin of associations suggest that the network in Zurich is
rather fragmented along immigration waves than on national/ethnic origins,
whereas in Lyon, no signiﬁcant pattern in terms of origin is observed.
However, the domination of one speciﬁc regional origin in a block does not
tell whether origin plays a role in fragmenting the network. Indeed, the fact
that members of an association are predominantly from the same national
origin does not necessarily mean that associations represent these members
as migrants. One way to look at this is to examine whether associations
5See Figure 4.5 on page 97 for the image matrix of the blockmodeling solutions.
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Table 5.2: Origin of associations by blocks in Lyon
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Total
China .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
DOM 20.0 .0 5.6 .0 5.8
EU-15 + EEA .0 .0 5.6 .0 1.9
Eastern Europe +
Russia
.0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Indian Subcontinent 10.0 .0 .0 .0 1.9
Maghreb 40.0 11.1 33.3 46.7 34.6
Mixed 10.0 33.3 33.3 40.0 30.8
Sub-saharan Africa 10.0 55.6 16.7 13.3 21.2
Turkey and Middle
East Muslim
10.0 .0 5.6 .0 3.9
Total (N) 100 (10) 100 (9) 100 (18) 100(15) 100 (52)
Fisher's exact .180
Table 5.3: Origin of associations by blocks in Zurich
Bloc 1 Bloc 2 Bloc 3 Total
Africa 5.6 .0 .0 2.6
China .0 7.7 .0 2.6
EU-15 + EEA 72.2 15.4 .0 l 38.5
East-Europe + Russia .0 46.2 50.0 25.6
Indian Subcontinent 16.7 .0 .0 7.7
Mixed 5.6 .0 .0
Turkey and Middle East Muslim .0 l 30.8 50.0 20.5
Total (N) 100 (18) 100 (13) 100 (8)
Fisher's exact .000
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deﬁne themselves as representing a speciﬁc group of people and whether this
group is an ethnic/national group. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 report the results
for the representation of a speciﬁc group across blocks. Consistent with the
previous ﬁndings on origin, in Lyon, there is signiﬁcant relation between the
structural location of associations and the group they represent. Moreover,
most of the associations in Lyon report that they do not represent any group.
Block 1,2, and 3 however have a certain number of associations declaring
representing migrants. Finally, no associations in Lyon represent a religious
group.
Table 5.4: Representation of speciﬁc group in Lyon and Zurich
Lyon Zurich Total
No one 65.4 28.2 49.5
Migrant group 23.1 51.3 35.2
Religious group .0 18.0 7.7
Other 11.5 2.6 7.7
Total (N) 100 (52) 100 (39) 100 (91)
Fisher's .000
Table 5.5: Represented group by blocks in Lyon
Bloc 1 Bloc 2 Bloc 3 Bloc 4 Total
No one 50.0 44.4 66.7 86.7 65.4
Migrant group 40.0 33.3 22.2 6.7 23.1
Religious group .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Other 10.0 22.2 11.1 6.7 11.5
Total (N) 100 (10) 100 (9) 100 (18) 100 (15) 100 (52)
Fisher's exact .289
In contrast, in Zurich, there is a diﬀerence between blocks and the group
associations declare they represent. Associations in block 1, composed mainly
of associations from the ﬁrst immigration waves to Switzerland, tend to rep-
resent migrants, that is, a speciﬁc ethnic/national group. As opposed to
origin, in which the second and the third block showed similar composition,
we ﬁnd here a diﬀerence in the groups they represent. While associations in
the second block report mainly that they represent no speciﬁc group, those
located in the third block represent a speciﬁc religious group. If we look
more in detail at the associations in this block, we see that they are Muslim
and Orthodox associations. The ﬁrst cluster is dominated by European and
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Tamil migrants from the ﬁrst immigration wave. These associations also re-
port representing immigrants. This block can thus be deﬁned as a block of
immigrant associations. In the second block, in which associations are from
the more recent immigration waves, mainly from Eastern Europe (Kosovo
and Serbia-Montenegro), associations do not represent any speciﬁc group,
and when they do, they tend to represent immigrants. The third block is
a block of religious associations, more precisely of Muslims and Orthodox.
While these ﬁndings do not support the hypothesis of the fragmentation
only along ethnic/national lines, they suggest that the origin, and the mi-
grant group, plays a role in fragmenting the network. These categories are
consistent with the categories used by actors in the ﬁeld of immigration
when making claims. Indeed, migrants are referred to as speciﬁc national
or religious groups. Thus, in Zurich, it is rather the migration wave that
diﬀerentiate clusters than the ethnic/national origin. Moreover, the more
recent wave in divided in two clusters, a secular and a religious one.
Table 5.6: Represented group by blocks in Zurich
Bloc 1 Bloc 2 Bloc 3 Total
No one 11.1 61.5 12.5 28.2
Migrant group 83.3 30.8 12.5 51.3
Religious group 5.6 .0 75.0 18.0
Other .0 7.7 .0 2.6
Total (N) 100 (18) 100 (13) 100 (8) 100 (39)
Fisher's exact .000
These results suggest that the length of settlement is fragmenting the
network in Zurich but not in Lyon, where no signiﬁcant relationship is found
between origin and group representation and the diﬀerent relational pat-
terns in which associations are embedded. The bivariate analysis describes
the compositions of the blocks in terms of origin and representation. How-
ever, it does not show whether ties are sent along those lines. Do associations
in diﬀerent relational patterns send ties to other associations that are simi-
lar in terms of origin or representation? To test for the hypothesis, we run
an analysis of variance testing for variable homophily on similarity matrices
constructed on the basis of these attributes of associations. 6 If associations
embedded in diﬀerent relational patterns (that is, holding diﬀerent structural
6See Section ?? in Appendix ?? on page ?? for a description of similarity matrix
construction.
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positions) send ties to similar others in terms of origin of group representa-
tion, we will ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive relationship between blocks and
similarity. In other words, if the network is fragmented along the migra-
tion wave or group representation of associations, the relationship between
the position of associations, their block membership, should be positively
related to similarity.7 Indeed, the similarity matrix records similarity scores,
the higher the score, the most similar are the associations on the attributes
under study.
The results for Lyon on origin and group representation are reported
in table 5.7. They conﬁrm the previous ﬁndings. Associations in Lyon,
whatever their location in the network, do not tend to send ties to similar
others. Neither ethnic/national origin nor the represented group fragment
the network of migrant associations in Lyon.
Table 5.7: Non-parametric estimates for fragmentation along origin in Lyon
Origin Group representation
Stdized Coeﬀ Sig. Stdized Coeﬀ. Sig.
Intercept 0.00000 0.5670 0.00000 0.6536
Block 1 -0016383 0.3796 -0.030174 0.3786
Block 2 -0.017460 0.3632 -0.012630 0.5036
Block 3 0.043577 0.1280 0.083649 0.1118
Block 4 -0.019987 0.3340 -0.041542 0.2778
Adj. R2 .003 0.6538 .010 0.4720
N 2652
In Zurich (table 5.8), we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between structural
position of associations and their similarity in length of settlement. Associ-
ations located in the same position in the network also send ties to similar
others in terms of migration wave. The network is fragmented along length
of settlement, and religious and secular lines, since immigrant associations
are more likely to be allied to associations from the same migration wave.
Migrant Associations from the ﬁrst migration waves have a higher tendency
to send ties to similar others than to any other group. Religious associations
are more likely to send ties to religious associations than to any other associ-
ation. Thus, not only do we ﬁnd a migrant groups from the same migration
7We use the same model as in the previous chapter. See section 4.5 on p.97 for a
description of the model.
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wave in each cluster in Zurich, but associations from the same wave are also
more likely to send ties to associations from the same wave.
Table 5.8: Non-parametric estimates for fragmentation along origin in Zurich
Origin Group representation
Stdized Coeﬀ. Sig. Stdized Coeﬀ. Sig.
Intercept 0.00000 0.9998 0.000000 0.9998
Block 1 0.368761 0.0000 0.390281 0.0000
Block 2 0.103658 0.0424 0.131539 0.0314
Block 3 0.129432 0.0208 0.121406 0.0204
R2 .138 0.0002 .154 0.0000
N 1682
We ﬁnd similar results for the representation of a speciﬁc group. Asso-
ciations embedded in similar modes of coordination of collective action, also
tend to represent the same group of people. In the ﬁrst block, dominated
by longer settled migrants, associations are more likely to send ties within
the group but also to associations representing migrant groups. The sec-
ond cluster is composed of associations representing no speciﬁc group that
are also more likely to be tied to each other than to any other actor in the
network. Finally, the third block is composed of religious associations from
more recent waves, that claim to represent a speciﬁc religious group and who
build alliances mainly with similar associations.
While the network in Zurich is not fragmented strictly along ethnic lines,
the origin of migrants plays a role in the segmentation of the network. Bound-
aries are deﬁned around speciﬁc immigrant groups, with religious associa-
tions interacting essentially with religious associations, migrants from the
ﬁrst wave mainly with migrants from the early waves of immigration, and
ﬁnally migrants from Eastern Europe (mainly Kosovars and Turks). These
results are consistent with ﬁndings on neighborhoods in diﬀerent Swiss cities,
where individual ties are not shaped along national lines, but where the net-
work is segmented along insiders, and outsiders (Wimmer, 2002, 2004).
He ﬁnds that individual networks of migrants are fragmented along their
length of residence and the degree of perceived assimilability in the system.
Migrants from the ﬁrst immigration waves were mainly connected to au-
tochthonous residents and migrants from the same immigration waves who
consider themselves as "insiders". Outsiders are immigrants from the more
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recent immigration waves, such as Turks and Kosovars, who are excluded
from the other networks. In contrast, in Lyon we ﬁnd no such strong frag-
mentation based on origin. Associations embedded in similar relational pat-
terns do not share the same origin and do not represent the same group of
people.
5.5 Sector of activity and self-deﬁnition: Functional
fragmentation
Contrary to the expectations, the network in Zurich is fragmented along
the wave of immigration. However, ethno-national origin plays a role as it
informs about the length of settlement of migrants as opposed to the network
in Lyon in which origin of migrants does not play a role. This section will
examine the second fragmentation principle, namely the area of activities of
associations and their self-deﬁnitions. First, it will compare activities and
self-deﬁnition across cities, and then it will look at how activities and self-
deﬁnition of associations are distributed across blocks. It ﬁnally examines
whether blocks are structured around associations' activities.
Table 6.10 shows the areas of activities of associations in both cities re-
coded on the basis of a list of thirty-four activities performed in the last
twelve months preceding the interview. Migrant associations engage to a
similar extent in activities such as sports, culture, new politics, and welfare
in Lyon and Zurich. Associations in Lyon engage in community activities
to a signiﬁcantly higher extent than do associations in Zurich. The second
most important areas in which associations in Lyon are active are general
welfare and family. In Zurich, many associations are active in the family
area, to a signiﬁcantly higher extent than associations in Lyon. Migrant
organizations in Zurich only diﬀer from those in Lyon in areas such as eco-
nomic interest, religious activities and immigration. While almost 80% of
associations in Zurich are active in the area of immigration, only half of mi-
grant organizations in Lyon do. While associations in Lyon engage much in
the community area, in Zurich the most important areas are family, culture,
and immigration.
Do associations occupying the same positions perform similar activities
and deﬁne themselves in similar ways? Tables 5.10 and 5.11 show the distri-
bution of areas of activity across blocks. In Lyon, out of the 12 broad areas
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Table 5.9: Area of activity in Lyon and Zurich, percentage of yes
Lyon Zurich Total Fisher's
Family 59.6 79.5 68.1 .068
Sports 40.4 58.9 46.1 n.s.
Culture 61.5 71.8 65.9 n.s.
Community 73.1 43.6 60.4 .004
Politics 1.9 33.3 15.4 .000
New politics 44.2 53.9 48.4 n.s.
General welfare 59.6 71.8 64.8 n.s.
Group speciﬁc welfare 48.1 61.5 53.8 n.s.
Economic interest 32.7 53.9 41.8 .035
Religious 3.9 38.5 18.7 .000
Immigration 50.0 79.5 62.6 .003
Other 21.1 28.2 24.6 n.s.
of activities, ﬁve diﬀerentiate associations between clusters. Activities in the
area of community are important for associations in all blocks. Although at
some diﬀerent levels, it is an important area for a large number of immigrant
associations in Lyon. Associations in block 4, the middle link of the chain
that displays a social movement mode of coordination (i.e., dense resource
exchange and high investment in boundary deﬁnition) show high levels of
activities in all areas except religion. However, they can be distinguished
from associations embedded in other relational patterns by their high in-
vestment in family activities, group speciﬁc welfare, economic interest, and
immigration. In contrast to this highly active cluster, the second block (iso-
lated from the chain) shows very low levels of activity. Associations holding
this position are mainly active in the area of general welfare, culture, and
community, and in contrast to all other clusters, have not been active at all
in the area of economic interest. To sum up, the three blocks forming the
chain engage in more activities. However, the central link of the chain is the
block that shows the highest level of activity.
In Zurich, associations in diﬀerent locations are less distinguished in
terms of areas of activities, diﬀering only on community, culture, general
welfare, and religion. While culture is an important area of activity for asso-
ciations in the ﬁrst two blocks, it is signiﬁcantly less important for Muslim
associations. Indeed, their activities focus mainly on religion (since most of
them are religious associations reporting also that they represent a religious
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Table 5.10: Area of activity in Lyon, percentage of yes
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Total Fisher's
Family 50.0 22.2 61.1 86.7 59.6 .016
Sports 40.0 22.2 44.4 46.7 40.4 n.s.
Culture 60.0 44.4 55.6 80.0 61.5 n.s.
Community 80.0 55.6 66.7 86.7 73.1 n.s.
Politics .0 .0 .0 6.7 n.s.
New politics 40.0 22.2 38.9 66.7 44.2 n.s.
General welfare 30.0 55.6 66.7 73.3 59.6 n.s.
Group speciﬁc welfare 30.0 11.1 50.0 80.0 48.1 .006
Economic interest 20.0 .0 33.3 60.0 32.7 .015
Religious 10.0 11.1 .0 .0 3.9 n.s.
Immigration 40.0 .0 61.1 73.3 50.0 .002
Other 10.0 .0 11.1 53.3 21.2 .006
group), all are active in the general welfare area, and they also invest much
in the family area, which are typical religious associations' activities. The
block of the ﬁrst immigration wave is less active on religion. Its most im-
portant activity area is immigration, followed by welfare (general and group-
speciﬁc), community, and sports. These associations invest a great deal in
areas that help preserve their culture of origin. The welfare area is in this
case focused on pensioners. Indeed, many migrants from the guest-workers'
area are now retired and still live in Switzerland, so these associations are
engaging more on issues related to retirement of migrants. Migrants from
more recent waves, whose associations are concentrated in the second block,
focus also on cultural activities, maintaining their origin cultures, but also
on family and the immigration area. One of the most important areas of
activity of associations in this block is oriented toward the integration of
their constituency into Swiss society, but they also seek to maintain their
homeland culture through the organization of homeland language courses
for the second generation.
These results suggest that the network in Lyon is more diﬀerentiated
along the areas of activity than in Zurich, since we ﬁnd more diﬀerences
across blocks in terms of activities in Lyon. However, rather than the area of
activity, it is the level of activities that distinguishes blocks. But what about
associations' self-deﬁnition? Looking at self-deﬁnition gives a more precise
picture of the fragmentation principle at work in the networks. Indeed, we
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Table 5.11: Area of activity in Zurich, percentage of yes
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Total Fisher's
Family 66.7 92.3 87.5 79.5 n.s.
Sports 72.2 38.5 37.5 53.9 n.s.
Culture 77.8 84.6 37.5 71.8 .063
Community 55.6 15.4 62.5 43.6 .045
Politics 44.4 30.8 12.5 33.3 n.s.
New politics 50.0 61.5 50.0 53.9 n.s.
General welfare 72.2 53.9 100 71.8 .089
Group speciﬁc welfare 77.8 46.1 50.0 61.5 n.s.
Economic interest 61.1 38.5 62.5 53.9 n.s.
Religious 33.3 15.4 87.5 38.5 .004
Immigration 83.3 76.9 75.0 79.5 n.s.
Other 27.8 30.8 25.0 28.2 n.s.
might ﬁnd associations that are active in diﬀerent areas, but still deﬁning
themselves diﬀerently. It might be that self-deﬁnition is more important for
the selection of allies than the area of activity. Indeed, the areas of activity
might vary over time and can be more contingent than self-deﬁnition. An
association can be active in an area for a short period of time (remember
that the area of activity is limited to the last twelve months preceding the
interview). Self-deﬁnition is a more stable aspect of an association that may
impact the selection of allies. We might ﬁnd clusters of associations in which
self-deﬁnitions are similar, more speciﬁcally in the clusters characterized by
high investment in boundary deﬁnition, because self-deﬁnition is part of self-
identiﬁcation and of the deﬁnition of others.
Before looking at self-deﬁnition across clusters, we will ﬁrst compare
self-deﬁnition in the two cities and see whether they diﬀer. Table 5.12 re-
ports the results of self-deﬁnition of associations. Migrant associations show
diﬀerent patterns of self-deﬁnition in Lyon and Zurich, and they diﬀer signif-
icantly on several types of associations. The most frequent self-deﬁnitions in
Zurich are as immigrant and cultural organizations. However, associations
in Zurich deﬁne themselves more frequently as retired associations than in
Lyon. The same goes for self-deﬁnitions as parents' associations and cultural
associations. Moreover, we ﬁnd more associations in Zurich deﬁning them-
selves ethnic, or religious associations. Finally, in Lyon, the most frequent
self-deﬁnitions are charity and cultural organizations, but associations deﬁne
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Table 5.12: Self-deﬁnitions of associations in Lyon and Zurich percentage of
yes
Lyon Zurich Total Fisher's
Sports club 21.2 18.0 19.8 n.s.
Youth 19.2 23.1 20.9 n.s.
Environmental 3.9 5.1 4.4 n.s.
Animal rights .0 2.6 1.1 n.s.
Peace organization 7.7 15.4 11.0 n.s.
Humanitarian aid or human rights 25.0 35.9 29.7 n.s.
Charity or social welfare 36.5 35.9 36.3 n.s
Patient, illness, addiction 5.8 12.8 8.8 n.s.
Disabled 5.8 2.6 4.4 n.s.
Retired 3.9 15.4 8.8 .061
Lodge, service club .0 .0 .0 n.s.
Political party .0 2.6 1.1 n.s.
Trade union .0 5.1 2.2 n.s.
Farmers' .0 2.6 1.1 n.s.
Business or employers' 1.9 2.6 2.2 n.s
Professional 3.9 2.6 3.3 n.s.
Parents' .15.4 30.8 22.0 .068
Cultural 34.6 59.0 45.1 .018
Other hobby 3.9 5.1 4.4 n.s.
Residents' housing 25.0 10.3 18.7 .063
Immigrants' 9.6 59.0 30.8 .000
Religious .0 33.3 14.3 .000
Women's 9.6 15.4 12.1 n.s.
Anti-racism 17.3 18.0 17.6 n.s.
Direct action .0 10.3 4.4 .031
Ethnic 9.6 25.6 16.5 .040
themselves to a signiﬁcantly higher extent as residents'/housing associations
than in Zurich.
Are some self-deﬁnitions dominant in some blocks? Self-deﬁnition does
not seem to be diﬀerentiating clusters in Lyon (table 5.13). Almost no self-
deﬁnition is dominant in one cluster, moreover, we ﬁnd no dominating self-
deﬁnition in the most interconnected cluster, block 4. Surprisingly, there is
a diﬀerence across associations in diﬀerent relational patterns for association
deﬁning themselves as ethnic associations. Block 1, the ﬁrst link of the
chain, diﬀers from other blocks on this aspect as more associations in this
block deﬁne themselves as ethnic associations. Thus associations deﬁning
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themselves as ethnic associations are concentrated in one cluster. However,
with this exception, no self-deﬁnition is dominant in clusters.
In contrast, in Zurich, self-deﬁnition of associations seems to distinguish
associations located in diﬀerent structural positions. In the block of as-
sociations from the ﬁrst migration wave, the share of associations deﬁning
themselves as retired associations is signiﬁcantly higher than in other blocks.
The block of religious associations, consistent with previous ﬁndings, deﬁnes
themselves mainly as religious associations but signiﬁcantly less than in other
blocks, as cultural associations. The block of the most recent immigration
wave is here again diﬀerent in terms of self-deﬁnition than religious associ-
ations. Block 1 and 2 are most similar on their self-deﬁnition; cultural and
immigrant associations are the most frequent self-deﬁnitions in these blocks.
Block 3 deﬁnes itself mainly as religious associations or as humanitarian or
human aid associations.
Table 5.13: Self deﬁnition, Lyon, percentage of yes
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Total Fisher's
Sport club 20.0 22.2 16.7 26.7 21.2 n.s
Youth 20.0 .0 16.7 33.3 19.2 n.s.
Envir .0 .0 .0 .0 3.9 n.s.
Peace 10.0 .0 5.6 13.1 7.7 n.s.
Humanitarian 40.0 22.2 16.7 26.7 25.0 n.s.
Charity 40.0 11.1 33.3 53.3 36.5 n.s.
Patient illness .0 11.1 .0 13.3 5.8 n.s.
Disabled .0 11.1 .0 13.3 5.8 n.s.
Retired 10.0 .0 .0 6.7 3.9 n.s.
Trade union .0 .0 .0 .0 0 n.s
Professional 10.0 .0 5.6 .0 3.9 n.s.
Parents 20.0 .0 11.1 26.7 15.4 n.s.
Cultural 40.0 33.3 22.2 46.7 34.6 n.s.
Other hobby 10.0 .0 5.6 .0 3.9 n.s.
Resident 40.0 22.2 16.7 26.7 25.0 n.s.
Immigrant .0 .0 16.7 13.3 9.6 n.s.
Religious .0 .0 .0 .0 0 n.s.
Women .0 .0 5.6 26.7 9.6 n.s.
Anti-racism 20.0 11.1 11.1 26.7 17.3 n.s.
Direct act .0 .0 .0 0 0 n.s.
Ethnic 30.0 .0 .0 13.3 9.6 .031
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Table 5.14: Self deﬁnition, Zurich, percentage of yes
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Total Fisher's
Sports club 27.8 7.7 12.5 18.0 n.s.
Youth association 22.2 30.8 12.5 23.1 n.s.
Environmental org 11.1 .0 .0 5.1 n.s.
Peace org 27.8 7.7 .0 15.4 n.s.
Humanitarian/human rights 50.0 23.1 25.0 35.9 n.s.
Charity or social welfare 50.0 30.8 12.5 35.9 n.s.
Patient illness or addiction 22.2 7.7 .0 12.8 n.s.
Disabled 5.6 .0 .0 2.6 n.s.
Retired 33.3 .0 .0 15.4 .025
Political party .0 7.7 .0 2.6 n.s.
Trade union 11.1 .0 .0 5.1 n.s.
Business org 5.6 .0 .0 2.6 n.s.
Professional .0 7.7 .0 2.6 n.s
Parents 38.9 38.5 .0 30.8 n.s.
Cultural, musical 72.2 69.2 12.5 59.0 .016
Other hobby .0 7.7 12.5 5.1 n.s.
Resident housing or neighb 5.6 15.4 12.5 10.3 n.s.
Immigrant 72.2 46.2 50 59.0 n.s.
Religious 33.3 .0 87.5 33.3 .000
Women 16.7 15.4 12.5 15.4 n.s.
Anti-racism 22.2 23.1 .0 17.8 n.s.
Direct action group 11.1 15.4 .0 10.3 n.s.
Ethnic 33.3 23.1 12.5 25.6 n.s.
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To sum up, activities of associations diﬀer more across blocks in Lyon
than in Zurich, as opposed to self-deﬁnition. Moreover, in Zurich, there seems
to be an overlap between activities and self-deﬁnition, as opposed to Lyon.
As for origin and representation, to see whether the network is fragmented
along these lines, we still need to examine whether the structural location
and diﬀerent modes of coordination of collective action aﬀect their similarity
in the activities and self-deﬁnition of associations.
Table 5.15 shows the results for the network fragmentation in Lyon. The
results show that the structural position is related to the area of activity
of associations. Indeed, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between structural
location and similarity on activities. This relation is negative for the ﬁrst and
second block. Associations at the end of the chain and isolated associations
from the network (block 2) are dissimilar in terms of activities. On the
other hand, the ﬁrst block of the chain shows a high similarity in terms of
area of activity. In other words, associations in blocks 1 and 2 display a high
diversity in terms of activities, while associations in block 3 tend to be similar
in the activities associations engage in. Migrant organizations that display a
social movement mode of coordination show no tendency toward similarity or
dissimilarity. Although we expected a high similarity of associations in block
4, hypothesizing that their engagement in the same type of activities would
be the basis for their collective identity, what we do not observe, the area
of activity fragments the network in Lyon. Only one block (3) shows high
similarity of associations in activities. Block 1 and 2 show signiﬁcantly high
dissimilarity. That is, the network is structured along the areas of activities
in which associations engage, but not to the expected extent.
However, the more stable aspect, self-deﬁnition, does not structure the
network in Lyon. Indeed, the model is not signiﬁcant. These results are
partly conﬁrming what was expected about Lyon, namely that the network
is structured around the areas of activity in which associations engage. In-
deed, while we ﬁnd some relationships between the structural position of
associations and the area of activities, the result is not as strong as expected.
Table 5.16 shows the results for the fragmentation along areas of activities
and self-deﬁnition in Zurich. As opposed to Lyon, the area of activity of
migrant associations does not fragment the network. However, we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant relationship for self-deﬁnition. The more stable aspect of the area
in which associations engage and which relates to their identity fragments
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Table 5.15: Non-parametric estimates for activities and self-deﬁnition in
Lyon
Area of activity Self-deﬁntion
Stdized Coeﬀ. Sig. Stdized Coeﬀ. Sig.
Intercept 0.00000 0.9928 0.000000 0.8108
Block 1 -0.1011032 0.0426 0.005641 0.3908
Block 2 -0.075573 0.0986 -0.058655 0.0954
Block 3 0.240442 0.0042 0.112120 0.0508
Block 4 0.045933 0.2706 -0.025835 0.3822
Adj. R2 .077 0.0152 .017 0.2796
N 2652
the network of migrant associations in Zurich. Associations from the ﬁrst
immigration wave deﬁne themselves in similar ways and this self-deﬁnition
is related to their structural location. However, self-deﬁnition corresponds
to the identities found previously in the clusters and it only structures the
third cluster.
Table 5.16: Non-parametric estimates for activities and self-deﬁnition in
Zurich
Area of activity Self-deﬁntion
Stdized Coeﬀ. Sig. Stdized Coeﬀ. Sig.
Intercept 0.000000 0.8660 0.000000 0.9968
Block 1 0.105541 0.1660 0.254138 0.0090
Block 2 -0.062377 0.2634 -0.019136 0.4510
Block 3 0.039685 0.2718 -0.022441 0.4498
R2 .017 0.5342 .067 .0554
N 1682
To conclude, networks of migrant associations diﬀer in Lyon and Zurich
as well as the line along which they are fragmented. The non-recognition of
particularistic identities in Lyon seems to have an eﬀect not only on the basis
on which migrants organize (indeed, we found associations active mainly in
the community area and deﬁning themselves as charity/social welfare and
residents' associations and only few deﬁning themselves as immigrant or
ethnic associations), but also in the way migrant associations relate to each
other. Moreover, associations deﬁning themselves as ethnic or migrant as-
sociations are mainly to be found in clusters embedded in organizational
modes of coordination. The fact that in the ﬁeld of immigration particular-
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istic identities are not salient, but that integration of immigrants is conceived
as social inclusion has a little eﬀect on the fragmentation lines of the net-
work. Indeed, rather than identities, issue agendas are salient. Associations
in a social movement mode of coordination are not similar in the activities
they engage in. Rather they display a high level of activities. This suggests
a situation in which these associations monopolize the ﬁeld. In Zurich, the
ethno-assimilationist model allows migrants to keep their ethnic/national
identity. This aﬀects the identity on which they organize. Indeed, migrant
associations are mainly active in the cultural area (aimed at maintaining
their origin culture), but they also deﬁne themselves as ethnic, immigrant,
or religious associations. The network is also fragmented along those lines
on which migrant associations exchange resources and send ties reﬂecting
boundaries to associations that are similar in terms of migration wave, as
well as in what speciﬁc group they represent. These results thus suggest that
the context in which migrant associations, more speciﬁcally the discursive
political opportunity structures in which they are embedded, has an eﬀect
on their networking strategies.
5.6 Conclusion
The objective of the last chapter was to examine what fragmentation prin-
ciples are at work in the network of migrant associations in Lyon and in
Zurich. Diﬀerent principles were hypothesized to fragment the network in
both cities. While the network in Lyon was expected to be fragmented along
areas of activities (functional fragmentation), in Zurich we expected the ori-
gin of associations to fragment the network (fragmentation along identity).
The ﬁndings partly support the hypothesis. In Zurich, the network is
highly fragmented into three totally disconnected clusters along the migra-
tion wave. One block is composed of associations from the ﬁrst migrant
waves to Switzerland. Moreover, these associations report that they rep-
resent a speciﬁc ethnic group. Finally, they deﬁne themselves mainly as
immigrant associations. A second block is composed of immigrants from the
more recent waves of immigration from Eastern Europe. Although the asso-
ciations do not represent any speciﬁc group, they deﬁne themselves mainly
as cultural associations. Finally, a third block is composed by religious asso-
ciations from recent waves, reporting to represent religious groups but also
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deﬁning themselves as religious associations. Moreover, in all three blocks,
the structural position of associations is positively related to their similarity
on length of settlement and group representation.
In Lyon, the picture is less straightforward. The origin of immigrants
clearly does not segment the network, although we ﬁnd some origins that are
more represented in some blocks than in others. The results for Lyon suggest
that the network is instead fragmented along the areas in which associations
are active. While no block is active in one speciﬁc are of activities, it seems
that the fragmentation is rather related to the level of activities. Indeed,
the central link of the chain, which displays a social movement mode of
coordination of collective action, is active in more areas than associations in
other blocks. However, associations holding this position do not send more
ties to similar others in terms of activities. Only associations in the ﬁrst link
of the chain are linked to similar associations in their activities.
These ﬁndings suggest that the discursive POS in the ﬁeld of immigra-
tion have an eﬀect on the way immigrant associations deﬁne themselves but
also on how they relate to each other. Migrant associations from diﬀerent
waves are densely interconnected, but the context does not encourage alliance
building cutting across this boundary. The ﬁeld is fragmented between old
established migrants and newly arrived. Interestingly, associations from the
earlier migrations waves still deﬁne themselves as migrant associations but
also declare to represent speciﬁc national groups. However, these migrants
settled a long time ago, and the fact that associations still organize on the
basis of their national origin and are tied mainly to associations from the
same waves suggests that the context excludes migrant associations from the
Swiss national community.
In Lyon, the discursive POS seems to favor a more integrated network.
Ethnic/national identities do not segment the network as a result of the
republican approach of citizenship. Moreover, the deﬁnition of immigrants'
integration in terms of political and social inclusion aﬀects the network.
One cluster seems to monopolize the ﬁeld, by engaging in a high number of
activities. Other clusters, engaged in an organizational mode of coordination,
engage in fewer activities.
But what are the consequences of these network structures on the polit-
ical inclusion of migrant associations? Do they provide them with resources
for political inclusion and making their voices heard? Are migrant asso-
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ciations displaying social movement modes of collective action more active
politically? Or does the context interact with the relational structure and
aﬀect the outcomes in terms of political inclusion? These questions will be





This chapter explores the political inclusion of immigrants' associations in
Lyon and Zurich. Drawing on the ﬁndings about the network structure in
both cities, it looks at the eﬀects of the POS and the structural location
of associations on their level of political inclusion. It hypothesizes that the
eﬀect of the structural location of immigrant associations on their political
involvement is context-dependent. More speciﬁcally, being embedded in sim-
ilar types of relations will favor participation in one context, but discourage
it in another. The ﬁrst section of the chapter discusses the theoretical ap-
proach and the relationship between POS, network structure, and political
inclusion, and recalls the hypotheses formulated in chapter 2. The follow-
ing section describes political inclusion and its various dimensions. Indeed,
political inclusion of associations refers not only their political activities,
but is also related to their contacts with local and regional political insti-
tutions and administration. It then explores how associations embedded in
diﬀerent relational patterns are politically included in Lyon and Zurich. The
hypotheses are then tested through variance analysis that explores the re-
lationship between structural position and political inclusion. It concludes
by discussing the link between network structures and political inclusion of
migrant associations in diﬀerent political settings.
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6.2 Structural location of associations and political
inclusion in diﬀerent contexts
What are the consequences of the network structures found in Lyon and
Zurich for the political inclusion of immigrants' associations? Do some struc-
tures provide associations with more resources for participation than others,
as hypothesized by the social capital approach (Putnam, 1993; Lin, 2001)?
Diﬀerent network structures have been found in both cities, and migrant
associations also display diﬀerent modes of coordination of collective action.
In Lyon, they are rather embedded in organizational modes of coordination,
and one cluster shows a social movement mode of coordination. The network
in Lyon is less fragmented than expected but the low fragmentation follows
rather a functional principle, that is, around areas of activities. In Zurich,
we found a totally fragmented network with three clusters displaying a social
movement mode of coordination. The fragmentation principle is based on
associations' wave of migration. What resources do these structures provide
associations with for political inclusion?
In Lyon, associations embedded in resource exchange and ties reﬂecting
boundary deﬁnition will have more resources for political participation and
for making their voices heard. These associations are active on the issues
recognized by public authorities as legitimate for immigrants, so their access
to the public sphere as well as their contacts with authorities will be facil-
itated. Associations embedded in other clusters will lack the resources for
political inclusion. In Zurich, associations are deeply embedded in clusters
in which resource exchange overlaps with boundary deﬁnition ties. However,
since they are linked around their identities as migrants, their access to the
public sphere is limited. Their embeddedness in this type of relational pat-
terns reinforces their exclusion from the public sphere. Thus, not only will
immigrant associations in Zurich display lower levels of political inclusion
than associations in Lyon, but we will ﬁnd no diﬀerences among clusters in
the level of political inclusion. Indeed, the presence of social capital, de-
ﬁned as dense ethnic civic communities by Fennema and Tillie (2001), is
not suﬃcient for political inclusion. The social capital of migrants has to be
mobilizable to play a positive role (Anthias, 2007).
In chapter 3 the hypothesis is formulated as follows:
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In Zurich, the combination of an ethno-assmilationist model and social
movements or subcultural modes of coordination of collective action
is expected to favor more client-oriented activities, few contacts with
political institutions, but more contentious forms of political partici-
pation.
In Lyon, the combination of a civic-assimilationist model of citizenship and
a hierarchical network based on coalitional or organizational modes of
coordination is expected to favor engagement in policy-oriented activ-
ities, show higher levels but less contentious forms of political partici-
pation and have more contacts with political institutions.
6.3 Deﬁning and measuring political inclusion of
migrant organizations
This section deﬁnes political inclusion of migrant associations and focuses
on two dimensions. The ﬁrst is related to the political activities of associa-
tions. First, the political function of associations is examined by distinguish-
ing between policy- and member-oriented activities. Exploring the political
function of associations allows us to assess the extent to which associations
are oriented toward the public sphere. The second aspect of the activity
dimension is related to the actual forms of political activities performed by
associations. The second dimension refers to the contacts associations have
with relevant institutions at the local and regional level to assess their po-
tential impact on local political authorities.
6.3.1 Political function and participation
Voluntary associations can be active in various domains. While social move-
ment organizations are usually considered primarily policy-oriented orga-
nizations, sports clubs or church-related organizations are rather member-
oriented but can provide their members with civic skills (Putnam, 2000).
However, associations with objectives that are not primarily political may
be engaged in political activities. To assess the political function of associ-
ations, we will draw on the typology developed by Lelieveldt et al. (2007,
p.82-85). Associations can engage in diﬀerent types of activities and the
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literature distinguishes between two general orientations of associations: in-
strumental activities, that is, the attainment of a speciﬁc goal and orga-
nizational maintenance. Instrumental activities are distinguished between
policy- and client-oriented activities. While policy-oriented activities target
political authorities, client-oriented activities focus on members of associa-
tions. The second dimension of the typology follows Kriesi (1996) in distin-
guishing between the actors who perform these actions. To attain the goals
of the association, members can participate directly. In other cases, the con-
stituency is not directly involved and the (professional) staﬀ of associations
performs these activities on behalf of their members. Thus, associations
can perform ﬁve types of activities. One type is activities for the mainte-
nance of associations, and the four other incorporate instrumental activities.
Maintenance activities comprise recruiting members, fund-raising, and pro-
moting volunteering. Representation is policy-oriented activities in which
members do not participate directly (representation and lobby activities).
Mobilization is when associations perform policy-oriented activities with the
direct participation of the constituency (mobilizing members, advocacy ac-
tivities). Activities that are client-oriented can be performed by members
directly. In this case, these activities are deﬁned as activation (socializing,
recreational/sports, or self-help activities). If the constituency is not directly
involved in client-oriented activities, these are service activities (services to
members or to others, advisory activities, and social/local integration). Dis-
tinguishing the orientation of activities and between the actors performing
these activities, we will be able to assess whether immigrant associations
have a political function. Migrant organizations were asked whether they
had performed these activities in the last twelve months.1
The second aspect of political inclusion of migrant organizations focuses
directly on the forms of political engagement. Associations were asked about
their frequency of performing diﬀerent political activities. These activities
range from conventional types, such as sending letters to authorities or col-
lecting signatures for petitions, to more radical form of participation such as
building occupation. The focus is on the last twelve months preceding the




6.3.2 Contacts with local and regional institutions
The third dimension of political inclusion is the contacts migrant associations
have with administrations and political institutions of the receiving country.
Do associations have contacts with administration in their city, or are they
excluded from institutions? This dimension relates to the potential political
impact that migrant organizations have with local political institutions and
whether they have access to public oﬃcials and consequently have their inter-
est represented in decision-making (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008b).
Migrants were asked about their contacts with diﬀerent political institutions.
We focus here on two types of institutions.3 First, contacts with diﬀerent
departments at the city level are explored, such as the department related
to immigration and welfare and another relevant department for migrant
associations (the Department of City Development in Zurich and the De-
partment for Associations in Lyon). Contacts with the local schools, local
police, and local health centers are also considered. Finally, contacts with
political institutions at the local and regional level are examined as well as
with institutions of the country of origin.4
6.4 Resources of associations
Before looking at the political inclusion of migrant associations and their
structural location, this section will look at the resources available to as-
sociations in both cities. While networks are one type of resource that can
explain political inclusion (Fennema and Tillie, 2001; Pilati, 2011; Vermeulen
and Berger, 2008), the availability of material resources, such as participants
(Strömblad and Bengtsson, 2009) and funds is a crucial aspect for explaiing
political inclusion of associations.
Voluntary associations rely on diﬀerent type of resources for attaining
their objectives. The resource mobilization theory deﬁnes diﬀerent types of
resources that need to be mobilized for collective action to occur: moral (le-
gitimacy), cultural (conceptual tools or knowledge, newspapers, magazines),
social-organizational (relationships, networks), human (labor), and material
(money) resources (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004). We will ﬁrst examine
3Q56 in questionnaire.
4See table ?? in Appendix ?? for the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this
chapter.
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how human and material resources are distributed across cities and then
across clusters within the networks. For material resources, the share of
state funding in the associations' budgets will be considered. For human
resources, we will look at the number of members of associations. Both
resources may increase the political inclusion of associations.
The discussion about the POS in both cities showed how associations
in Lyon have better access to state funding than in Zurich (see Chapter
3). Indeed, although no speciﬁc funding is foreseen for migrant associations
in Lyon, migrant organizations can receive funds from the state if they are
active on issues related to the political and social inclusion of citizens. In
Zurich, funding is project-related, and the budget of the city devoted to mi-
grant organizations' projects is very low. Moreover, the relationship between
state funding and political activities is ambivalent. An important argument
in this regard is that associations that receive substantial subsidies from lo-
cal or national political authorities tend to become more internally oriented
towards their constituencies and abandon political activism. Another ar-
gument is that state funding increases political participation (Bloemraad,
2005).
Table 6.1 shows the distribution of state funding of associations across
cities. The diﬀerence between cities is signiﬁcant. The results conﬁrm the
access to resources for associations in both contexts. Indeed, associations
in Lyon receive more subsidies than associations in Zurich. While around
50% of migrant associations in Lyon do not get any subsidies, over 80%
of associations in Zurich do not get funded by the state. Moreover, no
association in Zurich is entirely state-funded as opposed to Lyon, where
some associations are entirely ﬁnanced by the state.
Table 6.1: Source of funding of associations in Lyon and Zurich, percentage
of state subsidies in total budget
Lyon Zurich Total
No state funding 53.7 88.6 69.7
Up to 25% 7.3 8.6 7.9
Up to 50% 22.0 2.9 13.2
Up to 75% 7.3 .0 4.0
Up to 100% 9.8 .0 5.3
Total (N) 100 (41) 100 (35) 100 (76)
Fisher's .002
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To control for the eﬀect of human and material resources on the political
inclusion of associations, we now turn to the distribution of these resources
within the networks of migrant associations in Lyon and in Zurich. Table 6.2
shows the share of state funding in associations' budgets by blocks in Lyon.
There is a signiﬁcant relationship between block membership and the share
of state funding in associations' budgets. While almost 90% of associations
in block 1 do not get any subsidies, only a few associations in block 3 do not
get funds from the state. The ﬁrst link of the chain, block 3, is the one in
which associations get more subsidies. The isolated associations (block 2)
are divided in the two extreme categories, receiving no state subsidies at all
or having their budget entirely state-funded. Finally, in block 4, half of the
associations get funds from the state and half of them do not.
Table 6.2: State funding by blocks, Lyon
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Total
No state funding 88.9 71.4 28.6 45.5 53.7
Up to 25% 11.1 .0 24.3 .0 7.3
Up to 50% .0 .0 35.7 36.4 22.0
Up to 75% .0 .0 14.3 9.1 7.3
Up to 100% .0 28.6 7.1 9.1 9.8
Total (N) 100 (9) 100 (7) 100 (14) 100(11) 100 (41)
Fisher's exact .060
In Zurich, there is no diﬀerence across blocks in state ﬁnancing (table 6.3).
Only few associations are funded by the state; almost 90% of associations in
each block do not get any funds from the state. These ﬁndings are consistent
with the policies in terms of funding of migrant associations as described in
chapter 3. Access to state funding is much easier for associations in Lyon
than in Zurich. However, the access to subsidies varies with the structural
location of associations in Lyon, but not in Zurich. Thus, if the ﬁnancial
resources of associations and their origin have an eﬀect on political inclusion,
we expect a diﬀerence in terms of political inclusion in Lyon across clusters
but not in Zurich. Indeed, while the budgets of associations in Lyon are more
state-dependent than associations in Zurich, state funding is concentrated in
speciﬁc blocks in Lyon. In Zurich, no block seem to privileged in terms of
state funding.
What about human resources? Associations in Zurich have more mem-
bers than in Lyon (table 6.4). No association in Zurich has fewer than ten
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Table 6.3: State funding by blocks Zurich
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Total
No state funding 88.2 90.0 87.5 88.6
Up to 25% 11.7 .0 12.5 8.9
Up to 50% .0 10.0 .0 2.9
Up to 75% .0 .0 .0 .0
Up to 100% .0 .0 .0 .0
Total (N) 100 (17) 100 (10) 100 (8) 100 (35)
Fisher's exact n.s.
members, and the share of associations with more than 500 members is higher
than in Lyon.
Table 6.4: Number of members of associations in Lyon and Zurich
Lyon Zurich Total
From 1-9 9.8 .0 5.8
From 10-29 15.7 2.8 10.3
From 30-99 31.4 22.2 27.6
From 100-499 19.6 36.1 26.4
500 or more 23.5 38.9 29.9
Total (N) 100 (51) 100 (36) 100 (87)
Fisher's .021
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the number of members of associations in dif-
ferent structural locations in both cities. While Lyon and Zurich diﬀer in
terms of the size of associations, there is no signiﬁcant relationship between
the number of members of associations and the structural location in any
of the cities. The size of associations varies within blocks, and no block
concentrates the biggest or the smallest associations.
Table 6.5: Members by blocks in Lyon
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Total
From 1-9 .0 44.4 .0 6.7 9.8
From 10-29 20.0 .0 29.4 6.7 15.7
From 30-99 50.0 22.2 29.4 26.7 31.4
From 100-499 20.0 11.1 17.65 26.7 19.6
500 or more 10.0 22.2 23.5 33.3 23.5
Total (N) 100 (10) 100 (9) 100 (17) 100(15) 100 (51)
Fisher's exact n.s.
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Table 6.6: Members by blocks Zurich
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Total
From 1-9 .0 8.3 .0 2.8
From 10-29 18.8 33.3 12.5 22.2
From 30-99 37.5 33.3 37.5 36.1
From 100-499 43.8 25.0 50.0 38.9
500 or more
Total (N) 100 (16) 100 (12) 100 (8) 100 (36)
Fisher's exact .n.s.
Thus, while state funding diﬀers across blocks in Lyon, no such diﬀerence
is observed in Zurich. And the number of members of associations is not
related to the structural location in both cities. State funding is concentrated
in two blocks (3 and 4) in Lyon. The next section examines the political
activities of associations.
6.5 Political activities of immigrant associations
This section focuses on the political function of associations as well as their
forms of political engagement. While the political function distinguishes
between activities that are oriented towards the constituency of associations
or the public sphere, political participation refers to the forms of political
activities of organizations. Indeed, although the function of associations can
be oriented towards the constituency, they might nevertheless be politically
active. Associations with a primary goal that is not political might also be
engaged in political activities. Does the mode of coordination of collective
action have an eﬀect on the political function of associations and the type
and level of political participation of associations?
6.5.1 Political participation in Lyon and Zurich
Associations can perform diﬀerent forms of political activities, ranging from
more conventional forms to more violent ones. Before analyzing how asso-
ciations within cities diﬀer, we ﬁrst examine the political activities of asso-
ciations between cities. Associations in Lyon and in Zurich display totally
diﬀerent political functions. With the exception of mobilization activities,
migrant organizations diﬀer on all political functions. Associations in Zurich
generally show higher levels of activities than associations in Lyon. However,
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if they diﬀer in the frequency of diﬀerent political functions, they engage in
rather similar functions. The most important functions in both cities are
related to service and activation. Thus, associations in both cities display
a similar proﬁle in terms of political function, concentrating on the service
and activation areas and being less active in the policy-oriented activities.
Table 6.7: Political function of associations in Lyon and Zurich, percentage
of yes
Lyon Zurich Total Fisher's
Maintenance
Recruiting members/donors 11.5 51.3 28.6 .000
Fund raising 7.7 33.3 18.7 .002
Promoting volunteering 34.6 51.3 41.8 .084
Activation
Socializing 57.7 76.9 65.9 .044
Recreation 34.6 51.3 41.8 .084
Self help 17.3 33.3 24.2 .065
Service
Services to members 13.5 53.9 30.8 .000
Services to others 21.2 33.3 26.4 .144
Advisory activities .0 59.0 25.3 .000
Social and local integration 38.5 59.0 47.3 .042
Representation
Interest representation 9.6 43.6 24.2 .000
Lobby 7.7 25.6 15.4 .020
Contact media 17.3 43.6 28.6 .006
Mobilization
Mobilizing members 32.7 43.6 37.4 n.s.
Advocacy 9.6 18.0 13.2 n.s.
Do we ﬁnd any diﬀerences across blocks? Table ?? reports the percent-
ages of yes responses for the activities related to the political function of
associations in Lyon. Most of these functions in Lyon do not vary signiﬁ-
cantly among structural location of associations. Indeed, while associations
in blocks vary on the type of activities in which they are active, the political
function is rather similar across blocks. The ﬁrst block, at the end of the
chain structure is active in activities related to the activation area. Most as-
sociations in this block are proposing recreational activities, socializing, and
services to their members. Associations in this block are mainly oriented
towards services to their constituencies. Associations in the second block,
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the isolated associations, also invest in services, but are also mobilizing their
members to a high extent. Nevertheless, socializing seems to be the most
important activity for these associations, which is also related to the acti-
vation function. The block at the beginning of the chain is investing more
in the activation area, such as socializing, and focuses on social and local
integration, but is also active on maintenance by promoting volunteering.
Finally, block 4, the middle link of the chain, which is also characterized by
high resource exchange and high investment in ties reﬂecting boundaries, is
active in four areas: in activation, through providing services, socializing,
social and local integration, and mobilization by mobilizing members and
maintenance. Surprisingly, the level of mobilization is highest in the isolated
block which shows a little higher investment in mobilization than associa-
tions embedded in a social movement mode of coordination. Associations
in Lyon diﬀer signiﬁcantly only on providing services to their members, but
associations in all structural locations are service organizations or focus on
mobilization of their constituencies. Interest representation activities are less
important and performed to a very small extent. This is consistent with the
ﬁndings of chapter 5, showing that associations in Lyon claim to represent
no speciﬁc group.
In Zurich, associations are more diﬀerentiated in their function across
blocks (table 6.9). Associations from the ﬁrst migration wave (block 1) fo-
cus their activities on services and activation, such as recreational activities,
socializing, advisory activities, and social and local integration. Moreover,
these associations diﬀer signiﬁcantly from other blocks on the mobilization of
members or recruitment of members or donors. This suggests that they are
mainly oriented toward their clients and have suﬃcient resources in terms of
membership so they do not have to invest much in maintenance compared
to associations in other blocks. Associations in the block of the most recent
migration wave engage in more diverse functions. Indeed, they show higher
investment than others in member mobilization and recruitment (mobiliza-
tion and maintenance), in socializing activities, and in activities related to
local and social integration (activation and service). While they invest much
in one aspect of interest representation, they do not perform any advocacy
activities as opposed to associations holding a diﬀerent structural position.
Finally, the block of religious associations shows signiﬁcantly higher invest-
ment in activities than in all three political functions. They are mobilizing
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Table 6.8: Political function of associations in Lyon
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Total Fisher's
Maintenance
Recruiting members/donors 10.0 11.1 16.7 6.7 11.5 n.s.
Fund raising 10.0 .0 16.7 .0 7.7 n.s.
Promoting volunteering 30.0 11.1 44.4 40.0 34.6 n.s.
Activation
Socializing 50.0 66.7 38.9 80.0 57.7 n.s.
Recreation 50.0 44.4 27.8 26.7 34.6 n.s.
Self help 20.0 11.1 11.1 26.7 17.3 n.s.
Service
Services to members 40.0 11.1 5.6 6.7 13.5 .080
Services to others 30.0 22.2 5.6 33.3 21.2 n.s.
Advisory activities .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 n.s.
Social and local integration 30.0 11.1 44.4 53.3 38.5 n.s.
Representation
Interest representation 20.0 11.1 11.1 .0 9.6 n.s.
Lobby .0 .0 11.1 13.3 7.7 n.s.
Contact media 10.0 11.1 22.2 20.0 17.3 n.s.
Mobilization
Mobilizing members 20.0 44.4 27.8 40.0 32.7 n.s.
Advocacy .0 11.1 11.1 13.3 9.6 n.s.
140
members to a higher extent than associations in other blocks, they are also
providing more services to their members, and ﬁnally they are very active
on advocacy.
Table 6.9: Political function of associations in Zurich
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Total Fisher's
Maintenance
Recruiting members/donors 27.8 69.2 75.0 51.3 .025
Fundraising 33.3 23.1 50.0 33.3 n.s.
Promoting volunteering 50.0 30.8 87.5 51.3 .044
Activation
Socializing 66.7 92.3 75.0 76.9 n.s.
Recreation 55.6 38.5 62.5 51.3 n.s.
Self help 16.7 46.15 50.0 33.3 n.s.
Service
Services to members 44.4 46.2 87.5 53.9 .098
Services to others 33.3 23.1 50.0 33.3 n.s.
Advisory activities 55.6 53.9 75.0 59.0 n.s.
Social and local integration 55.6 69.2 50.0 59.0 n.s.
Representation
Interest representation 27.8 61.5 50.0 43.6 n.s.
Lobby 22.2 30.8 25.0 25.6 n.s.
Contact media 33.3 53.9 50.0 43.6 n.s.
Mobilization
Mobilizing members 22.2 61.5 62.5 43.6 .049
Advocacy 16.7 .0 50.0 18.0 .017
Migrant associations in both cities are showing rather similar patterns
regarding their political functions. Associations are engaged more in client-
oriented activities, since service and activation are the most mentioned func-
tions. However, in Zurich, the political function is not absent, and associ-
ations in the blocks of more newly arrived immigrants (block 2 and 3) are
engaging more than others in mobilization activities. On the contrary, as-
sociations in Lyon engage to a much smaller extent in mobilizations and
representation activities.
However, policy-oriented activities are not absent from the spectrum of
activities of migrant organizations. Table 6.10 reports the forms of political
participation of migrant associations in Lyon and in Zurich. Associations
show similar patterns of political engagement, diﬀering only for the imple-
mentation and management of public policies. This result is quite consistent
141
with studies of collective claim-making, showing a similar presence of mi-
grants in the public sphere in France and in Switzerland Giugni and Passy
(2006). Migrant associations engage in similar forms but also to a similar ex-
tent in political activities. Do we ﬁnd diﬀerences across structural positions
of associations?
Table 6.10: Political activities of associations in Lyon and Zurich, percentage
of yes
Lyon Zurich Total Fisher's
Send letters 57.7 59.0 58.2 n.s.
Organizing press conf 46.2 46.2 46.2 n.s
Impl and manag publ. pol. 11.5 51.3 28.6 .000
Inﬂuence public opinion 36.5 38.5 37.4 n.s.
Collect sig petition 28.9 33.3 30.8 n.s.
Org. public meeting 19.2 28.1 23.1 n.s.
Org boycott 3.9 .0 2.2 n.s.
Part. building occupation 1.9 .0 1.1 ns.
Part. local TV prog 36.5 46.1 40.7 n.s.
Table 6.11 shows the forms of political activities that migrant organi-
zations perform in Lyon. The most performed activities are also the more
conventional ones such as sending letters to authorities, organizing press con-
ferences, and distributing material to inﬂuence the public opinion. Block 4,
embedded in a social movement mode of coordination, is the most active
politically. Moreover, only associations in this block engage in unconven-
tional forms of political activities such as organizing boycotts or occupying
a building. Associations in the third block show similar patterns of political
participation as associations in block 4, with the exception of boycotting and
building occupation. Block 1 and 2 show lower levels of political participa-
tion and mainly send letters to authorities or organize press conferences. As
opposed to associations in block 3 and 4, they do not implement public poli-
cies. In sum, while we ﬁnd no diﬀerence across cities, the political activities
of associations vary according to the mode of coordination of collective action
they display. The ﬁrst two blocks of the chain are better integrated politi-
cally than the last link of the chain (block 1) and the isolated associations
(block 2), which show lower levels of political participation.
The ﬁrst striking result for the political participation of associations in
Zurich (table 6.12) is that no association engages in less conventional forms
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Table 6.11: Political activities in Lyon
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Total Fisher's
Send letters 50.0 55.6 61.1 60.0 42.3 n.s.
Press conf 40.0 33.3 44.4 60.0 46.2 n.s.
Impl public policies .0 .0 11.1 26.7 11.5 n.s.
Distribution mat. inﬂuence pp 10.0 11.1 50.0 53.3 36.6 .036
Collect signature petition 20.0 11.1 22.2 53.3 28.9 n.s.
Organize public meeting 10.0 11.1 22.2 26.7 19.2 n.s.
Organize boycotts .0 .0 .0 13.3 3.9 n.s.
Participation building occupation .0 .0 .0 6.7 1.9 n.s.
Part. local TV progr. 30.0 11.1 38.9 53.3 36.5 n.s.
of participation. Indeed, no association reports having organized a boycott
or occupied a building. While all three clusters display a social movement
mode of coordination, associations do not engage in typical social movement
forms of participation. However, on all other forms of political engagement,
associations in Zurich show a little higher participation than in Lyon. Asso-
ciations in block 3 (religious associations) are less engaged politically than
associations in the other clusters, although they are the associations report-
ing engaging in policy-oriented activities to a larger extent than the others.
However, they are highly engaged in the implementation of public policies
and in organizing press conferences. The block of associations from the ﬁrst
migration wave (block 1) shows high levels of engagement in all activities
except in implementing public policies. Finally, the cluster of associations
from more recent migration waves (block 2) also implements public policies,
and a high share of associations in this block send letters to authorities and
organize public meetings.
In sum, while associations in Zurich are all embedded in social movement
mode of coordination of collective action, they do not engage in activities
such as boycotting or building occupation as opposed to associations in Lyon
engaged in the same patterns of relationships. However, they display a little
higher level of participation than associations in Lyon. In Lyon, associa-
tions embedded in the cluster of high resource exchange and ties reﬂecting
boundary deﬁnition participate more and in a broader range of activities
than associations in the other clusters. Thus, while participation is higher in
Zurich, the spectrum of political activities of migrant associations is broader
in Lyon. How are these patterns related to the network structure? Are po-
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Table 6.12: Political activities in Zurich
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Total Fisher's
Send letters 61.1 69.2 37.5 59.0 n.s.
Press conf 44.4 46.2 50.0 46.2 n.s.
Impl public policies 27.8 69.2 75.0 51.3 .025
Distribution mat. inﬂuence pp 55.6 23.1 25.0 38.5 n.s.
Collection signature petition 50.0 23.1 12.5 33.3 n.s.
Organize public meeting 38.9 30.8 .0 28.2 n.s.
Organize boycotts .0 .0 .0 .0 n.s.
Participation building occupation .0 .0 .0 .0 n.s.
Part. local TV progr. 50.0 38.5 50.0 46.2 n.s.
litical functions and activities of associations structuring the network? The
next section will explore these questions by looking at the eﬀect of the block
membership of associations on their similarity.
6.5.2 Modes of coordination of collective action and similar-
ity of participation
The analysis of political function and participation do not show strong dif-
ferences across structural location, and the diﬀerent functions of associations
and forms of participations are not concentrated in one block. However, the
characteristics of associations may aﬀect their alliance-building strategy. To
test for the eﬀect of the diﬀerent patterns of relations, in which associations
are embedded, we run an analysis of variance on their similarity on political
function and on political activities.5 In other words, it tests whether the
similarity of associations is patterned by their structural location. If the ex-
pectations on the relationship between POS and network structure are met,
we will observe diﬀerent results in the two cities under study. In Lyon, a sig-
niﬁcant relationship between the structural location of associations and their
similarity in political functions and activities is expected. In Zurich, this re-
lationship is expected not to be signiﬁcant. Indeed, because associations in
the three clusters in Zurich are embedded in similar relational patterns and
are disconnected from each other, no division of labor in terms of political ac-
tivities is expected. In Lyon, associations in diﬀerent clusters are embedded
in diﬀerent types of relationships and consequently display diﬀerent types of
5See Section 4.5 for a description of the model used for the analysis and table ?? in
Appendix ?? for the construction of the similarity matrices.
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political activities. Thus, the political inclusion of associations should vary
across relational patterns in Lyon but not in Zurich.
Table 6.13 reports the results of the analysis of variance for political par-
ticipation and political function of associations in Lyon. Both relationships
are signiﬁcant, which means that in Lyon, the embeddedness of associations
in a speciﬁc relational pattern aﬀects their similarity on political participa-
tion and political function. A positive coeﬃcient indicates that associations
in the cluster tend to be more similar, whereas a negative coeﬃcient indicates
that they tend to be dissimilar associations. The forms of political partici-
pation of associations structure the network in Lyon. But only associations
in one block select associations that are more similar in terms of forms of
participation as allies. Associations in block 3, which are embedded in an or-
ganizational type of relationship (in which organizations tend to act on their
own), are engaged in similar forms of political participation. Associations in
other blocks show no similarity in political participation.
The network is also structured by the political function in Lyon. Associ-
ations in the isolated block (block 2) and in the last link of the chain (block
1) display dissimilar political functions. In block 3, the ﬁrst link of the chain,
associations are highly similar, because the relationship is positive. These
results show that the similarity of associations in the network is patterned
by their embeddedness in diﬀerent types of relations. While associations
that are isolated from the network and those that are located in the last
link of the chain are performing very diﬀerent political activities and have
also diﬀerent political functions, associations in the ﬁrst link of the chain
(block 3) tend to be engaged in similar forms of political activities (mainly
in sending letters, organizing press conferences, and distributing material to
inﬂuence public opinion) but also have a similar political function. Associa-
tions in this block are mainly engaged in activities of maintenance of their
organizations by promoting volunteering and service activities through so-
cial and local integration. Thus, as opposed to other clusters, associations in
this block have a speciﬁc political function in the network. Block 4, which
shows the higher levels of political participation but also the more diversity
in forms of political participation, is not signiﬁcantly similar or dissimilar in
terms of political activities. No speciﬁc patterns emerge in this block. The
same goes for the political function. Associations in this block are engaged
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in activities of all types, as opposed to associations in other blocks, but no
similarity or dissimilarity can be observed in this block.
Table 6.13: Analysis of variance for political participation and function Lyon
Political participation Function of associations
Stdized Coeﬀ. Sig Stdized Coeﬀ. Sig
Intercept 0.000000 .9620 0.000000 .9994
Block 1 -0.0565574 .1888 -0.088084 .0424
Block 2 -0.067769 .1026 -0.083737 .0426
Block 3 0.233124 .0046 0.278249 .00100
Block 4 -0.026949 .4022 0.082864 .1456
Adj. R2 .065 .0200 .099 .0028
N 2652
Table 6.14 show the results for Zurich. As expected, the similarity of
associations is not patterned by their block membership. That is, in Zurich,
no block displays speciﬁc forms of political participation or any speciﬁc po-
litical function. Forms of participation as well as functions of associations
are distributed randomly within the network. SInce the network in Zurich is
fragmented along identity lines, this is probably related to a division of labor
within clusters rather as within the whole network. The similarity of blocks
relies on their identities and not on their political activities or functions.
Table 6.14: Analysis of variance for political participation and function
Zurich
Political participation Function of associations
Stdized Coeﬀ. Sig. Stdized Coeﬀ. Sig.
Intercept 0.000000 .8696 0.0000000 .9304
Block 1 0.066293 .2376 0.134675 .1082
Block 2 0.025896 .3472 -0.038890 .3612
Block 3 -0.023020 .4252 0.007175 .4010
Adj. R2 .004 .8070 .020 .4502
N 1682
In conclusion, the political inclusion of associations on the activity di-
mension varies in both cities. Associations in Zurich show slightly higher
levels of more conventional forms of participation, but as opposed to Lyon,
they do not perform contentious activities. Thus, the range of political ac-
tivities that migrant organizations perform in Lyon is broader. In Lyon, the
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block characterized by a social movement type of relationship also shows
more diversity in political functions and activities. However, while political
activities of migrant associations in Lyon are patterned by their structural
location, we ﬁnd no relationhip for the more active block. This might be due
to the diversity of functions and activities that these associations engage in.
While the forms of political activities and the political function of associa-
tions are patterned by the structural location in Lyon, no such relationship
is found in Zurich. Associations in the same cluster share an identity rather
than a function in Zurich. Finally, the division of political labor is found
within the network in Lyon but within clusters in Zurich.
6.6 Political contacts of migrant organizations
The previous section examined the political activities that organizations re-
port and their similarity across blocks. This section explores the political
contacts of migrant organizations. Migrant organizations have been found
to be politically active in both cities. However, while the type of political
activities they perform describes their political participation, it gives no in-
dication of their possibility to make their voices heard by local institutions.
To assess migrant organizations' potential political impact, this section will
look at the contacts associations have with local institutions. It ﬁrst looks at
the presence or absence of contacts with local departments and then at their
contacts with political actors (local and regional executive, local legislative
and political parties). It ﬁnally tests the hypothesis of similarity of contacts
of associations with an analysis of variance.
6.6.1 Contacts of associations in Lyon and Zurich
The ﬁrst indicator of organizations' potential political impact is their con-
tacts with the local administration. Diﬀerent departments with which mi-
grant organizations' might be in contact have been selected: the local de-
partment related to immigration, the department related to welfare, another
relevant department for migrant organizations (the Department for City De-
velopment in Zurich dealing with issues such as citizens' integration in the
planning and implementation of city development and the Department for
Social Development and Associational Life in Lyon), the local school, the
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local police and ﬁnally the local health center. The focus here is not on the
frequency of contacts, but on the presence or absence of such contacts.
We ﬁrst look at the diﬀerences in political contacts of associations be-
tween the two cities under study. The results are reported in tables 6.15 and
6.16. Associations show diﬀerent potential political impact across cities. The
department associations have the most contact with is the department re-
lated to immigration in Zurich and the department for associations in Lyon.
In Lyon, this department supports associations for project deﬁnition and
coordinates social cohesion measures of the city. The department related to
immigration is the department for integration of migrants. Associations in
Lyon have more contacts with the schools and the local health center than
associations in Zurich. This suggests that associations in Lyon are better
connected than associations in Zurich that only show high levels of contacts
with the department of integration.
Table 6.15: Contact with local administration in Lyon and Zurich, percent-
age of yes
Lyon Zurich Total Fisher's
Dpt immigration 53.9 82.1 67.8 .004
Dpt welfare 30.8 25.6 28.6 n.s.
Other relevant dpt 73.1 18.0 49.5 .000
Local school 34.6 18.0 27.5 .062
Local police 11.5 12.8 12.1 n.s.
Health center 30.8 10.3 22.0 .017
The contacts with political actors also diﬀer across cities (table 6.16).
Associations in Lyon have more contacts with the city council, the regional
government, local parliamentarians, and local political parties than their
counterparts in Zurich. They thus have more potential political impact.
Having more contacts with local authorities, the possibility to have an eﬀect
on local politics is higher. Associations in Lyon seem to be better included
politically than associations in Zurich. Indeed, they are better related to
the local administration as well as to local political actors. Thus, while
associations in Zurich show higher levels in engagement in political activities,
they have less political contacts. However, these two aspects may be related.
Indeed, the exclusion in terms of political contacts may encourage them to
engage in more political activities, since this is an alternative channel for
making their voices heard.
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Table 6.16: Contact with local political authorities in Lyon and Zurich,
percentage of yes
Lyon Zurich Total Fisher's
Local city council 51.9 23.1 39.6 .005
Regional gov 42.3 10.3 28.6 .001
Local parl 45.2 15.4 30.3 .002
Local pol part 25.0 10.3 17.7 .063
Associations in Lyon are better connected to local institutions, but do we
observe any diﬀerences across modes of coordination? In Lyon, associations
holding diﬀerent structural positions show diﬀerences in their relationships
to departments (table 6.17). As for political activities, associations in block
4 have more contacts with all departments than associations in other blocks.
The most important contacts in block 4 (social movement mode of coordina-
tion) are with the department for social development and associational life,
followed by the department related to immigration and the local schools.
Block 3, the ﬁrst link of the chain, is also in contact with the department
related to immigration and to associations. We ﬁnd a similar result as for
political activities for blocks 1 and 2. Associations in this structural location
have less contact with the diﬀerent departments than associations in other
blocks. Yet, while associations in the isolated block (2) have few contacts
with all departments, associations in block 3 display a similar level of contact
with the department of associations as the better connected blocks. In sum,
in Lyon, associations can be divided in two categories in terms of contacts
to the administration. The isolated block and the last link of the chain show
low levels of contacts, whereas the ﬁrst and middle links of the chain are
very well connected to the local administration.
Table 6.17: Contact with departments in Lyon, percentage of yes
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Total Fisher's
Dpt immig 30.0 33.3 66.7 66.7 53.9 n.s
Dpt welfare 10.0 11.1 38.9 46.7 30.8 n.s.
Dpt associations 70.0 33.3 77.8 93.3 73.1 .015
Local school 30.0 11.1 22.2 66.7 34.6 .019
Local police .0 .0 16.7 20.0 11.5 n.s.
Health center 10.0 11.1 33.3 53.3 30.8 .078
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The structural location of associations in Zurich does not seem to have
an eﬀect on the level of contacts of associations with the local administration
(see table 6.18). The department with which most of the associations in all
clusters are connected is the department related to immigration. The share
of associations having contacts with other departments is very low. Associ-
ations from the ﬁrst migration wave (block 1) have more contacts with the
department related to welfare than do associations in other blocks. The clus-
ter of more recently arrived migrants shows higher levels of contacts with the
local school and the department for city development than its counterparts.
And ﬁnally, associations in the religious block are better connected to the
local health center than other associations.
Table 6.18: Contact with departments in Zurich, percentage of yes
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Total Fisher's
Dpt related immigration 83.3 84.6 75.0 82.1 n.s.
Dpt related welfare 33.3 15.4 25.0 25.6 n.s.
City devel 16.7 23.1 12.5 18.0 n.s.
Local school 11.1 30.8 12.5 18.0 n.s.
Local police 16.7 7.7 12.5 12.8 n.s.
Health center 5.6 7.7 25.0 10.3 n.s.
Results for the distribution of contacts within clusters show diﬀerent pat-
terns in Lyon and in Zurich. In Lyon, the contact to the local administration
seems to be monopolized by one cluster. Indeed, associations in the middle
link of the chain embedded in a social movement type of relationship are
better connected to all departments than associations in other clusters. The
ﬁrst link of the chain also shows high levels of contacts. But blocks 1 and
2 are rather disconnected from the local administration. In Zurich, there
is no such relationship between the structural location of associations and
contacts to the local administration. All clusters are well connected to the
department related to immigration, but show much lower levels of contacts
with all other departments.
Turning to contacts with local political actors, we also ﬁnd a diﬀerence
between Lyon and Zurich. Tables 6.20 and 6.19 show the results for contacts
with political institutions in Lyon and Zurich, respectively. In Zurich, the
structural position of associations is not related to contacts with political
institutions, whereas in Lyon, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences across blocks.
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Indeed, we ﬁnd similar results as those for contacts with the local admin-
istration. Two clusters are better connected to political actors. In blocks
3 and 4, the levels of contacts are rather similar. But in block 4, associa-
tions have more contacts with the local parliamentarians and local political
parties, while associations in block 3 are better connected to the local city
council and the regional government. The ﬁrst link of the chain is not totally
disconnected from political institutions, as 40% of associations in this cluster
have contacts with the city council. Their contacts to other institutions are
very low, as they are for associations in the isolated block (2).
Table 6.19: Contact with political actors in Lyon, percentage of yes
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Total Fisher's
Local city council 40.0 22.2 66.7 60.0 51.9 n.s.
Regional gov 10.0 22.2 61.1 53.3 42.3 .027
Local parl 20.0 22.2 55.6 66.7 45.2 .049
Local pol part 20.0 .0 22.2 46.7 25.0 .075
In Zurich, migrant associations show much lower levels of contacts to
political institutions than in Lyon. Moreover, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence across clusters. However, associations of the recent migration waves
and Muslim associations have a little more contact to institutions than as-
sociations from the ﬁrst migration wave. In all clusters, the most important
contact of associations is the local city council. Associations in block 2 are
better connected to local parliamentarians, and associations in block 3 have
more contacts with local political parties. Nevertheless, migrant associations
in Zurich are less connected to local and regional political institutions than
in Lyon.
Table 6.20: Contacts with political institutions in Zurich, percentage of yes
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Total Fisher's
Local city council 16.7 30.8 25.0 23.1 n.s.
Regional government 5.6 15.4 12.5 10.3 n.s.
Local parliamentarians 11.1 23.1 12.5 15.4 n.s.
Local political parties 11.1 7.7 12.5 10.3 n.s.
The weight of migrant associations seems to be related to their structural
position in Lyon, but not in Zurich. In Lyon, contacts with departments
as well as with political institutions are concentrated in two blocks: the
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ﬁrst and middle links of the chain. In Zurich, ﬁrst contacts to the local
administration and political institutions are much lower than in Lyon, and we
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between the structural position of associations
and the political weight of associations. These ﬁndings suggest that migrant
associations have more weight in Lyon than in Zurich, at least a part of them.
But the low weight of associations is equally distributed across the network
in Zurich, while in Lyon, the higher political weight is limited to speciﬁc
organizations, more precisely to associations displaying a social movement
mode of coordination.
6.6.2 Modes of coordination of collective action and political
contacts
The potential political impact of migrant associations is unequally distributed
among clusters in Lyon, but is the network structured along the political
weight of associations? We run the same analysis as for the political ac-
tivities of associations on the similarity matrices of contacts with the local
administration and contacts with political institutions. The results for Lyon
are presented in table 6.21. The ﬁndings show that similarity of associations
in political contacts is patterned by their structural location in Lyon. For
the isolated block (2) and the block at the end of the chain (1), the rela-
tionship is negative for contacts with the local administration. This means
that associations in these blocks show low levels of similarity. In block 3,
associations are highly similar in their contacts to the local administration.
Finally, for block 4, there is no signiﬁcant relationship.
Results are similar for contacts with political actors. Yet, the relation is
only signiﬁcant for blocks 1 and 3. In the latter, the block membership of
associations is related to their similarity in contacts with political institu-
tions.
Table 6.22 reports the results for the political weight of associations in
Zurich. As for political activities, similarity in terms of contacts is not pat-
terned by the block membership of associations. In all blocks, contacts to
associations are rather low, and there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in their
contacts to political institutions.6
6The analysis of variance used in this chapter to test the hypothesis does not allow to
control for other variables such as the size and the source of funding of associations for
their political integration. To test for the eﬀect of these variables and check the robustness
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Table 6.21: Analysis of variance for political contacts in Lyon
Departments Political
Stdized Coeﬀ. Sig. Stdized Coeﬀ. Sig.
Intercept 0.000000 .9984 0.000000 .9938
Block 1 -0.088206 .0590 -0.103373 .0042
Block 2 -0.101664 .0162 -0.035120 .3164
Block 3 0.248061 .0040 0.184953 .0138
Block 4 0.101798 .1090 0.084726 .1322
Adj. R2 .090 .0060 .053 .0448
N 2652
Table 6.22: Analysis of variance for political contacts in Zurich
Departments Political
Stdized Coeﬀ. Sig. Stdized Coeﬀ. Sig.
Intercept 0.000000 .5490 0.000000 .1010
Block 1 0.035017 .3082 -0.078107 .1168
Block 2 -0.025979 .4278 0.028038 .2592
Block 3 -0.041523 .2088 -0.035072 .2742
Adj. R2 .003 .7692 .007 .4804
N 1682
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter explored the political inclusion of migrant organizations in Lyon
and in Zurich. Starting from the idea that the same type of relations can
provide migrants with diﬀerent resources for political inclusion following the
context, it examined the political inclusion of migrant organizations and its
relation to the modes of coordination of collective action in both cities.
of the results in this chapter other analyses have been run. Using OLS models based on
permutation for taking into account the interdependency of cases (Borgatti et al., 2002;
Hanneman and Riddle, 2005) the eﬀect of these variables has been tested. However, these
analysis follow a somewhat diﬀerent logic as it looks at the number of political activities
performed by associations as well as the number of contacts instead of their similarity
in political inclusion. Controlling for membership, source of funding, and budget it tests
the eﬀect of block membership of associations on all indicators of political inclusion used
in this chapter. The results are consistent with those presented here. Membership and
budget has no eﬀect on the level of political inclusion, neither in Lyon nor in Zurich.
In Zurich no relation is signiﬁcant, whereas in Lyon we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of state
funding on the contact of political integration, and the eﬀect of block membership remains
even when controlling for those variables.
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The political inclusion of migrant associations varies according to the
mode of coordination in which associations are embedded. Furthermore,
associations in similar modes of coordination in diﬀerent contexts show dif-
ferent levels of political inclusion, particularly on the contact dimension.
While associations show higher levels of political activities in Zurich, they
are better connected to local institutions in Lyon. In Lyon, the level of po-
litical inclusion is higher in the block displaying a social movement mode of
coordination and in its closely linked block (3). Associations in other blocks
are excluded from the political process. Not only do they show low levels
of political activities, but their range of activities is more restricted than
for associations in the more active blocks. These associations also have less
contact to political institutions as opposed to associations in the two other
blocks. The same situation of monopoly appears as for activities. The block
displaying a social movement mode of coordination is not only composed of
associations being more active than associations in other blocks, it is also in
this block that associations get more state subsidies. In chapter 4, we saw
that this block is composed of the social centers providing cultural activities,
but also after school assistance and being active in the welfare area. More-
over, as opposed to associations in other blocks, no associations in this block
are referring to ethnicity in its name.
In Lyon, the cluster showing the higher level of political inclusion has
access to the political institutions because the issues on which associations
are active and which they share are publicly recognized as legitimate. Mi-
grant organizations in Lyon are encouraged to mobilize on the basis of social
and economical exclusion, which is speciﬁcally the case of associations in
this cluster. Migrants in Lyon have access to the political process under the
condition that they do not mobilize on an ethnic or any other particularistic
identity basis. Thus, these associations in Lyon are adapting to the context
and have more resources for political inclusion than associations excluded
from that cluster. However, they monopolize the ﬁeld of immigration. The
monopoly of a small group of associations of the ﬁeld has several implica-
tions. First, some associations are excluded from the ﬁeld and from the
political process. As a consequence, some interests might not be represented
in the political process. The chain structure of the network suggests that
some of the more peripheral associations send ties to the better integrated
ones, seeking to access indirectly the resources of these associations. Despite
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the eﬀorts of local authorities in promoting associations for political and so-
cial inclusion, many associations remain excluded. This implies that some
migrant groups but also some interests remain excluded from the political
debate. Associations adapting to the context implement public policies in
the ﬁeld of immigration by providing para-municipal service, such as after
school activities or health awareness campaigns. A negative consequence of
such a conﬁguration is that these associations are controlled by the munici-
pality and that associations raising other issues than the publicly recognized,
remain excluded. A similar pattern has been observed in other French cities
(Garbaye, 2002).
In Zurich, all clusters display a social movement type of mode of coor-
dination. But the three blocks are totally disconnected from each other, as
opposed to Lyon. Being embedded in the same type of relations, the blocks
in Zurich show no diﬀerences on political inclusion. Associations' level of
political participation is rather low, they do not engage in less conventional
forms of participation and they have few political contacts, with the excep-
tion of the department for integration. While in Lyon some associations
have access the political process, in Zurich whatever their structural loca-
tion, associations are excluded from it. In Zurich, although associations are
all embedded in in a social movement mode of coordination, they have only
limited contacts with local authorities. While they are politically active,
their possibility to make their voice heard and to inﬂuence policy-making is
rather limited. Recall that associations in Zurich mainly deﬁne as immigrant
and cultural associations and that their cultural activities are mainly aimed
at preserving their culture of origin. This might also hold true for political
participation. Studies on collective claim-making of migrants in Switzer-
land show that they mobilize mainly on issues oriented to their homelands
(Giugni and Passy, 2006). This may also hold true for migrant associations'
participation. Finally, while diﬀerences in political contacts or participation
could have been expected because of the length of settlement of diﬀerent
migrant groups, it does not seem to play a role for migrant associations'
political inclusion. Thus, in Zurich the social movement type of relation in
which associations are embedded do not provide associations with the neces-
sary resources for mobilization. The POS in Zurich excludes migrants from
the political process, at least for the contact dimension, and the relational
patterns in which they are embedded reinforces this exclusion.
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This results show that being embedded in dense relations with other asso-
ciations does not necessarily favor political inclusion. The context interacts
with the network structure in aﬀecting political inclusion of migrant asso-
ciations. Associations located in clusters where resource exchange overlaps
with collective identity should have the resources to access the public sphere
as hypothesized by social movement scholars. According to the typology of
modes of coordination of collective action (Diani, 2011) associations in this
mode of coordination should show higher levels of collective mobilization
as they combine dense resource exchange with strong collective identities.
While the social movement literature pointed to the importance of collec-
tive identity for mobilization, the saliency of identities and issue interest
depends upon the political opportunity structure which has consequences
for the mobilization potential of actors. As a consequence, actors embedded
in relations combining dense resource exchange will get access to the polit-
ical process only if their identities or the issues on which they mobilize are
publicly recognized as legitimate. In sum, dense networks are not necessar-
ily a precondition for political integration of migrants as hypothesized by




Political inclusion of migrants is at the heart of a contested scholarly and
political debate. The increasing diversity of European democracies and the
exclusion of a large part of the resident population from the political process
raise questions about social cohesion and the quality of democracy. Gov-
ernments are seeking to develop and implement policies fostering migrants'
political inclusion. In this respect, migrants' associations are considered as
central actors and governments are increasingly seeking to include them in
the deﬁnition and the implementation of such policies (Morales and Ramiro,
2011). In the absence of voting rights for migrant residents, associations are
considered as an alternative for voice, as they are representing migrants and
defending their interests in the political process. Yet, the question of what
policies do a better job in fostering the political inclusion of migrants' asso-
ciations remains an open one. While scholars also addressing the political
inclusion of migrants, a growing body of literature focuses on the role that
migrants' associations play for political participation at both the individual
and the community levels. However, little is known about the conditions
favoring the political inclusion of migrants' associations.
Studies on migrants' associations tend to consider migrants' organiza-
tions as discrete units acting independently from each other. Yet, migrants'
associations do not act in a vacuum and are embedded in webs of relations
as well as in a wider political context. While the eﬀect of the context has
been analyzed with respect to the foundation and continuity of migrants'
organizations and with respect of their mobilizing potential for individuals,
only few studies looked at the network in which associations are embedded
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and at their eﬀects on political inclusion. The few available studies either
focused on the network of one speciﬁc ethnic group in diﬀerent contexts,
or looked at the network of diﬀerent migrant groups in one context. Yet,
the ﬁndings suggest that not only diﬀerent network structures provide mi-
grants' organizations with diﬀerent resources for political inclusion, but also
that the same structure may have diﬀerentiated eﬀects on political inclusion
of migrants' associations in diﬀerent context. The interaction between the
politic opportunity structure and the relational structure has to be taken into
consideration to get a better understanding of the conditions under which
migrants' associations are politically engaged. Indeed, considering only one
of the two structures might lead to wrong conclusions as to what favors the
political inclusion of associations. The objective of this study was therefore
twofold. First, it attempted to link two traditions in the social movement lit-
erature: the political opportunity theory and the relational approach. While
the eﬀect of the former on the latter has been implicitly acknowledged by
social movement scholars, it remains understudied. Second, the study aimed
at furthering our knowledge on the mechanisms linking the embeddedness of
migrants' associations in an institutional and relational context with their
political inclusion.
In this study, I drew on the social movement literature to account for the
political inclusion of migrants' organizations. More speciﬁcally, I attempted
to combine two approaches: the relational approach and the political oppor-
tunity theory. The relational approach provides useful tools for comparing
networks across contexts. Indeed, it deﬁnes a typology aiming at distin-
guishing social movements from other forms of collective action. By deﬁning
collective action as activities in which actors engage for demanding and/or
providing collective goods, it identiﬁes diﬀerent modes of coordination of
collective action. Modes of coordination refer to the mechanisms through
which resources are allocated within collectivities, but also to how collective
representations are elaborated as well as collective identities (Diani, 2011).
To deﬁne the context in which organizations are embedded and to un-
derstand how it can aﬀect network structures, I drew on the political op-
portunity theory. The political opportunity theory posits that the context,
the political opportunity structures aﬀects the action repertoire, the level of
mobilization but also the outcomes of social movements. In the ﬁeld of im-
migration, speciﬁc opportunities shape collective claim-making (Koopmans
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et al., 2005). The speciﬁc opportunities in the ﬁeld of immigration draw
on the citizenship approaches of nation-states to deﬁne the opportunities
in the ﬁeld. Two dimensions of opportunities are deﬁned: an institutional
and a cultural dimension. The ﬁrst refers to the rights and duties oﬀered
to immigrants and to the institutional channels available to them, provid-
ing access to institutional channels but also resources to actors acting in the
ﬁeld. The cultural dimension refers to the notions of citizenship and national
identity that act as discursive opportunities and provide public recognition
of diﬀerent identities in the ﬁeld.
The main argument of the present study was that the speciﬁc POS might
provide actors in a ﬁeld with diﬀerent resources, and that it publicly recog-
nizes diﬀerent identities. Further, it might shape the way in which associa-
tions in a ﬁeld exchange resources and deﬁne boundaries, i.e. deﬁne collective
identities. The speciﬁc POS was also expected to aﬀect the fragmentation of
the network. Finally, as migrant associations are embedded in POS and in
relational structures, we further claimed that these two structures interact
to account for political inclusion of migrant associations.
In this concluding chapter, I will ﬁrst summarize the main ﬁndings. Then
I will discuss the broader implications of the study and ﬁnally I will suggest
some directions for further research on migrants' political inclusion.
7.1 Main ﬁndings
Empirically, this study looked at migrants' organizational networks in two
contexts: Lyon and Zurich, which are cities that oﬀer diﬀerent speciﬁc op-
portunities to migrants. Opportunities are more open in Lyon, through the
combination of a civic approach of citizenship with a request for the assim-
ilation of migrants. Zurich displays more closed opportunities, combining
an ethnic conception of citizenship with an assimilationist approach. The
two cities distinguish also by their discursive opportunities, as the symbolic
ethnic cleavage is more salient in Zurich than in Lyon. As a consequence,
integration policies in Lyon are deﬁned in terms of political and social in-
clusion. They are not directed towards migrants but towards socially and
economically excluded populations, which are de facto migrants. In Zurich,
integration policies are speciﬁcally oriented towards foreigners. Thus, while
both cities request assimilation of migrants, in Lyon no particularistic iden-
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tities are recognized, while in Zurich migrants are deﬁned on the basis of
their national origin.
The hypotheses formulated in chapter 2 and speciﬁed in chapter 3 state
that the above mentioned diﬀerence may aﬀect not only the way migrants'
associations create alliances in the ﬁeld, but also in what type of modes of
coordination of collective action they are embedded and in the fragmentation
principles at work in the networks. In Zurich, the closed opportunities and
the deﬁnition of migrants on the basis of their national origin were expected
to favor a social movement mode of coordination. The network was also
expected to be fragmented along national lines, because of the salience of
national identities. Resource exchanges and boundary deﬁnition processes
were expected to take place within subgroups of associations from the same
origin. In Lyon, the more open opportunities were expected to favor orga-
nizational modes of coordination, with sparse resource exchange and little
investment in boundary deﬁnition processes. As no particularistic identities
are recognized in Lyon, and as the issue of integration is approached in terms
of social inclusion, the network was expected to be fragmented along func-
tional lines, that is along the activities in which association engage. Indeed,
what is publicly recognized in the ﬁeld of immigration in Lyon are areas of
activities, not speciﬁc identities. Finally, the interaction between the politi-
cal opportunity structure and the network structure were expected to aﬀect
the political inclusion of migrants' organizations, which was hypothesized to
be favored if migrant associations are embedded in modes of coordination
building on the legitimized categories in the ﬁeld. Thus, similar patterns of
relations were expected to produce diﬀerent outcomes for political inclusion
according to the context and the lines along which the network is organized.
The three empirical chapters (chapters 4, 5, and 6) reported the com-
parison between the network structure of migrant organizations in Lyon and
in Zurich and their political inclusion. Three aspects were examined. The
ﬁrst empirical chapter provided analyses of the modes of coordination of col-
lective action in both cities. The second empirical chapter focused on the
fragmentation lines of the networks. And ﬁnally, the last empirical chapter,
drew on the ﬁndings of the previous chapters and explored how the diﬀerent
modes of coordination in diﬀerent contexts aﬀect the political inclusion of
migrants' organizations.
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7.1.1 Modes of coordination in Lyon and Zurich
By comparing the overall network structures and the modes of coordination
of collective action, I found that networks vary across contexts. Results show
that in Lyon, the network is better integrated than in Zurich. A structural
equivalence analysis was applied to reduce the information about the net-
works, and revealed three diﬀerent patterns of interaction. The network is
composed of four clusters and displays a chain structure. Three clusters are
linked in a chain, and a fourth clusters is composed of mainly isolated associ-
ations. Three clusters display an organizational mode of coordination but the
middle link of the chain displays a social movement mode of coordination.
Moreover, results revealed diﬀerences in the characteristics of associations
according to the mode of coordination in which they are embedded. Indeed,
associations in an organizational mode of coordination are mainly ethnic as-
sociations. In these cluster, in contrast to associations embedded in a social
movement mode of coordination, associations refer to ethnic origin in their
names. Moreover, associations in the social movement mode are mainly ac-
tive on socio-cultural activities and are composed of many social centers,
providing assistance and activities for socially excluded, such as youth, el-
derly and disabled. As concerns Zurich, I found a network with lower density
and a diﬀerent structure than in Lyon. Three clusters were identiﬁed. These
three clusters are totally disconnected from one another, but boundary def-
inition ties overlap with resources exchanges within the blocks. In Zurich,
associations are embedded in social movement modes of coordination and
seem to be organized along the length of settlement of the diﬀerent commu-
nities. Indeed, one cluster is composed of associations from Italian, Spanish
and Tamil origin. The second block is formed by associations from more
recent migration waves (mainly from Turkey and Kosovo), and the last clus-
ter contains mainly religious associations, also from more recent migration
waves.
7.1.2 Identity and function as fragmentation principles
Results of the present work revealed that the fragmentation principles at
work in the network to vary. Looking at fragmentation along ethnic/national
lines and along functional lines partly conﬁrmed the role of the speciﬁc POS
in explaining the fragmentation principles. In Lyon, speciﬁc areas of activity
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are not concentrated in speciﬁc blocks, however, blocks diﬀer in the the fre-
quency of engaging in speciﬁc activities. Associations in the same mode of
coordination are not engaging in similar activities. The fragmentation along
functional line is not as clear as expected. However, activities of associations
do, to some extent, fragment the network. Indeed, the block embedded in
a social movement mode of coordination is engaging in more activities than
associations embedded in other blocks. In Zurich, by contrast, the network is
fragmented as it was expected. Associations from diﬀerent migration waves
are composing the blocks. I found one block composed mainly of associations
from European origin and Tamil associations, another one with associations
from more recent waves (mainly Turks and Kosovars) and ﬁnally a block
of associations from similar migration waves as the second one, but orga-
nized on a religious basis. Moreover, the network is also along the speciﬁc
group associations represent. While the network is not fragmented along
strictly national lines, it is fragmented following the waves of migration to
Switzerland.
7.1.3 The political inclusion of migrants organizations
By drawing on the ﬁndings about the network structure, I looked at the po-
litical inclusion of migrant organizations. Chapter 6 addressed the resources
available to migrants' organizations to control for the eﬀect on political in-
clusion. Political inclusion was analyzed following two dimensions: the ac-
tivities associations engage in (whether they are policy- or client-oriented,
and the forms of political activities they perform) and the political contacts
of migrants' associations (the extent to which they are in contact with local
authorities). Migrant associations display higher levels of political engage-
ment in Zurich than in Lyon. However, Lyon and Zurich similarly focus on
client-oriented activities and engage less in policy-oriented activities. More-
over, the engagement of migrants' organizations in Zurich is higher on the
diﬀerent forms of political participation than in Lyon, but the associations
do not perform any contentious political activities. It can further be pointed
out that results on political activities do not conﬁrm the initial hypothesis,
as very little diﬀerence is found between modes of coordination in both cities.
Further, the interaction of the speciﬁc POS and modes of coordination plays
a role in explaining the political contacts of associations. Indeed, associations
in a social movement mode of coordination in Lyon have more contacts with
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political institutions than associations in an organizational mode. In Zurich,
by contrast, associations have only few contacts with political institutions,
although all are embedded in a social movement mode of coordination.
These results show that the networks vary according to the context and
that the speciﬁc opportunities in the ﬁeld of immigration play a role in shap-
ing the network. In Lyon, particularistic identities are not recognized and
the issue of integration is framed in terms of social inclusion. Associations
that engage in more diverse activities and forms of political participation
are at the center of the network and serves as bridge between the diﬀer-
ent subgroups of associations. These associations have also more contacts
with authorities than associations embedded in other clusters. This pattern
suggests that the network is dominated by these associations and the other
associations are rather excluded from the local political life.
In Zurich, the assimilationist approach excludes migrants from the po-
litical sphere. Moreover, it encourages organizations on an ethnic basis but
these identities are not recognized as legitimate for intervening in the po-
litical process. The network of migrants' organizations tends to reinforce
this exclusion, as migrants' associations from diﬀerent migration waves are
totally disconnected one form another. Moreover, their political impact is
limited, as compared to that of the associations in Lyon.
Together, and by combining two approaches of social movement analy-
sis, I identiﬁed the network structures in which migrants' organizations are
embedded, and the implication of such structures for the political inclusion
of organizations. Dense networks of relations do not necessarily favors polit-
ical inclusion. Indeed, inclusion depends on the context. While associations
in Lyon, embedded in dense webs of relations, show higher levels of politi-
cal contacts than associations in other clusters but also than associations in
Zurich, migrants' organizations embedded in the same pattern of relation in
Zurich have only a limited political weight. Dense networks have a positive
eﬀect on political inclusion if the identity on which these networks are orga-
nized is salient in the context within which they are embedded. Migrants'
organizations in Lyon that are not organizing and creating alliances on the
basis of their ethnicity can draw resources from social movement modes of
coordination. This pattern is opposed to the one found in Zurich, where
a social movement mode of coordination based on ethnic identity tends to
exclude migrants.
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7.2 Broader implications of the study
What do these results tell us about the organizational ﬁeld of immigration?
Diﬀerent conclusions can be drawn. First, it shows the importance of taking
into account the relational and the political opportunity structures in which
migrants' associations are embedded. Indeed, looking at the network in the
ﬁeld gives a better understanding, not only of the conditions favoring polit-
ical inclusion of migrants' associations, but also of the mechanisms linking
the relational and institutional contexts with political inclusion. Common
mechanisms can be highlighted. Indeed, associations in both contexts adapt
to the legitimate identities in the ﬁeld in their networking strategies. Actors
embedded in a ﬁeld share deﬁnitions of social categories, and adapt in part
to these deﬁnitions when creating alliances in the ﬁeld. Not only do they
organize along these identities, but they also create strong ties with simi-
lar associations in this respect. Thus, the modes of incorporating migrants
shape the interaction patterns of associations in the ﬁeld of immigration.
Studying the ﬁeld of immigration, rather than selecting associations on
the basis of the interest in speciﬁc issues, adds to our knowledge on the con-
ditions under which migrants' associations are involved politically. Further,
considering the relational aspect shows that being embedded in the same
mode of coordination of collective action can have diﬀerent consequences for
migrants' associations as a function of the context. It remains that these
outcomes can be related to similar mechanisms: associations in a ﬁeld tend
to adapt to the rules of the ﬁeld and to the institutional deﬁnition of social
categories in the ﬁeld in their strategies of alliance-building.
The present study revealed that both the institutional and the discursive
POS aﬀect the network structure, but also the political inclusion of associ-
ations. Yet, it does not give a clearcut answer to the question of what is
the best approach to foster the political inclusion of migrants' associations.
Nevertheless, it shows that granting migrants some access to the political
process as in Lyon, can have positive eﬀects on their alliance strategies and
on their political inclusion. It also shows that some associations remain
excluded. Thus, the deﬁnition of policies aimed at encouraging political par-
ticipation of migrants' associations should not only consider the way to favor
their inclusion, but also how to avoid the exclusion of the political process
of associations. This could be done by taking into account the interaction of
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approaches of incorporating migrants and their eﬀect on alliance strategies
of associations.
The ﬁndings reported in this work also have implications for migrants'
associations, as the alliances they build might have diﬀerent outcomes ac-
cording to the institutional and speciﬁc POS in which they are embedded.
Associations willing to engage in the political process to defend their in-
terests should consider their alliance strategies according to the context in
which they are embedded. Indeed, in some contexts, some strategies are
more eﬀective, but the same strategy in another context may have negative
consequences.
7.3 Further research
While this study showed the importance to consider the interaction of speciﬁc
opportunity structures and the relational structure to better understand the
political inclusion of migrants' associations, it raises several questions leading
to suggestions about how studies of political inclusion of migrants can be
developed.
First, this study focuses on the ﬁeld of immigration by looking at the mi-
grants' organizing processes and at the links between migrants' associations.
However, the ﬁeld could be broadened to include also autochthonous associ-
ations linked to migrants' associations. Indeed, in an ethno-assimilationist
context, autochthonous associations may serve as bridges between migrants'
organizations and political authorities. In a civic assimilationist view, these
associations may also serve as bridges on issues related to the ethnic and
racial origin of migrants, as for example in issues related to discrimination.
A recent study pointed to the role that autochthonous associations play in
an ethno-assimilationist city, and it showed how autochthonous associations
serve as bridges for ethnic associations in accessing the political process (Pi-
lati, 2011).
Second, the present study shows that associations embedded in similar
position also share some characteristics, such as the type of activities in
which they are embedded or their political inclusion. However, what we do
not know is whether associations are similar because they are related to each
other, or because they send ties to actors they consider as similar. In other
words, what explains the similarity of associations in similar positions? Is
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it due to a diﬀusion mechanism, in which similar behaviors would diﬀuse
between associations, or is it due to a selection mechanism? For example, do
associations show similar patterns of political inclusion because the practice
is diﬀusing within the network, or do they collaborate because of similar
patterns of political inclusion? Disentangling diﬀusion from selection is cer-
tainly a diﬃcult task since it requires a longitudinal approach. However,
comparing network of migrants' associations over time can contribute to a
better understanding of mechanisms of political inclusion of associations.
Third, while the present study focused on the forms of participation of
associations and on their political contacts, the question of their inﬂuence in
the political process remains open. To what extent are migrants' associations
engaging in political activities and trying to defend their interests eﬃcient in
making their voice heard? Previous studies examined the political weight of
migrants' associations (Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad, 2008a), but they did
not consider the interaction of POS and the relational structure in aﬀecting
associations' chances of success. Since this interaction aﬀects their political
inclusion, it might also determine the extent to which they are heard.
These are only a few suggestions for further research. Migrant associa-
tions are embedded in complex structures that are interacting in aﬀecting
their political inclusion and this study is a ﬁrst attempt in trying to identify
some mechanisms linking these structures which calls for further research,
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A.1 Collection of institutional POS indicators
Data for the institutional indicators of the political opportunity structure
were collected on the basis of the national (and local legislation) on immi-
gration and citizenship. It has been collected in 2006. For Switzerland it is
based Information was retrieved through the analysis of national legislation
on immigration and citizenship. The indicators refer to the legislations in
2006. For comparative purposes, a 3-level scoring has been used for each in-
dicator, in addition to the narrative presentation of the indicator. The score
-1 refers to the most restrictive situation that can be envisaged, the score
1 corresponds to the most open conﬁguration and the score 0 applies to
intermediary potential situations.
A.2 List of institutional POS indicators
Table A.1: Indicators of political opportunity structure
Lyon Zurich
Individual rights
Access to the community
continued on next page
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Table A.1  continued from previous page
Lyon Zurich
Short-term permits
Automatic acquisition of the permit if
mother or father of a national minor child
1 -1
Automatic acquisition of the permit if
marriage with a national
1 1
Economic resources requirement 1 1
Link between work regime and permit
regime
1 1
Grounds for withdrawal 0 -1
Overall score short-term permit 0.8 0.2
Long-term permits
Automatic acquisition of the permit if
mother or father of a national minor child
1 -1
Automatic acquisition of the permit if
marriage with a national
1 -1
Required minimum time of habitual resi-
dence
1 0
Economic resources requirement 1 0
Grounds for withdrawal 0 0
Expulsion precluded 0 -1
Overall score long-term permits 0.7 -.05
Nationality
Eligibility for second and third generation
immigrants (jus soli)
0 -1
Marriage with a national 0 0
Required minimum time of habitual resi-
dence
1 -1
Economic resources requirement for natu-
ralization (ﬁrst generation immigrants)
-1 0
Grounds for withdrawing status -1 0
Overall score nationality -0.2 -0.4
Family reunion
continued on next page
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Lyon Zurich
Eligibility for legal residents 0 1
Economic resources requirement -1 -1
Duration of validity of permit 1 -1
Grounds for withdrawal 1 0
Right to autonomous residence permit for
partners and children reaching age of ma-
jority
1 0
Overall score family reunion 0.4 -0.2
Social and economic rights
Labor market access
Short-term permits
Access to employment -1 0
Termination of a foreigner's work contract
is a reason for revoking or refusing to re-
new his/her permit of stay
1 1
Long-term permits
Access to employment -1 1
Unemployment is a reason for revoking or
refusing to renew his/her permit of stay
1 0
Overall score labor market access 0 0.5
Welfare state access
Access to social security, social assistance
and healthcare for illegal immigrants
1 0
Access to social security, social assis-
tance and healthcare for non-nationals
with short-term permits
0 -1
Access to social security, social assis-
tance and healthcare for non-nationals
with long-term permits
1 0
Overall score welfare state access 0.7 -0.3
Anti-discrimination rights
Legislation against ethnic discriminations 1 1
continued on next page
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Lyon Zurich
Types of sanctions in case of racially dis-
criminatory hiring
1 0
Public structures dealing with ethnic dis-
criminations
1 0
Overall score anti-discrimination 1 0
Political rights
Right to vote in local elections -1 -1
Right to stand for elections -1 -1
Overall score political rights -1 -1
Individual rights score 0.3 -0.2
Cultural/group rights
Cultural requirement access com-
munity
Cultural requirements for obtaining short-
term permits
1 1
Cultural requirements for obtaining long-
term residence permits (duration of valid-
ity 5 years)
1 1
Cultural requirements for naturalization
(ﬁrst generation immigrants)
-1 -1
Overall score 0.3 0.3
Language programs
Host-country language programs for immi-
grant adults
1 1
Host-country language programs for immi-
grant children
1 1
Overall score 1.0 1.0
Schooling
Possibility of public funding for Muslim
private-owned schools (full time schools)
1 0
continued on next page
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Lyon Zurich
Possibility of public funding for other mi-
nority group private-owned schools (full
time schools)
1 0
Number of public-funded minority group
schools (full-time schools)
-1 -1
Cultural/language courses for pupils of
minority groups inside public schools
(courses on their original language and/or
culture)
1 0
Changes in public schools' curriculum to
take into account the cultural diversity of
society
-1 0
Overall score 0.0 -0.3
Religion
Religious education in public schools 0 0
Islamic religious signs in the public sector 0 1
Islamic religious signs in the private sector 0 0
Islamic breaks for praying 0 0
Cemeteries and burial according to Islamic
rite
0 1
Local public budget for mosques (building
and managing)
-1 0
Overall score -0.3 0.3
Media
Islamic religious programs in public and
state-subsidized private broadcasting (not
including cable and satellite)
0 -1
Programs in public and state-subsidized
private broadcasting (not including cable
and satellite) for other minority groups or
for the whole immigrant population
0 -1
Overall score -0.5 -1
continued on next page
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Lyon Zurich
Labor market: group rights
Aﬃrmative actions for ethnic minorities in
the private sector
0 -1
Aﬃrmative actions for ethnic minorities in
the public sector
0 -1
Measures to further the integration of for-
eigners into the labour market
0 1
Overall score 0 -0.3
Cultural/group rights score 0.1 -0.1
Local specific POS
Main responsibility for immigrants ` inte-
gration policies
-1 1
Public information and support services
for immigrants at the local level (which
inform them about their rights, the insti-
tutions to which they can address, etc.)
-1 1
Which institution (s) has(ve) the leading
role in the ﬁeld of immigrants' integration?
 Local Level
1 1
Policies related to immigrants' integration
at the local level
0 1
Is there a speciﬁc department in the local




immigrants/minority groups (for example,
in France, the Parisian Council of Non-Eu
foreigners)
-1 1
Involvement of minority/immigrant orga-
nizations in the deﬁnition of local policies
-1 0
Involvement of minority/immigrant orga-
nizations in the implementation of local
policies
-1 0
continued on next page
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Lyon Zurich
Involvement of organizations specialized in
immigration/integration issues in the def-
inition of local policies
-1 0
Involvement of organizations specialized in
immigration/integration issues in the im-
plementation of local policies
-1 0
Involvement of organizations playing a
relevant role for immigrants' integration
(such as Human rights organizations) in
the deﬁnition of local policies
-1 0
Involvement of the local power in the fund-
ing of minority/immigrants organizations
-1 0
Requirements to be able to apply for sub-
sidies
1 1
Party arrangements to favor the pres-
ence of persons with ethnic minority back-
ground in the leadership of the party  Lo-
cal level
-1 1
Party arrangements to favor the pres-
ence of persons with ethnic minority back-
ground in the party (rank-and-ﬁle mem-
bers) Local level
-1 1
Share of radical right and anti-immigrant
parties in the electoral vote  National
level: general elections Mean over the 10
past years (raw percentage)
-1 -1
Share of radical right and anti-immigrant
parties in the electoral vote  Local level:
general elections
-1 -1
Share of radical right and anti-immigrant
parties in the electoral vote  Local elec-
tions (city council)
-1 -1
continued on next page
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Lyon Zurich
Local speciﬁc POS score -0.85 0.3
Overall POS score
A.3 Collection of discursive opportunities data
Political claims analysis extends protest event analysis by including speech
acts and public discourse variables (Koopmans et al., 2005). All forms of
public claim-making are collected, this includes statements, judicial acts,
press releases, conferences, publications but also forms of protest. Moreover,
all actors are included. Any claim made in the ﬁeld of immigration and
ethnic-relation is recorded, regardless of the actor making the claim (social
movement groups, NGOs, interest groups, but also political parties, govern-
mental or state actors). For each claim the following elements have been
coded: location of the claim, actor making the claim, the form of the claim,
the addressee of the claim, the issue of the claim, but also the identity of the
object of the claim. Claims at the national as well as at the local level have
been recorded. Al claims reported in the Monday, Wednesday, and Friday
issues of Le Progrès in Lyon and Neue Zürcher Zeitung in Zurich. These
newspapers have been selected on the basis of their quality but also because




B.1 List of interviewed immigrant associations in
Lyon and Zurich
Table B.1: Interviewed migrant associations in Lyon
Name Origin Acronym
Nkam Nkam de France Cameroun A2NF
Ailleurs et autrement Mixed origin AA
Association des Assyro Chaldéens
de Lyon
Assyrian Chaldeans AACL
Amicale des Algériens en Europe Algeria AAE
Association culturelle folklorique
portugaise Estellas Do Minho
Portugal ACC Folklo
Amicale Club Franco-Malgache Madagascar ACFM
Association de la copropriété
Cervelière
Mixed, Algeria ACRC






Algériens futur Vaudais Algeria AFV
Aid Auto 69 Mixed Maghreb AidAuto
continued on next page
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Name Origin Acronym
Association des locataires du Grand
Bois
Mixed ALGB
Association amitié Afrique France
Internationale
Sub-Saharan Africa AMAFI
Alliance Morony Lyon Comoros AML
Association des Mahorais du Rhône Mayotte AMR
Association de promotion des Soma-
liens en France
Somalia APS
Association sportive et culturelle
centrafricaine
Central Africa ASCC






Association vaudaise solidaire Mixed Maghreb AVSS
Bâtir ensemble Mixed Africa BE
Cultures-Elles Mixed C-elles
Canelle Solidarité Algeria C-solidarité
Canelle et Piment Mixed C&P
Centre des cultures arabes et médi-
tarranéennes
Algeria CCAM
Clics et déclics services Algeria CDS.RA
Association des commerçants Cen-
tre Vie
Mixed Centre vie
Le collectif d'entraide et des rassem-
blement des comoriens de Lyon et
environs
Comoros Cercle
Association pour la gestion du
Grand Vire
Mixed CGV
Collectif Handicap Vaulx-en-Velin Mixed Coll-Handicap
Conﬂuence Maroc Rhône Alpes Morocco COMARA
Centre social Georges Lévy Mixed Maghreb CS Lévy
continued on next page
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Name Origin Acronym
Centre social et culturel Jean et
Joséphine Peyri
Mixed CS Peyri
Centre social le monde réel réussite
échange expériences locales
Mixed CS Réel
Cercle la Soie Rayonne Mixed CSR
Espace projets interassociatifs Algeria EPI
Football club antillais de Villeur-
banne Vaulx
Antillean FCAV
Association Frameto Mixed Frameto
Futsal de Vaulx Maghreb Futsal
Groupement Franco-comorien
d'action solidaire en direction de la
Ville d'Iconi
Comoros GFC
Horizons solidarités Cameroun Sub-saharan Africa HSC
Association Imazighen Idhourar Algeria Imazighen
La case africaine Mixed LCA
Lyon Outre Mer Antillean LOM
Lyon Villeurbanne Rhône XII Mixed LVR13
Institut Méridien Turkey Méridien
Maison de la jeunesse et de la cul-
ture de Vaulx-en-Velin
Mixed MJC
Oxygène 120 Mixed Oxygène
Roller Olympique club de Vaulx-en-
Velin
Mixed ROCVV
Sifaka Folklore Madagascar Sifaka
Thé à la menthe Algeria ThéMenthe
Vaulx premières planches Mixed VPP
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Table B.2: Interviewed migrant associations in Zurich
Name Origin
Albanisches Kulturzentrum Kosovo AKV
Associazione Valtellinesi e Valchiavenaschi Italy GVVZ
Chiesa Evangelica di Lingua Italiana Italy CELI
Circolo Lucano di Zurigo Italy CLZ
Casa Nostra de Zurich Spain CNZ
Comitato degli Italiani all'estero Italy COMIT
Circolo Trentino nel Mondo Italy CT
Federazione delle associazioni Lucane in
Svizzera
Italy FALS
FC Galatasaray Zurich Turkey FCGZ
Federazione delle Colonie Libere Italiane
in Svizzera
Italy FCLI
Gruppo Alpinistico Italiano Zurigo Italy GAIZ
Herzegowiner Kroaten in der Schweiz Croatia HKS
Istituto Tutela Assistenza Lavoratori Ital-
iani
Italy ITAL
Basketball Club Zurch Korac Serbia Montenegro KORAC
Kurdiswiss Turkey KS
Albanischer Lehrer und Elternverband Kosovo LAPSH
Demokratisch Dardanische Liga Kosovo LDD
Mision Catolica de Lengua Espagnola en
Zurich
Spain MCLE
Missione Cattolica di Lingua Italiana Italy MCLI
Mozaik Bibliotek und Begegnungsort Turkey MOZ
Russisch-orthodoxe Auferstehungskirche Russia ROAL
Stiftung Islamische Gemeinschaft Zurich Mixed Muslim SIGZ
Sri Lankan Cricket Club of Zurich Sri Lanka SLCCZ






Scuola Professionale Emigrati Italy SPE
continued on next page
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Name Origin
Secondos Plus Schweiz Mixed SPZ
Albanischer Studentenverein Kosovo STUDENTI
Swiss Tamil Kulturzentrum Zurich Sri Lanka TCCZ
Telefono de la Esperanza Spain TE
Tamil Education Service Zurich Sri Lanka TESS
Türkischer Elternverein Sihlfeld Turkey TEVS
Türkische Islamische Stiftung für die
Schweiz
Turkey TISS
Verein Albanische Bibliothek in der
Schweiz
Kosovo VABS
Verein Africa Freedom Sub-saharan Africa VAF
Vereinigung der Islamischen Organisatio-
nen in der Schweiz
Mixed Muslim VIOZ
Vereinigung der Slowaken in der Schweiz Slovakia VSS
Verein Tibeter Jugend in der Schweiz China VTJE
Frauenverein Fatima az Zahra Mixed Muslim ZAHRA
B.2 Associations in blocks
Table B.3: Associations in blocks Lyon
Block Freq. Members
1 10 LCA AACL ACTM ASEM A2NF FCAV
AMR AFM ACRC ThéMenthe
2 9 AML ACFM Sifaka Oxygène AFV ALGB
Comara ASCC GFC
3 18 ROCVV Cercle AMAFI BE Méridien
Coll-Handicap ACC folklorique Aid Auto
AVEC AAE Imazighen AVSS CDS.RA
LOM CSR LVR XIII C-Solidarité APS
4 15 AA MJC CCAM EPI CS Peyri CS Lévy
CS réel C-Elles Frameto HSC Futsal Cen-
tre Vie VPP CGV C&P
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Table B.4: Associations in blocks Zurich
Block Freq. Members
1 18 MCLI FALS CLZ ITAL MCLE TE CNZ
VAF TESS TCCZ SPZ SLCCZ FCLI AVV
GAIZ COMIT CT CELI
2 13 SPE VTJE FCGZ TEVS VSS HKS
LDD LAPSH STUDENTI MOZ KS AKV
VABS







Diﬀerent matrices are constructed for the analysis of the ﬁeld of immigra-
tion. Migrant organizations were asked diﬀerent questions about their links
to other organizations. First they were asked about their relationships to a
closed list of autochthonous organizations (Question 52, see Appendix ??)
and then about their relationships to a closed list of migrant organizations
identiﬁed through the mapping procedure (Question 53). For each type of
actors, migrant organizations were asked about 5 types of relationships: ex-
change of information, project collaboration, resource exchange, shared core
members and friendship ties. The networks of resource exchange combine
ties of information exchange, project collaboration, and resource exchange
and record whether one of these relations is present. Boundary deﬁnition
ties combine shared core members and friendship ties and also records the
presence and absence of any of these ties.
To analyze the network of relations between immigrants' associations for
each city a matrix of resource exchange and one matrix of ties reﬂecting
boundary deﬁnition were constructed. These are binary adjacency matrices
of 52X52 in Lyon and 39X39 in Zurich. These matrices are constructed on the
basis of the question on relations to a closed list of immigrant associations
(see Q53 in Appendix ??). A ﬁrst incidence matrix of NxM was created,
where N=the interviewed associations and M=the mentioned associations.
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Some of the mentioned associations couldn't be interviewed for diﬀerent
reasons. While some were not existing anymore, others could not be reached.
These associations were dropped from the matrix, so as to keep only the
interviewed associations. While this may seem to reduce the representativity
of the networks in both cities, with the exception of two associations in
Zurich, none of these associations had a higher indegree than 1 (the indegree
measures the number of times an actor receives a tie from another actor),
which means that none of these associations were considered as important
actors in the network by the interviewed associations.
C.2 Similarity matrices
To look at the relation between modes of cooperation of immigrants' associ-
ations (their structural location) and diﬀerent characteristics of immigrant
associations similarity matrices are constructed. A similarity matrix tells
whether two actors in a network are similar on selected dummy variables.
To construct a similarity matrix, we start from an incidence matrix NxM,
where N are the actors (the migrant associations) and M the variables. We
then construct the transpose of the matrix, which is created by interchanging
the rows and the columns of the original matrix (i.e. MxN). The original
matrix (NxM) is then multiplied by its transpose (MxN) to get a similarity
matrix of NxN. The values in the cells of the similarity matrix indicate the
degree of similarity of actors on the variables used for creating the original
matrix. The higher the value in the cell, the higher the similarity between
two actors on the selected variables. Table ?? lists the variables used for the
similarity matrices in Chapters 5 and 6.
Table C.1: Variables in similarity matrices
Matrix Variables Used in table
Origin of associations Africa, yes=1, no=0 5.7 and 5.8
China, yes=1, no=0
EU-15 + EEA, yes=1, no=0
East-Europe and Russia, yes=1, no=0
Indian subcontinent, yes=1, no=0
continued on next page
196
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Matrix Variables Used in table
Mixed, yes=1, no=0
Muslim, yes=1,no=0
Turkey and Middle East Muslim, yes=1,
no=0
Representation of group No speciﬁc group, yes=1, no=0 ?? and ??
National/ethnic group, yes=1, no=0
Religious group, yes=1, no=0
Other group, yes=1, no=0





New politics, yes=1, no=0
General welfare, yes=1, no=0
Group speciﬁc welfare, yes=1, no=0
















continued on next page
197
Table C.1  continued from previous page










Political function Recruiting members/donors, yes=1, no=0 6.13 and 6.14
Fundraising, yes=1, no=0
Promoting volunteering, yes=1, no=0
Socializing, yes=1, no=0
Recreation, yes=1, no=0
Self help, yes=1, no=0
Services to members, yes=1, no=0
Services to others, yes=1, no=0
Advisory activities, yes=1, no=0
Social and local integration, yes=1, no=0
Interest representation, yes=1, no=0
Lobby, yes=1, no=0
Contact media, yes=1, no=0
Mobilizing members, yes=1, no=0
Advocacy, yes=1, no=0
Political activities Send letters, yes=1, no=0 6.13 and 6.14
Press conference, yes=1, no=0
Implementation public policy, yes=1,
no=0
Mat. inﬂuence public opinion, yes=1,
no=0
Collection signature petition, yes=1, no=0
Organize public meeting, yes=1, no=0
continued on next page
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Table C.1  continued from previous page
Matrix Variables Used in table
Organize boycotts, yes=1, no=0
Building occupation, yes=1, no=0
Local T.V. program, yes=1, no=0
Contact with depart-
ments
Dpt related to immigration, yes=1, no=0 6.21 and 6.22
Dpt related to welfare, yes=1, no=0
Other relevant dpt, yes=1, no=0
Local school, yes=1, no=0
Local police, yes=1, no=0
Local health center, yes=1, no=0
Contact with political
institutions
Local City Council, yes=1, no=0 6.21 and 6.22
Regional government, yes=1, no=0
Local parliamentarians, yes=1, no=0





Table D.1: Descriptive statistics of all variables used
Mean Std. Deviation Min Max Observations
Network resource Lyon 0.038 0.276 0 1 2652
Network boundary Lyon 0.021 0.144 0 1 2652
Network resource Zurich 0.037 0.189 0 1 1482
Network boundary Zurich 0.017 0.129 0 1 1482
Chapter 5
Area of activity
Family 0.681 0.468 0 1 91
Sports 0.461 0.501 0 1 91
Culture 0.659 0.476 0 1 91
Community 0.604 0.491 0 1 91
Politics 0.153 0.362 0 1 91
New politics 0.483 0.502 0 1 91
General welfare 0.648 0.480 0 1 91
Group speciﬁc welfare 0.538 0.501 0 1 91
Economic interest 0.415 0.495 0 1 91
Religious 0.186 0.391 0 1 91
Immigration 0.626 0.486 0 1 91
Other 0.241 0.431 0 1 91
continued on next page
200
Table D.1  continued from previous page
Mean Std. Deviation Min Max Observations
Self-deﬁnition
Sports club/outdoor 0.197 0.401 0 1 91
Youth 0.208 0.408 0 1 91
Environmental 0.044 0.206 0 1 91
Animal rights 0.010 0.104 0 1 91
Peace organization 0.109 0.314 0 1 91
Humanitarian/human aid 0.296 0.459 0 1 91
Charity/social welfare 0.362 0.483 0 1 91
Patient/illness/addiction 0.087 0.284 0 1 91
For disabled 0.043 0.206 0 1 91
Retired 0.087 0.284 0 1 91
Lodge, service club 0.010 0.104 0 1 91
Political party 0.010 0.104 0 1 91
Trade union 0.021 0.147 0 1 91
Farmers' 0.010 0.104 0 1 91
Business/employers' 0.021 0.147 0 1 91
Professional 0.032 0.179 0 1 91
Parents' 0.219 0.416 0 1 91
Cultural 0.450 0.500 0 1 91
Other hobby 0.043 0.206 0 1 91
Residents'/housing 0.186 0.391 0 1 91
Immigrants' 0.307 0.464 0 1 91
Religious 0.142 0.351 0 1 91
Women's 0.120 0.327 0 1 91
Anti-racism 0.175 0.382 0 1 91
Direct action 0.043 0.206 0 1 91
Ethnic 0.164 0.373 0 1 91
Chapter 6
State funding .671 1.179 0 4 76
Members 3.643 1.181 1 5 87
Political function
Recruiting members/donors 0.285 0.454 0 1 91
Fundraising 0.186 0.391 0 1 91
continued on next page
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Mean Std. Deviation Min Max Observations
Promoting volunteering 0.417 0.495 0 1 91
Socializing 0.659 0.476 0 1 91
Recreation/sport 0.417 0.485 0 1 91
Self help 0.241 0.431 0 1 91
Service to members 0.307 0.464 0 1 91
Service to others 0.263 0.443 0 1 91
Advisory 0.252 0.436 0 1 91
Social or local integration 0.472 0.502 0 1 91
Interest representation 0.241 0.430 0 1 91
Lobby 0.153 0.362 0 1 91
Contacts with media 0.285 0.454 0 1 91
Mobilizing members 0.376 0.486 0 1 91
Advocacy 0.131 0.340 0 1 91
Political activities
Send letters 0.582 0.495 0 1 91
Organize press conf 0.461 0.501 0 1 91
Implementation p. policy 0.285 0.454 0 1 91
Inﬂuence public opinion 0.376 0.486 0 1 91
Collect sig petition 0.307 0.464 0 1 91
Org. public meeting 0.230 0.423 0 1 91
Org. boycott 0.021 0.147 0 1 91
Part. building occupation 0.010 0.104 0 1 91
Part. local TV prog 0.406 0.493 0 1 91
Contact
Dpt immigration 0.659 0.476 0 1 91
Dpt related to welfare 0.285 0.454 0 1 91
Other relevant dpt 0.494 0.502 0 1 91
Local school 0.274 0.448 0 1 91
Local police 0.120 0.327 0 1 91
Health center 0.219 0.416 0 1 91
Local city council 0.395 0.491 0 1 91
Regional government 0.285 0.454 0 1 91
Local parl 0.329 0.472 0 1 91
continued on next page
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Common Core Organisational Questionnaire 
 
LOCALMULTIDEM PROJECT 
Based on the questionnaire designed by the Multicultural 
Democracy in Europe (MDE) network 
 
Final Version (27 May. 07) 









I1. Questionnaire ID number (ES):  
I2. Questionnaire version date (ES):  















                                                      
1  THIS VERSION SIGNALS WHICH QUESTIONS ARE IDENTICAL TO THE MDE-NETWORK 
COMMON CORE (MDE), WHICH COME FROM THE SPANISH PILOT STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE 
(ES), WHICH FROM THE ITALIAN PILOT STUDY (IT), AND WHICH ARE COMPLETELY NEW 
(NEW). 
 1 
ADMINISTRATIVE VARIABLES (TO BE PRE-CODED BEFORE INTERVIEW BY FIELDWORK 
COORDINATOR) [MDE] 
 
Pre1. Date of interview (dd/mm format) : …………………………… 
 
Pre2. Year of interview (yyyy format): …………………………… 
 
Pre3: City of interview: ……………………………. 
 
Pre4: Mapping method for this organisation: 
1. Official/institutional list  
2. Informal snowball 
 
Pre5. Classification of main ethnic group of association (country-specific variable evaluated before 
interview according to document on definitions):2 
1. Autochtonous (country of residence) 
2. Ethnic group 1 (e.g. Turkish) 
3. Ethnic group 2 (e.g. Moroccan) 
4. Ethnic group 3 (e.g. Ecuadorean) 
5. Etc.    (e.g. “mixed” autochtonous-general migrants; “mixed” autochtonous-group X, “mixed” 
specific category of regional-origin migrants/ethnic minority) 
 
Pre6. Classification of association as suggested by the name (use list in q13 and enter category 
number): ……………………………. 
 





My research institute (Institute name) is conducting a research on different kinds of 
organisations in (city name). The project is part of a larger research project, undertaken in 
several European cities. 
In this project the universities of six European countries are all participating. At the 
moment, we are specifically looking at (ethnic group name) organisations, and 
organisations which often cooperate with members of the (ethnic group name) community. 
We are especially interested in learning more about the way in which (ethnic group name) 
organisations in (city name) cooperate and organise themselves in order to achieve their 
goals. We are, of course, also interested in your organisation and that is why we have 
contacted you.  
The results of the study will be used for scientific publications. Information that is provided 
will be treated confidential. 
Although we will be asking very precise questions on your organisation, we want to stress 
we are not specifically focussing on your organisation alone. It is the general picture, which 
interests us. But to get a good general picture, we need good information on individual 
organisations as well. Are you willing to participate? 
                                                      
2 THIS QUESTION IS COUNTRY-SPECIFIC, BUT SHOULD BE MEASURING ONLY ONE 
DIMENSION (ETHNIC HETERO-DEFINITION) AND NOT SEVERAL. THUS, WE CAN 
PERFECTLY ACCOMMODATE “MIXED” CATEGORIES FROM AN ETHNIC POINT OF VIEW, 
BUT NOT "CATEGORICAL" OR "SECTORIAL" (E.G. REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS, ETC.) 
DEFINITIONS BECAUSE THIS IS NOT THE MAIN FOCUS OF THIS PARTICULAR ITEM. 
RATHER, THE POINT IS TO CHECK HOW EXTERNAL (E.G. OUR) PERCEPTIONS OF THE 
ETHNIC IDENTITY OF THE GROUP MATCH OR NOT WITH SELF-DEFINITIONS OF THEIR 
ETHNIC IDENTITY. 
3  THIS INTRODUCTION CAN BE READ EITHER BEFORE DOING THE QUESTIONNAIRE OR 
WHEN THE ORGANISATION IS CONTACTED DURING THE MAPPING PROCESS, WHEN WE 
REQUEST AN INTERVIEW (USUALLY BY PHONE). 
 2 
 TYPE OF ORGANISATION 
 







2. Is there an acronym/short version of this name? [MDE] 
1. Yes 
2. No → Go to question 3 
 




3. In which year was your organisation founded? (yyyy format) [MDE] 
 
3a. Year of original foundation:  
3b. (Only if different) Year of official registration/foundation  
 
 
4. Did this organisation exist previously with a different name or with a different 
organisational composition? [MDE] 
1. Yes 
2. No → Go to question 5 
  











5. Is your association registered in any official register? [NEW] 
1. Yes  
2. No → Go to q6 
 




5b. What is the legal form under which your organisation has registered?4[NEW] 
 
1. General association 
2. Foundation 
3. Sport club 
4. Political party 
5. Religious organisation 
                                                      
4  EACH COUNTRY IS ABLE TO EXPAND THIS LIST TO ADAPT IT BETTER TO ITS LEGAL 
REGULATIONS, BUT SHOULD BE ABLE TO RECODE ALL THE LIST INTO THE COMMON 
CATEGORIES FOR COMMON ANALYSES. SEE DOCUMENT ON DEFINITIONS ABOUT 
INCLUSION IN THE STUDY ONLY IF “MEMBERSHIP-BASED”. 
 3 
6. Trade union 
7. Commerce chamber or professional guild  
8. Another, which? _______________________________ 
 
 







7. Is your association/group an umbrella organisation (e.g. a federation or confederation)? 
[MDE] 
1. Yes 
2. No → Go to question 8 
 




7b. What are the names of these organisations? [To be asked as documentation at the end if 












8. Is your organisation a member of a regional organisation or federation? [MDE] 
1. Yes 
2. No  → Go to question 9 
 
 







9. Is your organisation a member of a national organisation or federation? [MDE] 
1. Yes 
2. No  → Go to question 10 
 
 










10. Is your organisation a member of an international organisation or federation? [MDE] 
1. Yes 
2. No  → Go to question 11 
 







11.  Is your organisation a member of a network (or platform) of organisations? (E.g. 
horizontally-related network) [ES& IT] 
1. Yes 
2. No  → Go to q12 
 








12. In which of these areas is your association/group active [multiple responses possible]: 
[Interviewer: by active we mean that the organisation pursues its goals at that geographical level] 
[MDE] 
 
1. only in a part of (CITY)              →  1a. which part?: …………........…………………. 
                                                        1b. only in the local neighbourhood 
                                                        1c. other: …………........………………......…. 
2. in (CITY) in general 
3. in the (WIDER REGION/PROVINCE) 
4. in the whole (COUNTRY) 
5. in other COUNTRIES →              5a. Which countries?: ………………………… 
6. at the European Union level 
 
 
SHOW CARD 1  
13. I will now read you a list of types of associations. For each type, can you tell me if your 
organisation can be defined as such?  [MDE modified] 
[Coding instructions: before coding an organisation as “other club or association”, please check 
that it does not fit with any other category.] 
 
  YES NO 
1 Sports club or outdoor activities club 1 0 
2 Youth association (for example, scouts, youth clubs) 1 0 
3 Environmental organisation 1 0 
4 Association for animal rights /protection 1 0 
5 Peace organisation 1 0 
6 Humanitarian aid or human rights organisation 1 0 
7 Charity or social-welfare organisation 1 0 
8 Association for medical patients, specific illnesses or addictions  1 0 
9 Association for disabled 1 0 
10 Pensioners’ or retired persons’ organisation 1 0 
11 Lodge or service clubs 1 0 
12 Political party 1 0 
 5 
  YES NO 
13 Trade Union 1 0 
14 Farmers’ organisation 1 0 
15 Business or employers’ organisation 1 0 
16 Professional organisation 1 0 
17 Consumer association 1 0 
18 Parents’ association 1 0 
19 Cultural, musical, dancing or theatre society  1 0 
20 Other hobby club/society 1 0 
21 Residents’, housing or neighbourhood association 1 0 
22 Immigrants’ organisation 1 0 
23 Religious or church organisation 1 0 
24 Women’s organisation 1 0 
25 Association for war, victims, veterans, or ex-servicemen 1 0 
26 Anti-racism organization 1 0 
27 Direct action group [but difficult translation to other languages] 1 0 
28 Ethnic association  1 0 





[Note to the interviewer: IF MORE THAN ONE GO TO Q13A, OTHERWISE GO TO Q14] 
 
13a. And, of these that you have mentioned, which of the following categories best 
describes your organisation? [Interviewer: We only accept one, and please assure that always 
one is given] [NEW] 
 
[Write number in previous list]: _____ 
 
 
14. Is there an official mission statement of your organisation? It might be that you have this 
on paper. [MDE] 
 
1. Yes 
2. No  → Go to question 15 
 







15. Do you see your organisation as representing any particular group of people? 
[Note to the interviewer: If the interviewee does not understand what we mean with “representing”, 
please explain that we mean organising activities for and/or defending the interests or views of a 
specific collective or of a certain group of people] [MDE] 
 
1. Yes 
2. No  → Go to question 16 
 
 









16. Does your organisation feel close to any social or political movements? For example, 
the peace movement, the environmental movement, the feminist movement, etc. [IT] 
 
1. Yes  
2. No → go to Q17 
 
16a. (If yes) To which social or political movements do you feel close?  








17. Does your organisation feel close to religious organisations or groups? [IT] 
 
1. Yes  
2. No → go to Q18 
 
17a. (If yes) To which religious organisations or groups do you feel close?  








18. Does your organisation feel close to any (COUNTRY) political party? [IT] 
 
1. Yes  
2. No → go to Q19 
 
18a. (If yes) To which political party(ies)?   








19. I will now read you a list of contacts that may be considered important for an association 
in order to achieve its own goals. Can you please tell me if, for your organisation, each of 
these contacts are very, somewhat, not very, or not at all important? [IT] 

















1 With immigrants’ associations  1 2 3 4 99 
2 With (country) associations pro-
immigrants 
1 2 3 4 99 
3 With associations of another country   1 2 3 4 99 
4 With organisations or groups that share 
the same religion 
1 2 3 4 99 
5 With local political parties  1 2 3 4 99 
6 With national political parties 1 2 3 4 99 
 7 
7 With local trade unions 1 2 3 4 99 
8 With national trade unions 1 2 3 4 99 
9 With the national Government 1 2 3 4 99 
10 With the local government  1 2 3 4 99 
11 (When relevant) with the regional 
government 
1 2 3 4 99 
12 With EU institutions 1 2 3 4 99 
 
 
20. I will now read you a list of social issues. Can you tell me if your organisation would 
support events or activities organised around each of these issues? Would your 
organisation certainly support, maybe support, or would not support it?  [IT] 












1. In favour of equal opportunities for 
women 
1 2 3 99 
2. In favour of unmarried couples (living 
together without being married)  
1 2 3 99 
3. In favour of further rights for homosexual 
individuals 
1 2 3 99 
4. In favour of the legalisation of the 
personal use of drugs  
1 2 3 99 
5. In favour of euthanasia 1 2 3 99 
6. Against censorship of news in TV or 
newspapers 
1 2 3 99 
7. Against the death penalty 1 2 3 99 





SHOW CARD 2 
21. Please tell me in which sectors or areas has your association/group been active during 
the last 12 months: (Interviewer: several possible) [MDE] 
 
  YES NO 
1 Charity /welfare 1 0 
2 Health  1 0 
3 Disabled  1 0 
4 Pensioners, elderly 1 0 
5 Discrimination issues 1 0 
6 Religious activities 1 0 
7 Education 1 0 
8 Poverty 1 0 
9 (ethnic: to be substituted by group name) concerns 1 0 
10 Sports  1 0 
11 Youth, children 1 0 
12 Parents 1 0 
13 Culture, music, theatre, … 1 0 
14 Hobbies 1 0 
15 Research  1 0 
16 Peace 1 0 
17 Humanitarian aid 1 0 
18 Women 1 0 
19 Human rights 1 0 
20 Child care/other children’s services 1 0 
21 Community development 1 0 
22 Politics 1 0 
23 Business relations 1 0 
24 Labour relation  1 0 
25 Consumers’ interests  1 0 
26 Family  1 0 
27 Employment and training  1 0 
28 Housing  1 0 
29 Crime  1 0 
30 (Hhomosexuality) optional 1 0 
31 Issues related to immigration 1 0 
32 International cooperation 1 0 
33 Neighbourhood or local demands 1 0 




[If more than one category, ask q21a, if not go to q22] 
 
 
21a. Which sector has been most important? [MDE] 
[Please note the number of the sector (e.g. note ‘10’ if sports has been the most important sector) 
Please press the informant to choose 1 and only 1 sector.] 
 
Write number: ____ 
 
 
SHOW CARD 3 
 
22. I will now show you a card with a list of activities, can you please tell me which have 
been the most relevant activities that your organisation/group has done in the past 12 
months.  [ES] 
 9 
1. Lobby activities 7. Services to members 13. Promoting volunteering 
2. Interest representation 8. Services to others 
(individuals or organisations) 
14. Advocacy 
3. Mobilizing members 9. Advisory activities 15. Contacts with media 
4. self-help  10. Social or local integration 16. Other ____________ 
5. Recreation or sport 
activities 
11. Fund-raising  




[If more than one activity, ask q22a, if just one go to q23:] 
 
22a. Which activity has been the most important? [ES] 






SHOW CARD 4 (RESPONSE CATEGORIES) 
 
23. How frequently has your organisation engaged in the following activities in the last 2 
years? [MDE modified] 








1 Organise cultural events 
(concerts, exhibitions, 
performances, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
2 Organise social events (parties, 
meals, fairs, dances, trips, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
3 Organise intellectual events 
(lectures, debates, conferences, 
etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
4 Organise political events 
(lobbying, demonstrations, public 
meetings, strikes, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
5 Organise educational activities 
(language courses, visits to 
museums, other courses, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
6 Organise sport and leisure 
activities (competitions, fitness 
courses, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
7 Organise religious activities 
(peregrinations, collective 
prayers, bible discussion/koran 
reading, catechesis, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
 
 
[CONTINUE WITH CARD 4] 
24. And how frequently has your organisation provided any of the following services in the 
last 2 years? [NEW] 
 
 








1 Legal representation of 1 2 3 4 5 99 
 10 
immigrants  
2 Providing assistance in 
connection with the immigration 
process (legal, administrative 
help) 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
3 Providing information on other 
laws and institutions of [host 
country] 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
4 Providing assistance in housing 1 2 3 4 5 99 
5 Providing assistance in 
employment seeking 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
6 Providing assistance in access to 
the [host country] welfare system: 
health care, education  
1 2 3 4 5 99 
7 Providing financial support 1 2 3 4 5 99 
8 Providing in-kind support (e.g. 
meals, accommodation, clothes, 
etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
9 Providing translation or 
interpretation 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
 
 






SHOW CARD 5 (RESPONSE CATEGORIES) 
25. During the last 12 months, how frequently has your organisation done any of the 
following? [mark all that applies] [MDE modified] 
 
  Never 1 - 3 
times 







1 Send letters or writings to the authorities 
(allegations, appeals, petitions, denunciations, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 99 
2 Press conferences  or press releases 1 2 3 4 99 
3 Management or implementation of public programs 
(social, educational, cultural, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 99 
4 Distribution of newsletter, information notes or other 
written materials to influence public opinion 
1 2 3 4 99 
5 Collect signatures for a petition 1 2 3 4 99 
6 Organise or collaborate in the organisation of 
demonstrations and public meetings 
1 2 3 4 99 
7 Organise boycotts to products, institutions or 
countries 
1 2 3 4 99 
8 Organise or participate in the occupation of a 
building or in a “lock-up” 
1 2 3 4 99 
9 Participate in local radio or TV programmes (If yes, 
ask in which language: ………..................) 
1 2 3 4 99 
10 Participate in national radio or TV programmes (if 
yes, ask in which language: ………..................) 




26. In the last 2 years, has your organisation taken part in protest action or demonstrations 
on any of the following issues? [Mark all that applies] [MDE] 
 11 
 
  YES NO 
1 Housing 1 0 
2 War / defence 1 0 
3 International politics 1 0 
4 Political development in other countries 1 0 
5 Defence of minorities’ traditional lifestyles 1 0 
6 Quality of or access to education 1 0 
7 Racial harassment / discrimination 1 0 
8 Citizenship rights 1 0 
9 Asylum 1 0 
10 (Un) employment issues 1 0 
11 Poverty 1 0 
12 Fighting crime in local neighbourhood 1 0 
13 Fighting drugs 1 0 
14 Religious rights 1 0 
15 Police behaviour 1 0 
16 Homelessness 1 0 
17 Immigration policies 1 0 
18 Other: which? …………………………….. 1 0 
 
 
[If yes to any protest or demonstration, go to Q27, if none mentioned go to Q28] 
 
27. Could you please mention the 3 most important protest actions or demonstrations 
related with any of these issues in which your organisation has participated in the last 2 
years? [NEW] 
(Interviewer: When one event is mentioned ask:)  



















28. Does your organisation publish any of the following? [Mark all that applies. If answer is 
yes, ask:]  
28a. And in what language? [MDE] 
 
  NO YES  28a. Language 
1. Newsletter/newspaper 0 1   
2. Website 0 1   
3. Journal/review/magazine 0 1   
4. Books 0 1   
5. Local radio/television programme 0 1   
6. National radio/television programme 0 1   
 
 
29. In the last 2 years, has your organisation assisted members in: 
[MDE modified] 
  Yes No 
1. Contacts with landlords? 1 0 
 12 
2. Personal contacts with the police and the judicial system? 1 0 
3. Personal contacts with local authorities? 1 0 
4. Writing letters to authorities? 1 0 
5. Contacts with employers? 1 0 
 
 
SHOW CARD 6 (RESPONSE CATEGORIES) 
30. How often does your organization call upon ordinary members to make any of the 
following types of contributions?:  [MDE] 
  Never rarely sometimes regularly DK/NA 
1 to contact government officials on behalf of 
the [org.name] 
1 2 3 4 99 
2 to write letters to newspapers or magazines 1 2 3 4 99 
3 to sign a petition 1 2 3 4 99 
4 to boycott certain products or organisations 1 2 3 4 99 
5 to participate in demonstrations or picketings 1 2 3 4 99 
6 to participate in a strike 1 2 3 4 99 
7 to work in political candidates’ campaigns 1 2 3 4 99 
 
   
31. During the latest general elections, did your association organise or take part in any 
campaign to increase the election turnout (or to promote inscriptions in the electoral 
register)? [MDE modified] 
1. Yes 
2. No  
 
32. And during the latest local elections, did your association organise or take part in any 




2. No  
 
 
33. Has anyone in your organisation ever stood as a candidate in elections? [MDE] 
 
1. Yes 
2. No  → Go to question 35 (MEMBERSHIP) 
 
 33a. At which level? [MDE] 
 Yes No 
1. Local  1 0 
2. Regional  1 0 
3. National  1 0 
4. (Country of origin)  1 0 
 








34. Has anyone in your organisation ever been elected? [MDE] 
1 Yes 






34a. At which level? [MDE] 
 Yes No 
1. Local  1 0 
2. Regional  1 0 
3. National  1 0 
4. (Country of origin)  1 0 
 
 














MEMBERSHIP COMPOSITION  
 
 
35. SHOW CARD 7 (CATEGORIES IN ROWS) AND, IF NECESSARY, 7A (Q35B CATEGORIES)  
 
Please indicate for each category below how many persons are there in your association/ 
group. If you are the local or regional branch of a larger association we are only interested 
in your own branch and not in the larger organization. If you do not have precise figures feel 
free to use informed estimates.  
[Note to interviewer: If the organisation is a federation or confederation of other 
associations/organisations, or a foundation and does not have individual members code as  
–1 in column 35 and 35c] 
[Note to interviewer: if interviewee is unable to give an estimate in any of the rows (1-8) of Q35, 
please show card 7A and ask which category describes best (Q35b)] 
 
35c. Please also indicate the percentage of women each category consists of.  
[MDE modified] 
  35. 35b. If unable to give an estimate, which 
category describes best? 
Refuses to 
provide any 
answer to 35 
and 35b 
35c 
  Write 
figures 
here 










1 Total number of 
members  
 1 2 3 4 5 -9  
2 Active members 
(formal members who 
frequently participate in 
the activities of your 
organisation) 
 1 2 3 4 5 -9  
3 Non-member 
participants (individuals 
taking part in the 
activities of your 
organisation without 
being a formal or 
informal member) 
 1 2 3 4 5 -9  
4 Paid staff, full-time 
(approx. 30 hours/week 
or more) 
 1 2 3 4 5 -9  
5 Paid staff, part-time 
(less than 30 
hours/week) 
 1 2 3 4 5 -9  
6 Volunteers working 3 
hours or less per week 
 1 2 3 4 5 -9  
7 Volunteers working 
more than 3 hrs. per 
week 
 1 2 3 4 5 -9  
8 Clients (individuals who 
benefit directly from the 




 1 2 3 4 5 -9  
 










37. How many of your members pay a membership fee? [MDE] 
 
1. All of them or almost all of them 
2. Some of them 
3. Very few or nobody 
4. We don’t have a membership fee 
 
38. How many members have joined the association in the last 12 months? Estimations are 
also valid. [MDE] 




39. How many members have left the association in the last 12 months? Estimations are 
also valid. [MDE] 





[Note to interviewer: Ask only if organisation has volunteers in Q35/Q35b, otherwise go to Q42]   
 
40. What about volunteers, how many volunteers have joined the association in the last 12 
months? Estimations are also valid. [NEW] 





41. And how many volunteers have left the association in the last 12 months? Estimations 
are also valid. [NEW] 






42. What was the activity organized by your organization in the last 12 months, that 






43. Suppose your organization has a very important activity, to which maximum 





44. How many children or young persons under 18 years would you estimate take part in 






SHOW CARD 8 (RESPONSE CATEGORIES) 
 
45. Of all your members, what percentage is part of each of these social groups?  
[MDE modified] 























1 Children or young persons 
under 16 
1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
2 Young people (16-30) 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
3 Mature adults (31-64) 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
4 Retired people (or 65 
years +) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
5 (Ethnic group 1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
6 (Ethnic group 2) 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
7 (Ethnic group 3) 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
8 (country nationals) 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
9 (main religious group in 
survey country) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
10 (main religious group of 
ethnic group) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
11 Newcomers to the country 
(last 5 years) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
 
[Note to interviewer: Ask Q46 only if organisation has paid staff in Q35/Q35b, otherwise go to Q47] 
 
46. And what about your paid staff, of all your paid staff, what percentage is part of each of 
these social groups? [NEW] 























1 Children or young persons 
under 16 
1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
2 Young people (16-30) 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
3 Mature adults (31-64) 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
4 Retired people (or 65 
years +) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
5 (Ethnic group 1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
6 (Ethnic group 2) 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
7 (Ethnic group 3) 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
8 (country nationals) 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
9 (main religious group in 
survey country) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
10 (main religious group of 
ethnic group) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
11 Newcomers to the country 
(last 5 years) 





[Note to interviewer: don’t ask question 47 to interviewee, reply yourself and then follow 
instructions] 
 
47. Interviewer: is ethnic group language different to country language? [MDE] 
 
1. Yes   → Go to question 48 




SHOW CARD 9 (RESPONSE CATEGORIES) 
48. In what language do you generally conduct the following activities of the association? 
[MDE] 
























1 Regular activities 1 2 3 4 5 99 
2 Membership meetings 1 2 3 4 5 99 
3 Correspondence with 
members or participants 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
4 Correspondence with 
external contacts 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
5 Board meetings 1 2 3 4 5 99 
6 Announcement of 
activities 
1 2 3 4 5 99 




49. How many of the participants in your activities cannot speak (the language of the 





[Note to interviewer: Ask Q50 only if organisation has paid staff in Q35, otherwise go to Q51] 
 
 
50. And how many of the the members of your paid staff cannot speak (the language of the 








RELATIONS TO OTHER ORGANISATIONS, ETHNIC AND NON-
ETHNIC 
 
51. Could you tell me the name of the local (country of residence) and 
(ethnic/immigrants/nationality/etc. ) associations you have had most frequent contact with 
in the last 2 years? [MDE] 














SHOW CARD 10 (LIST OF ORGANISATIONS) 
(Specific list designed within national teams. For each row, national teams will have to add 2-5 
specific organisations that suit the general category of the row.) 
 
I would like to present you now a list of other (country of residence) associations and 
organisations that work in this city.  
 
52a. First, could you tell me with which of these have you had any meetings, consultations 
or exchange of information in the last 2 years? [MDE modified] 
 
52b. Secondly, could you tell me with which of these have you collaborated in projects or 
events in the last 2 years? [MDE modified & IT] 
 
52c. Thirdly, do you share resources (meeting spaces, postal address, phone, fax, etc.) with 
any of these organisations? [MDE modified & IT] 5 
 
52d. Does your organisation have personal links with any of these organisations through 
individual members? [IT] 
 
52e. And do you share leaders with any of these organisations? [IT] 
 
52f. Finally, with regard to this list, could you tell me with which of these would you say that 
your organisation has major disagreements?[NEW] 
 
 

























1 Main political 




      
                                                      
5  QUESTIONS 52B & 52C ARE MEANT TO BE A SPECIFICATION OF THE “COOPERATION” 
CATEGORY OF THE ORIGINAL MDE VERSION.  
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2 Main trade 
unions in city 




      
4 Main peace 
organisations 
      
5 Main human 
rights 
organisations 




      





      








      
11 Main religious 
associations 
      
12 Sufficient 




not included in 
the list 




SHOW CARD 11 (LIST OF ORGANISATIONS) 
(Specific list designed within national teams.) 
 
I would like to present you now a list of other [ethnic/immigrant/nationality] associations 
and organisations that work in this city.  
 
53a. First, could you tell me with which of these have you had any meetings, consultations 
or exchange of information in the last 2 years? [MDE modified] 
 
53b. Secondly, could you tell me with which of these have you collaborated in projects or 
events in the last 2 years? [MDE modified & IT] 
 
53c. Thirdly, do you share resources (meeting spaces, postal address, phone, fax, etc.) with 
any of these organisations? [MDE modified & IT] 
 
53d. Does your organisation have personal links with any of these organisations through 
individual members? [IT] 
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53e. And do you share leaders with any of these organisations? [IT] 
 
53f. Finally, with regard to this list, could you tell me with which of these would you say that 
your organisation has major disagreements? 
 
 
































      
2        
3        
4        
5        
6        
7        
8        
9        
10        
11        
12        
ETC.         
 
 
54. Do you have any contacts with organisations that are based and operate in [homeland 
country]? What are the names of these organisations? (Up to 5 possible) [MDE modified] 
 
1. 
2.   
3.   





55. Do you have any contacts with organisations that operate on an international level? 
What are the names of these organisations? (Up to 5 possible) [MDE modified] 
[If respondent asks we are interested in knowing about any organisation operating outside of (host 
country) and of (homeland country)] 
1. 
2.   
3.   






CONTACTS WITH POLITICIANS AND AUTHORITIES 
 
The next set of questions is about contacts of your organisation with public administrations 
and/or politicians. 
 
SHOW CARD 12 (with list only) 
(Specific list designed within national teams. For each row, national teams will have to add the 
names of the institutions that suit the general category of the row.) 
  
56. During the last 2 years, did your association/group have contact with any of these 
institutions and representatives? 
[When interviewee mentions one, ask:] Was this contact occasional or regular?  [MDE] 
 






DK / NA 
Municipal administration or local officials of:     
- [institution 1: department related to immigrants 
issues] 
0 1 2 9 
- [institution 2: department related to welfare 
issues] 
0 1 2 9 
- [institution 3: other department relevant] 0 1 2 9 
- Local school 0 1 2 9 
- Local police 0 1 2 9 
- Local health centre 0 1 2 9 
The city council [executive body] or members of 
the council 
0 1 2 9 
Local parliament/assembly or local 
parliamentarians of:  
    
- [Parliamentarians of X party] 0 1 2 9 
- [Parliamentarians of Y party] 0 1 2 9 
- [Parliamentarians of Z party] (fill in as many as 
needed) 
0 1 2 9 
Local political parties or politicians of:     
- Party 1 0 1 2 9 
- Party 2 0 1 2 9 
- Party 3 (fill in as many as needed) 0 1 2 9 
Provincial administration [if it exists] or 
officials of: 
    
- [institution 1] 0 1 2 9 
- [institution 2] 0 1 2 9 
- [institution 3] 0 1 2 9 
Regional administration [if it exists] or officials 
of:  
    
- [institution 1] 0 1 2 9 
- [institution 2] 0 1 2 9 
- [institution 3] 0 1 2 9 
Regional government or members of the regional 
government 
0 1 2 9 
Regional assembly or regional MPs of:      
- [Parliamentarians of X party] 0 1 2 9 
- [Parliamentarians of Y party] 0 1 2 9 
- [Parliamentarians of Z party] (fill in as many as 
needed) 
0 1 2 9 
Regional political parties or politicians of: 
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DK / NA 
- [ X party] 0 1 2 9 
- [Y party] 0 1 2 9 
- [Z party] (fill in as many as needed) 0 1 2 9 
National administration or officials of: 
 
    
- [institution 1] 0 1 2 9 
- [institution 2] 0 1 2 9 
- [institution 3] 0 1 2 9 
National government or members of the national 
government 
0 1 2 9 
National parliament (Lower Chamber) or 
national MPs of: 
    
- [Parliamentarians of X party] 0 1 2 9 
- [Parliamentarians of Y party] 0 1 2 9 
- [Parliamentarians of Z party] (fill in as many as 
needed) 
0 1 2 9 
National political parties or politicians of:      
- [ X party] 0 1 2 9 
- [Y party] 0 1 2 9 
- [Z party] (fill in as many as needed) 0 1 2 9 
National or regional Trade unions  0 1 2 9 
European institutions 0 1 2 9 
Administration or officials of (country of origin) 0 1 2 9 
Political parties or politicians of (country of origin) 0 1 2 9 
 
 
SHOW CARD 13 (with list only) 
57. In the last 2 years, has your organisation been called to participate in decision-making 
processes in any of the following ways?  
57a. [Interviewer: Only when interviewee mentions one, ask:] Did your organisation finally 
participate? [MDE] 




  YES NO YES NO 
 Local level     
1 As a permanent member of the district or 
neighbourhood council 
1 0 1 0 
2 As a permanent member of a municipal council on 
specific issues (social services, women, education, 
etc.) 
1 0 1 0 
3 An occasional invitation to participate in a municipal 
committee to solve a specific problem 
1 0 1 0 
4 To join a municipal consultation committee or group 
for a specific policy or issue 
1 0 1 0 
 Regional level (when applicable)     
5 As a permanent member of a regional council on 
specific issues social services, women, education, 
etc.) 
1 0 1 0 
6 An occasional invitation to participate in a regional 
committee to solve a specific problem 
1 0 1 0 
7 To join a regional consultation committee or group for 1 0 1 0 
 23 




  YES NO YES NO 
a specific policy or issue 
 National level     
8 As a permanent member of a national council on 
specific issues (social services, women, education, 
etc.) 
1 0 1 0 
9 An occasional invitation to participate in a national 
committee to solve a specific problem 
1 0 1 0 
10 To join a national consultation committee or group for 
a specific policy or issue 
1 0 1 0 
 
 
[SHOW CARD 14] 
 
58. Regardless of whether you ever get invitations to participate in decision-making 
processes, does your organisation get official information concerning the decision-making 
processes on questions relevant for your organisation from any of these authorities? [NEW] 
 












1. District or neighbourhood council or government 1 2 3 
2. Local/municipality council or government 1 2 3 
3. Regional council or government 1 2 3 




SHOW CARD 15 (with list only) 
 
59. Has your organisation in the last 2 years had contact with any of these representatives 
of public authorities and institutions? [MDE] 
59a. Would, if necessary and urgent, someone of your organisation be able to arrange a 
meeting with any of these types of people within two or three days?  [MDE modified] 
59b. Has anyone in your organisation arranged a meeting with any of these types of people 
within two or three days? [MDE modified] 
 








1 Office of mayor  1  1  1 
2 (Office responsible) of police  1  1  1 
3 Ambassador or consul of (country of origin)  1  1  1 
4 Highest representatives of your religion at city  1  1  1 
5 TV-journalist from local TV  1  1  1 
6 TV-journalist from national TV  1  1  1 
7 TV-journalist from homeland TV  1  1  1 
8 Journalist of local newspaper  1  1  1 
9 Journalist of national newpaper  1  1  1 






SIZE AND FACILITIES 
 





60a. Is it shared with other organisations?  [MDE] 
 




60b. Does your organisation own it? [MDE] 
 
1. Yes → Go to Q61 
2. No  
 
 





60d. Do you rent it? [MDE] 
 
1. Yes 
2. No  
 
 
61. Does your organisation use a different space for its regular activities?  [MDE] 
 
1. Yes 
2. No → Go to Q62 
 





61b. Is it shared with other organisations?  [MDE] 
 




61c. Does your organisation own it?  [MDE] 
 
1. Yes → Go to Q62 
2. No  
 




61e. Do you rent it? [MDE] 
 
1. Yes 




62. Which of the following does your organisation have? (Mark all that applies) [MDE] 
  No Yes  (If Yes) 
1. Its own phone number  0 1 → Which? ___________________________________ 
2. Its own postal address 0 1  
3. Its own computers  0 1  
4. Its own internet connection 0 1  
5. Its own email address 0 1 → Which? __________________________________ 
6. Its own fax machine and fax number 0 1  







63. Does your association have…? (Interviewer: Read out rows) 
63a. [If yes in 1 and/or 5 ask :] How often does it meet? SHOW CARD 16 (FREQUENCY 
CATEGORIES of 63a  FOR 1 & 5 ONLY) 
[MDE] 
  No Yes  63a. How often does it meet? 







1. A board 0 1  1 2 3 4 5 
2. A chair person 0 1       
3. A secretary 0 1       
4. A treasurer 0 1       
5. A general assembly 0 1  1 2 3 4 5 
6. A written constitution 
(ask copy) 
0 1       
7. Committees or work 
groups for specific 
issues 
0 1       
   
[INTERVIEWER: If organisation does not have a general assembly → Go to question 65] 
 




[INTERVIEWER: If oganisation does not have a board → Go to next section on FINANCES] 
  











66a. (Ask only if category applicable in Country): How many deputy members are there in 








67a. (Ask only if category applicable in Country): And, how many deputy board members 









68a. (Ask only if category applicable in Country): And, how many deputy board members 









69a. (Ask only if category applicable in Country): And, how many deputy board members 





















[Interviewer: If refusal to respond code as –9, if he/she doesn’t know code as –8. In Both cases, 
ask Q71a] 
 
SHOW CARD 17 
71a. If you don’t know the precise budget, do you know in what range it is? 6  [MDE] 
 
1. Less than € 1,000 
2. Between € 1,000 and € 2,499 
3. Between € 2,500 and € 4,999 
4. Between € 5,000 and € 9,999 
5. Between € 10,000 and € 49,999 
6. Between € 50,000 and € 99,999 
7. Between €100,000 and € 149,999 
8. Between € 150,000 and € 199,999 





SHOW CARD 18 
 
72. Could you tell us what your budget is made of? If possible, please give me the 
approximate figure in (EURO). [MDE] 
(If DK or REFUSAL in Q72) 72a. Could you provide us, at least, with an estimation of the 
share of each category in your overall budget.  [MDE] 
[Interviewer: for percentages, please make sure that the sum of all categories mentioned adds up 
to 100%] 
 
  72. EURO 72a. % of total 
budget 
  Gives 
figures 
(write) 





1 Returns from the sales of goods or 
services 
 -9   -9 
2 Returns from events or campaigns for 
funds raising 
 -9   -9 
3 Membership fees  -9   -9 
4 Donations from individuals  -9   -9 
5 Sponsoring from companies/firms  -9   -9 
6 Finance from federation or umbrella 
organization 
 -9   -9 
7 Grant from city district  -9   -9 
8 Grant from municipality  -9   -9 
9 Grant from regional government  -9   -9 
10 Grant from national government  -9   -9 
11 Grant from European Union  -9   -9 
                                                      
6  TEAMS WITH CURRENCY DIFFERENT TO EURO, SHOULD USE THEIR OWN CURRENCY 
BUT IN RANGES STRICTLY EQUIVALENT TO THESE ONCE THE EXCHANGE RATE IS 
APPLIED. 
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12 Grant from (country of origin) 
government 
 -9   -9 




THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND COLLABORATION. 
 




POS1. Time questionnaire ends (hh:mm format):  _ _ : _ _   [MDE] 
 
 
Materials to obtain just after the questionnaire interview: 
 
1. If informant answered in question 8 that this is a umbrella organisation, ask for the list of 
organisations that are members of this federation/confederation and fill in question 8. 
2. Written constitution/statutes/regulation 




POS2. Time complete interview ends (hh:mm format):  _ _ : _ _    [MDE] 
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FINAL SECTION, questions to the interviewer 
 
This section is to be filled in by the interviewer inmediately after he/she has left the place 
where the interview has taken place. 
 




POS4. Ethnic origin of interviewer  [MDE] 
……………………………………………………….. 
 
POS5. Language of interview  [MDE] 
………………………………………………………… 
 
POS6. Please describe the attitude of the informant during the interview  [MDE] 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
POS7. Has the informant used  written materials and documentation to answer questions 1 








POS9. Please rate the level of informedness of the informant  [MDE] 
1. Very well informed 
2. Fairly informed 
3. Not very well informed 
4. Very badly informed 
 








POS12. Could you please provide a general evaluation of how the informant’s responses 
match what  you could see during the course of the interview?  [MDE] 
1. Responses by the informant were generally in accordance with what I could observe 
2. Responses were sometimes in accordance and sometimes not 
3. Responses were generally in disagreement with what I could observe 
 
POS13. Classification of main ethnic group of association (evaluated after interview 
according to document on definitions):  7  [MDE] 
1. Autochtonous (country of residence) 
2. Turkish 
3. Ethnic group 2 (e.g. Moroccan) 
4. Ethnic group 3 (e.g. Ecuatorian) 
5. Etc 
                                                      
7 USE THE SAME CATEGORIES THAN FOR QUESTION PRE5 AT THE BEGINNING OF 
QUESTIONNAIRE. 
